Arguing by Intuition, Part 3
I originally planned to address only the problems with basing one's arguments on intuition. The quote from Ganssle has provided us with a good example. However, in it he also brings up several points that are not directly connected with intuition, but are nevertheless problematic. So we will point them out before we move on to something else.
We will first turn our attention to the following statements:
If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.
First, let us acknowledge that Ganssle is not trying to construct a detailed case for his position in this portion of his book; it represents only a summary of his reasons for his position on freedom. However, this does not prevent us from criticizing what he has written, since he provides enough information here to tell us what kind of arguments he considers as valid rational support for his position.
Unless he completely changes the direction of his whole presentation, then even if given the time and space to elaborate, he would still argue his case using the same type of arguments. That is, even if given the time and space, he could give us only a more detailed version of the same fallacious thinking.
(Just before I put the following criticisms into writing, I carefully checked his book again, and paid special attention to the chapter in which these statements appear. Ganssle does try to provide more details and arguments in the prior pages. However, nothing that he says can serve to fend off the criticisms below. Readers who wish to verify this can check p. 129-137 of his book. An upcoming revised version of this series of articles will provide additional comments and documentations in the footnotes.)
In order to treat his points in some detail, we will deal with each of these statements individually.
"If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it."
This statement is so ambiguous that it is hard to know what to do with it. In particular, the crucial expression, "up to" is undefined. Depending on what he means, the expression can refer to anything from a volitional freedom relative to other creatures or a volitional freedom relative to God himself, which is absolute freedom.
Now, it appears that the language demands the latter interpretation. For one's action to be "up to" himself is contrasted with "determinism." The context of the book suggests that the "determinism" here is inclusive of, if not restricted to, divine determinism, or the idea that it is God who determines all things, including all human decisions. That is, if one's action is "up to" himself, then it is not determined by God.
But if this is true, then Ganssle is no longer talking about the God of the Bible. At this point, I must refer you to my previous works for detailed explanations on this subject. In any case, the expression "up to" remains ambiguous.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Malachi
Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil"
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
Arthur Pink, The Sovereignty of God
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
March 14 2005 | Apologetics, Philosophy, Theology