Short Answers to Several Criticisms

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This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

The following includes a number of objections against my anti-empiricism. They were taken from an Internet discussion board, and sent to me by one of my readers a while ago. Although these objections are weak and careless, they represent some of the frequent misunderstandings and fallacious reasonings that Christian empiricists (or at least Christians who embrace some version or some degree of empiricism) have toward my position. So what follows should still help a number of people.

I have performed some minor editing to make both the objections and my answers more presentable. The objections are in blue and my answers are in black.

Although the objections were written by several different people, it is not important to designate the author of each objection, so for the sake of clarity and convenience, I have edited my answers as if all the objections were written by "Tom" (not anyone’s real name).

Also, since the reader who sent me the objections was already familiar with my writings and my arguments, most of my answers to him were short. I have expanded on some of these answers in what follows, but not by much. Thus, for more details, please consult the recommended readings at the bottom of this blog entry.

— 01 —

One thing that makes me unable to understand how anyone could hold that belief of Clark's is that the nerves in the brain are sensory, and thus by making the decision to think specific things and change thought processes in their minds, are they not thus relying on their senses in order to even think, and thus relying on their senses to deduce with logic and attain knowledge?

This badly begs the question. It already assumes that science is right and/or that any/all thinking occurs in the brain. Who says?

In fact, I deny that any thinking occurs in the brain, but that whatever coincidentally occurs in the brain while someone thinks, thinking itself occurs only in the incorporeal mind.

— 02 —

Here's something that's problematic: one uses his senses to read the words in the Bible. If the senses allow us to recall what we already know about God, then what of other parts in the Bible? For example, David's adultery. It is hard to imagine that we already knew about this adultery via some innate knowledge. David's adultery is not something we know about God (what would this mean even). So, we can't know that David committed adultary even though it is the infallible word of God.

This entails a very bad misunderstanding of both Gordon Clark and me. We never said that all knowledge is innate, only that all knowledge must come from God apart from sensation, but some knowledge comes from God on the occasion of sensation (but still apart from sensation).

As for the claim that we must use the senses to read the Bible, I have already answered this in several places.

Also, note even if it is true that we need the senses to read the Bible (although, again, I have refuted this), this observation alone does not prove empiricism, so that unless Tom can prove empiricism, we would just end up with skepticism, which means that no one can read the Bible.

But whereas Tom cannot read the Bible before proving empiricism, I can, and precisely because I reject empiricism.

See:

Ultimate Questions, p. 38-43.

Presuppositional Confrontations, p. 68-74.

Occasionalism and Empiricism

The Transcendental Argument for Materialism

— 03 —

I don't see how he can deny that we can know ANYTHING through sense perception. Surely, we can even know certain things about God through sense perception (Romans 1).

I have already dealt with Romans 1 in my books, showing that it does not entail empiricism.

— 04 —

I'd be interested in seeing if a third man argument would work against this, since it is one of the most devastating argument against Plato's theory of knowledge (recollection) which seems to be, with some modifications, similar to Cheung's.

If we must compare, I am closer to Augustine, and the Logos doctrine of various Church Fathers, not Plato.

But I am in fact just applying the necessary implications of the biblical doctrines of divine sovereignty, providence, etc. Or is God sovereign over all things, except sensations?

— 05 —

Your critiques are only against one view of sense perception. I don't have the view that facts bear their own meaning. I would tend more towards Quine's "web" program. But nonetheless, you use your senses to obtain knowledge. Tell me, how would you know how many ants were in your backyard? Did you know this previously?

Note that he never tells us exactly how any knowledge can come from sensation. He just keeps on saying that it must be so. But none of the things that he says necessarily entails that any knowledge can come from sensation.

He accuses me of following Plato (which I deny) — but is he now following Quine (which he admits)?

He should give an account of how he can support sensation from Scripture, keeping in mind that to show that somebody saw something does not support sensation. I never deny that we see (that is, the act occurs), but that knowledge does not come from what we see; rather, God must work.

And who says we know how many ants are in our backyard? Does he know?

As for knowing "previously," this is again the misunderstanding that we say that all knowledge is innate, which we never taught.

— 06 —

But since, in some cases, our senses are required to obtain knowledge (e.g., how many ants are in my back yard), then I would say that in those cases senses are a necessary feature of gaining knowledge.

How true! If the senses are necessary, then the senses are necessary.

But are the senses necessary? And necessary for what? What exactly do they do? How?

Now if knowledge can rationally be derived from sensation, then it could be written out as a propositional argument or a syllogism. I want him to write out the syllogism so that we can examine its validity.

— 07 —

Sorry, brother, but you just proved too much! If God conveys ALL things, then he conveys "John's" belief that a heretic is correct, and also "Tim's" belief that he is not correct! God is not the author of confusion. I think this is devestating to what you just argued.

So are heretics autonomous? As I repeatedly point out, such inconsistent Calvinism results in dualism — two opposing power of good and evil, instead of one God who reigns supreme.

See:

The Author of Sin

The Author of Confusion

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

— 08 —

Furthermore, the observations are not dependent on the molecules! The molecules are the same, regardless. It is the way man’s brain interprets the collection of molecules which results in hallucination.

This does not directly attack my position, but it betrays the person’s fallacious thinking.

