Arguing by Intuition, Part 6

"The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them."

What I have said above already covers this last statement. Here I will approach the argument from a slightly different angle.

The argument amounts to saying:

1. If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible. (Remember that he fails to justify this statement, and we do not accept it. But this is what he asserts.)
2. But we do hold each other morally responsible.
3. Therefore, determinism is false.

The problem is that the conclusion is not a necessary inference from the premises. Even if we were to use the same premises, we could come to a very different conclusion:

1. If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible. (Again, we deny this, but this is what he asserts without justification.)
2. But we do hold each other morally responsible.
3. Therefore, we are wrong in holding each other morally responsible.

Ganssle's version of the argument refuses to compromise the practice of holding each other morally responsible, whereas the second version of the argument refuses to compromise determinism. Both versions of the argument are fallacious, since the conclusions are not derived from the premises by necessary inference. Moreover, Ganssle provides no justification for the first premise, and it is a premise that I reject.

Anyway, we have said enough about this paragraph.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Predestination
Gordon Clark, God and Evil
(See www.monergismbooks.com)