Arguing by Intuition, Part 1

(The following is an edited response to an inquiry on the topic.)

Let me say something about arguing by intuition.

Gregory E. Ganssle recently published a book called Thinking about God. In one chapter, he explains freedom and determinism, and concludes by stating that he favors "libertarian free will." Note how he argues (p. 136-137):

Now, why should you agree with me about the nature of human freedom? Let me give you two reasons. First, it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him. If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.

Second, libertarian free will makes the most sense of our deliberation. We often find ourselves deliberating between alternatives, and we are convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome. The decision we come to, upon deliberating, seems to be up to us. If freedom is not of the libertarian kind, then deliberation does not make as much sense. Thus, libertarian freedom is the better concept of freedom, and compatibilist freedom is no freedom at all.

This is terrible, terrible! I feel dirty just for typing it. There are numerous falsehoods and fallacies in these two paragraphs (my books have already addressed all of them), but I will deal with only those words that are relevant to our topic, which is intuition.

Note the words that I have highlighted in red. If we were to debate the issue of human freedom, or Calvinism vs. Arminianism, is Ganssle going to come at me with "seems strange," "we are convinced," and "seems to be"? I can just as readily say it "seems right," "I am not convinced, and "seems not to be"! Well, he is convinced of the premises that seems to him as true, but I can be just as convinced of the opposite.

Once you mix "seems like" as an essential part of your argument (instead of a non-essential part of your presentation, such as in a mere illustration), you have departed from the realm of strict rational argumentation. Also, you have just lost the right to forbid your opponent from using exactly the same argument, and to him it "seems like" that you are wrong.

When it comes to Calvinism vs. Arminianism, you may have heard something like, "If God is absolutely sovereign, then he controls even our decisions, and in this sense we do not have freedom or free will, but we sense (we are convinced, we feel, we think, it seems like, etc.) that we do have freedom or free will in our daily activities; therefore, Calvinism must be wrong." My response is that I sense or intuit, or it seems to me, that this person is an idiot; therefore, he is an idiot.

If he disagrees with my intuition, then why do I have to agree with his? If he tells me that I do not really sense or intuit that he is an idiot, then I can just as readily tell him that he does not really sense or intuit freedom. That is, if he can claim to know what is really going on in my mind, then I can just as readily claim to know what is really going on in his mind.

He is claiming to know what we all intuit. Among other things, he says:

1. I intuitively hold to a standard of ethics such that "it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him,"
2. I am "convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome," and
3. The decision that I come to, upon deliberating, "seems [to me] to be" up to me.

However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, if he can claim to know what I intuitively affirm in my own mind, then why can't I also claim to know what he intuitively affirms in his mind? Thus I affirm that "we are convinced" that he is wrong, and that he "seems to be" quite confused and arbitrary. Unless he stops arguing by intuition as he does, he cannot with consistency reject my claims.

So the whole thing amounts to purely subjective nonsense.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation
Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Now part of Christian Philosophy)
(See www.monergismbooks.com)