Compatibilist Freedom
Posted by Vincent Cheung on May 6, 2005(The following is taken from two separate email discussions.)
— A —
Regarding compatibilist freedom…My understanding of this is that we willingly choose from a God-directed will — whether for good or evil, depending on whether he has hardened or enlightened us. Is there anything in this that you would consider incorrect/unbiblical?
I agree with what you wrote, but what I disagree with is to call this "freedom" in a sense, as many Calvinists do.
When speaking of freedom in such a context, I always speak of freedom in relation to God — and that is why the issue immediately becomes clear. I can consistently use the same definition whether I am dealing with the nature of God, the decree of God, the nature of man, the nature of salvation, or determinism from a philosophical perspective.
But many Calvinists do not speak this way; rather, they say that we always choose what we desire the most (although they might also acknowledge that it is God who determines this desire), but when they add that this is in a sense "freedom," and that we are responsible based on this "freedom," then I disagree. Instead, I deny any sense of human freedom and deny any relationship between freedom and responsibility.
Moral responsibility (or accountability) has to do with whether God has decided to judge us; it has no direct relationship with whether we are free. In fact, if we were free from God but not judged by God, then we would still not be morally responsible (or accountable). In other words, moral responsibility does not presuppose human freedom, but it presupposes divine sovereignty. We are responsible not because we are free, but we are responsible precisely because we are not free.
Also, Calvinists often affirm that Adam was free before the Fall. But again, I always speak of freedom relative to God, and from this perspective, I would say that Adam had no freedom whatsoever even before the Fall. To be "free" from sin is irrelevant. The issue is whether Adam was free from God to choose to remain free from sin — he was not. In addition, I would not say that God permitted Adam to fall, but that God caused it. Many Calvinists would also disagree with me on this.
Compatibilists would hesitate to say that we are free from God, but they would insist that since we always act according to the strongest desire of the moment, that this is a real sense of freedom, and that this "freedom" is the precondition for moral responsibility.
Now consider the following. Let’s say that I have committed a murder. I was indeed free from other creatures when I made my decision, and I acted according to my own internal desire. But this desire was caused and controlled by God, and the fact that I would always act on my strongest desire (which is human nature) was also caused by God. But this amounts to saying that we have no freedom from God to abstain from murder, but that we only have internal freedom from other creatures to abstain from murder.
Then, if we were to soften this and say that our desires are somehow not determined but merely permitted by God, then, even ignoring for now that this is unbiblical, we must still explain how it is possible for God to permit something without causing it, and yet immutably decree it to happen in a sense that is not merely an expression of prescience. If we can’t, then we are Arminians.
Also, if God merely permits us to do something, then I would also demand a metaphysical explanation on how it is possible for a creature to direct and control its own mind. That is, is it possible for a created thing to function at all under God’s bare permission without his constant causative determination? How?
Calvin himself wrote, "Indeed, not even an abundance of bread would benefit us in the slightest unless it were divinely turned into nourishment." This sounds like my occasionalism. There is no inherent "nature" or power in bread that always works with the body to provide nourishment, but it must be "divinely turned into nourishment" each time it is consumed. This is Calvinism — it is a consistent application of divine sovereignty over everything. It is a denial of any form of dualism or deism. Thus I affirm that God controls everything about everything that is anything, including every aspect of every detail of every human decision and action, in such a way that man has no freedom in any meaningful or relevant sense.
In summary, libertarian freedom is indeed freedom, but it is unbiblical and impossible — there is no such freedom. On the other hand, compatibilist freedom is not "freedom" at all (except from other creatures, which is irrelevant), but it is just a description of what happens when God controls every aspect of our decisions and actions. Both the words "compatibilist" and "freedom" are misleading.
For more information, you will have to read some of my books that deal with this.
— B —
I would consider myself a "Calvinistic" Baptist…According to my understanding sin entered this world through the disobedience of Adam and not as a result of the determining purpose of God.
Actually, all Reformed writers would affirm that sin came as a result of God’s decree, so that it was determined at least in this sense, but many would say that this is a "passive" or "permissive" decree. My position is that there is no such thing as a "passive" or a "permissive" decree with God, that it is unbiblical and impossible for a divine decree to be "passive" or "permissive."
It is correct to say that sin came through the disobedience of Adam, but this is not the debated issue. The issue is what caused this disobedience. To say that before the Fall Adam had "free will" is irrelevant unless by this "free will" is meant freedom from God. If this is what is meant, then this is PAGANISM, not Calvinism or Christianity. If only freedom from sin is meant, then again this is irrelevant, since the relevant question in discussing divine determinism should be whether Adam was free from God to abstain from sin, not whether he was free from sin to abstain from sin.
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, "Arguing by Intuition"
Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil"
Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will
Gordon Clark, Predestination
Gordon Clark, God and Evil