Arguing by Intuition, Part 7

We are not done with Ganssle yet, since he goes on to say:

Second, libertarian free will makes the most sense of our deliberation. We often find ourselves deliberating between alternatives, and we are convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome. The decision we come to, upon deliberating, seems to be up to us. If freedom is not of the libertarian kind, then deliberation does not make as much sense. Thus, libertarian freedom is the better concept of freedom, and compatibilist freedom is no freedom at all.

We have so thoroughly dissected his way of thinking that by now you should be able to see what's wrong with the above statements without much help. So we will briefly summarize the problems without going into the details.

We note that the whole paragraph again tries to merely make sense of what we supposedly do, without justifying that we should do it in the first place.

He says, "We are convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome." But who is he to speak for all of us? In fact, I am not convinced of this statement at all. In any case, even if we are all convinced of this statement, the question remains, "But is it true?" As it is, the foundation of his premise is mere subjective intuition, or even mere popular opinion. Adding to this that the term "real effect" is ambiguous, the whole statement is unintelligible.

Then, he says, "The decision we come to, upon deliberating, seems to be up to us." Again, he is resting this premise upon intuition alone. Just because something seems a certain way to us does not mean that it is really true. But we have already discussed the fallacy of appealing to intuition, so we will move on.

His conclusion is that, "If freedom is not of the libertarian kind, then deliberation does not make as much sense." Well, then, so much the worse for deliberation! The argument intends to establish libertarian free will, and to do that he claims that only libertarian free will can make sense of deliberation. But the argument completely fails because, first, he fails to establish that only libertarian free will can make sense of deliberation; second, he fails to establish that we should make sense of deliberation; and third, he fails to establish that deliberation makes sense at all.

He claims that "libertarian freedom is the better concept of freedom," but whether this is true or not is irrelevant at this point, since he fails to establish libertarian freedom, or for that matter, any kind of freedom.

Nevertheless, I might agree with him on something after all, for he ends the paragraph by saying, "compatibilist freedom is no freedom at all." Now, as he explains in the previous pages, by "compatibilist freedom" he means "determined but free." Earlier in the chapter, he states that this is a popular concept of freedom, but one that he opposes. Here he adds that it is "no freedom at all."

But it appears to him that the only remaining option is to accept libertarian freedom; however, this is not true. What if we deny both libertarian and compatibilist freedom, and affirm an absolute and comprehensive divine determinism?

I understand that even many Reformed/Calvinistic writers would object to this; instead, they feel compelled to affirm compatibilist freedom. This is at least partly because they assume that man must have some kind of freedom in order to be justly held accountable. But this is just an assumption, impossible to prove, and contradicted by Scripture.

Of course, we must be careful to define "freedom" in an accurate and relevant way. We must at least answer the question, "Free from what?" Now, when we are speaking of divine determinism, the "determiner" is God. So in this context, the only relevant thing to be free from is God, and whether we are free from any other thing is irrelevant. Thus the question becomes, "Is man free from God in any sense?" Once you assert that man is free from God in some sense, you have lost the God of the Bible.

A consistent Reformed/Calvinistic/Scriptural position would be as follows. Absolute divine determinism is true; therefore, man has no freedom at all relative to God — he is not free from God in any sense. However, he is still morally responsible and accountable because God holds him morally responsible and accountable. There is no logical reason to bring in the issue of freedom at all. The premise, "responsibility presupposes freedom," is completely arbitrary, unbiblical, and impossible to prove. Rather, Scripture teaches that responsibility presupposes divine judgment, and divine judgment presuppose God's decision to judge. It has nothing to do with whether or not man is free.

In fact, since human responsibility presupposes divine judgment, and since divine judgment presupposes divine sovereignty (God's right and power to judge), it follows that human responsibility presupposes divine sovereignty, and not human freedom. We are morally responsible precisely because God is sovereign and we are not free.

The question then becomes whether or not this is just — that is, whether it is just to hold someone accountable who is not free. However, this is just the same question rephrased. The issue of justice appears to be relevant only because one has already illegitimately and arbitrarily brought freedom into the discussion. But we answer that this is just because it is what God has decided to do, and he is the sole and ultimate standard of justice; therefore, this is just by definition.

This position is biblical and coherent, and there is nothing inherently contradictory or impossible about it. Many people might not like it because it contradicts their intuition of freedom, responsibility, and justice; however, theirs is a sinful intuition. In appealing to their intuition, they have ignored the noetic effects of sin. In chiding them for placing their trust in their own intuition, I do not then turn to assert my own intuition as true; rather, I appeal to divine revelation alone, and if we are going to speak of intuition at all, we must look to revelation to judge our intuition.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil"
(http://www.vincentcheung.com)

Gordon Clark, Predestination
Gordon Clark, God and Evil
(http://www.monergismbooks.com)

Ronald Cammenga and Ronald Hank, Saved by Grace
Herman Hoeksema, The Wonder of Grace
(http://www.rfpa.org)