We are continuing our analysis of Ganssle's statements. Today we will examine the following: "Yet we do hold each other morally responsible."

To understand this statement, and to perceive what is so wrong about it, we need read it in the context of the entire paragraph. So here it is again:

If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.

To simplify the argument, we may paraphrase it as follows: "If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible. But we do hold each other morally responsible. Therefore, determinism is false." Even assuming we agree that "we do hold each other morally responsible," Ganssle says nothing to establish that this is in fact the right thing to do. Just because we do something does not mean that it is necessarily the right thing to do. Maybe we are wrong in holding each other morally responsible.

Note that the argument is supposed to show that determinism is false, and not to merely make sense of holding each other morally responsible. That is, the function of the argument is not just to explain something that we do, but that might be either right or wrong. Rather, the argument intends to refute determinism, and to do that, it depends on the premise "we do hold each other morally responsible," and on the assumption that this is the right thing to do. As it stands, the best that this argument can do is to explain why Ganssle and others like him would want determinism to be false! They want determinism to be false because they want to explain why they hold each other morally responsible. In other words, according to this argument, in order to justify what we do (whether what we do is right or not), we must reject determinism (whether determinism is in fact true or not). The argument is purely pragmatic, not rational.

Besides failing to establish that we should hold each other morally responsible in the first place, we have already pointed out that Ganssle also fails to establish the previous premises, especially the one claiming that if an action is not "up to" us, then we are not morally responsible for it. Thus what he intends to be a rational explanation for affirming "libertarian free will" turns out to be incomprehensible chaos.

In contrast, the biblical position is that God has revealed his moral laws to us, and he has declared that he will hold us accountable according to those laws. Then, he has also established human relationships and institutions by which we hold each other accountable in a relative and temporal way, to maintain a level of peace, order, and justice in human society, until absolute and perfect accountability may be rendered by God when he judges humanity. Rather than basing our arguments on intuition or even common practice (as Ganssle does), our foundation for moral responsibility is divine revelation.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount
Vincent Cheung, On Good and Evil
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Predestination
Gordon Clark, God and Evil
Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy
Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things
(See www.monergismbooks.com)

Gordon Clark, Essays on Ethics and Politics
(See www.trinityfoundation.org)

John Murray, Principles of Conduct

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