We have contended that intuition cannot provide a reliable foundation for our arguments, citing Ganssle's book as an example. Although we have concluded the main part of our discussion on the subject, there is still a related topic that we need to address in order to further our understanding and to avoid confusion. I have in mind our innate knowledge of God and its relationship to intuition and revelation.

Scripture teaches that every person has an innate knowledge of God in the sense that he knows about God and his attributes by instinct, or by intuition, apart from observation and experience. This knowledge resides in man's mind because God has directly imparted it to him as a creature made in the divine image.

Presuppositional apologists often mention this fact; however, when they do so, are they not appealing to intuition? We need to think about this with care. We did not say that even the bare mention of intuition renders one's case fallacious; rather, we said only that it is fallacious to appeal to intuition as the foundation of one's arguments, or to appeal to intuition to derive the premises of our arguments. There might still be a place for our innate knowledge of God in a biblical and coherent system of theology.

In the case of presuppositionalism, biblically and rationally formulated, our innate knowledge of God is not established by intuition itself, but by revelation. We do not say, "I have an intuitive knowledge of God; therefore, I indeed have an intuitive knowledge of God," and then leap from that to saying, "Therefore, my intuitive knowledge of God is true."

Instead, we say, "God's revelation tells me that I have an intuitive knowledge of God; therefore, I indeed have an intuitive knowledge of God." And, "God's revelation tells me that my intuitive knowledge of God is true in itself, or as far as it goes; therefore, my intuitive knowledge of God is true in itself, or as far as it goes."

Then, we must also add, "God's revelation tells me that our intuitive knowledge of God has been suppressed and distorted by sin; therefore, although it is true that I have an intuitive knowledge of God, and although this intuitive knowledge of God is true in itself, this intuition is nevertheless unreliable as a source of knowledge or justification for my premises in reasoning, because I cannot clearly perceive and accurately represent the information contained in this intuition. Rather, if I am to know anything about it at all, I need God's revelation to tell me what this intuitive knowledge contains."

So when we talk about our intuitive knowledge of God, we are talking about a claim made by revelation about intuition. It is not a claim by intuition about intuition, and still less a claim made by intuition about revelation. In other words, when we mention our innate knowledge of God, we are not trying to prove God's revelation by our intuition; rather, we are just stating what God's revelation tells us that we know by intuition. Again, this knowledge has been suppressed and distorted by sin, but we know even this only by revelation. Therefore, when we talk about intuition, and specifically our intuitive knowledge of God, it is for an entirely different purpose than the one that we have been opposing. In no instance do we make intuition the foundation of our arguments; instead, we depend solely on divine revelation.

As biblical presuppositionalists, we begin by revelation, and from it we deduce all the necessary propositions within our worldview; there is never any dependence on intuition. When we mention intuition, we do so in the context of saying that God's revelation tells us that every person knows God by intuition, and this explains why they cannot logically or morally excuse themselves. We do not begin by saying that everyone knows God by intuition, and therefore there is no excuse for unbelief; rather, we begin by revelation, and then on the basis of revelation say that everyone knows God by intuition, and therefore on the authority of God's revelation (not intuition), there is no excuse for unbelief.

Moreover, our claim is stronger than just saying that the knowledge of God is intuitively inescapable; instead, our claim is that, positively, the knowledge of God is clear and overwhelming, and negatively, it is logically unavoidable and undeniable.

Thus the criticisms against intuitive arguments do not apply to consistent biblical/presuppositional apologetics. The opponents of Christianity must therefore directly attack revelation. Also, since our criticisms against intuition remain in force, those who would appeal to intuition to support their arguments when attacking Christianity must first prove the reliability of intuition; otherwise, they will have to avoid it altogether. In other words, not only must they directly attack revelation, but they must have something with which to attack it.

(End of series)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy
(See www.monergismbooks.com)

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