Arguing by Intuition, Part 2

Continuing from "Arguing by Intuition, Part 1," we have been discussing the problems with basing the premises of our arguments on intuition, and we cited an example from Gregory E. Ganssle.

When debating Arminians, or when reading their literature, you will notice that many of them base a number of their crucial premises on intuition, and often on intuition alone. Ganssle's pattern of argument is very common with them — they just assume that their needed premises are true because to them they seem to be true. They say that they are convinced that these premises are true (often they say that we are all convinced), and then they proceed on that basis. One of these premises is that we all seem to have free will; another is that it would seem unjust to hold someone morally accountable who does not have free will. At least in these instances, their ultimate standard of truth and morality is not God's revelation but their own intuition. Their "seems like" seems unquestionable to them.

However, all the "seems like" could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don't know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone.

Many atheists also argue this way. For example, since they reject revelation, they cannot depend on it as a foundation for ethics. Then, when they turn to sensation, those who are less stupid realize that they cannot derive anything from sensation. Thus some turn to intuition, and claim that by it they know certain ethical principles. But other than the problems already mentioned (that intuition is subjective, non-universal, fallible, etc.), why must we obey intuition?

It is most unfortunate that many Reformed/Calvinistic writers also appeal to intuition to construct their arguments and their systems. When they do this, it is often because they are trying to assert some of the very same ideas and premises that the Arminians and the atheists affirm, such as unbiblical concepts of freedom and justice. But since these false premises cannot really be derived from biblical revelation, and since we can derive nothing at all from sensation, they take refuge in intuition. However, as we have shown, this is to banish themselves to subjectivism and irrelevance, and when Reformed/Calvinistic writers do this, they are being inconsistent with their otherwise biblical and rational theology.

One example is William G. T. Shedd. Although he is to be highly commended for being one of the least empirical among theologians, he fails to depend solely on divine revelation. Rather, appeals to intuition pervade his Dogmatic Theology, and he does this to establish premises and principles that in fact only Arminians should affirm, and that only Arminians need, such as a version of free will and an unbiblical basis for moral accountability.

As Reformed/Calvinistic Christians — as Christians whose views on God, man, and salvation are truly biblical — we must not and need not appeal to sensation or intuition, which can only lead to irrationalism and self-contradictory skepticism. Rather, we must cling to God's written revelation, which alone comes from Logos, the Reason of God, and which alone can save us and those who hear us.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation
Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Now part of Christian Philosophy)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
(See www.monergismbooks.com)