That is, it begs the question. He is leaning on science again, and he assumes premises that, if empiricism is false, could never be established.

What are molecules anyway? Do we know that there are such things? Really, we know that? We are sure? How?

I would ask that he first proves empiricism, and then science, before using these premises, since empiricism and science are precisely the things being questioned.

As for the comment on "the way man’s brain interprets the collection of molecules," how does he know that? Does the brain "think" at all? Does it interpret anything at all?

— 09 —

Lastly, if God is in control of EVERYTHING, and conveys EVERYTHING to people, then, what about this: John "sees" a bee on a rose, but "Tim" doesn't see it. John believes that his observation was true. Tim believes the converse. So, God conveyed A and not-A?

Of course. So what?

There is only a problem if we say that God affirms both A and not-A.

But note what Tom is thinking. His question implies that God does not really control EVERYTHING. In fact, if we take his words seriously, he is saying that God is not even "in control" of everything.

So our problem is not really first about sensation or empiricism, but that Tom does not even affirm divine sovereignty, or to speak charitably, he is at least being very inconsistent here.

Tom speaks as if false information occurs autonomously! But how? By spontaneous generation? By autonomous sensation? By free will?

If Tom cannot believe that God controls false information, then how can he believe that God is even now directly sustaining Satan himself? Or as Luther affirms, that God even now controls (not only sustains) Satan?

See:

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will

— 10 —

Now, of course God can tell you how many ants are in your backyard, but is this the normal operation of how things work? Indeed, I'm very interested in exploring this concept and the view that there is no new revelation.

I do not say that there is "new revelation." I am saying that God’s control over all knowledge and all mental acts is the normal operation of things. It is a matter of ordinary providence.

Here it is as if Tom is saying that if God controls anything today, then that must be a miracle. And if he controls knowledge, then there must be new revelation (in the same sense as biblical revelation). Is Tom a deist?

Just as I believe that the death of a sparrow is still controlled by God, without calling that a miracle (since a miracle is special providence, but the death of a sparrow is ordinary providence), I merely include knowledge in the category of ordinary providence, as anyone must who affirms the biblical doctrine.

But Tom wants to protect sensation and autonomous evil and errors, and therefore his position becomes inconsistent.

— 11 —

But, the whole faculty of man, which God created with eyes and ears in order to learn and know things about his environment, does use his senses to aquire knowledge, but this cannot be separated from his rationality (i.e. seeing a tree and coming to a conclusion also involves a chain of reasoning).

Just because God created something does not mean that it is for the purposes and functions that Tom thinks. Tom’s statement begs the question. He says that God created eyes and ears "to learn," but this is precisely the point we are arguing about. Asserting it again does not make it true.

Then, Tom admits that seeing a tree and coming to a conclusion involves a chain of reasoning. Good! This gets closer to my point: Is the chain of reasoning logically valid? Write it out as a syllogism and let us examine it.

— 12 —

You missed my point about John and Tim. I said that God told one a LIE and the other a TRUTH. Does God lie?

This betrays a strange confusion. Telling is different from facilitating or controlling. I am talking about metaphysics, and he is talking about (it seems) an interpersonal relationship. Yes, God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches), but that is different from him telling a lie as if he claims that it is the truth.

— 13 —

I would still need that verse refuted for as it stands: the Lord of Glory has told us that "when you SEE the fig tree you KNOW that summer is near."

Right. When you see a mirage, there must be water (or whatever you see). Hallucinations never happen. Nonsense.

It is fallacious to infer from this verse a simplistic "I see, therefore I know" epistemology. Otherwise, it would be impossible to make a mistake, so that when I SEE water, I KNOW that there is water, and that it must not be a mirage.

Also, as I have pointed out in Presuppositional Confrontations when refuting Ronald Nash, when the Bible acknowledges that someone saw something, it is not the same as affirming sensation as a means to knowledge.

For example, if John writes, "Peter saw the resurrected Christ," I can accept John's statement about what Peter saw without accepting sensation itself as a way to knowledge. The object of my belief is John's inspired statement, not Peter's fallible sensation. For all I know, Peter’s sensations could be wrong in all instances but this one, and I only know that he is right this time because John infallibly (by inspiration) says so.

In other words, I agree that when I think that I am looking at a red car, it is possible that I am indeed looking at a red car (but it is also possible that I am dreaming, or looking at the blue sky). The problem is, how do I know in this instance whether I am indeed looking at a red car? Now, if God infallibly affirms that I am indeed looking at a red car, then I know that in this instance what I think I see indeed corresponds to physical reality.

But from this, it would be fallacious to infer, "Therefore, sensation yields knowledge." No, it is God's infallible affirmation (that I am looking at a red car) that gives me the knowledge (that I am looking at a red car), and not my act of looking at the red car. That is, the sensation provides the occasion for God's infallible affirmation, not knowledge itself.

This is the kind of invalid inference that Tom has made with the verse from Jesus. That is, from Jesus' infallible affirmation of something, Tom infers that the very means that the Pharisees thought that they had obtained the information is also reliable.

Does Tom want to prove that sensations are in fact infallible? I am guessing that he does not. But then how can the verse that he quotes allow for mistakes in sensation, if Jesus is approving sensation itself instead of making an infallible judgment about the sensation (of seeing the fig tree)?

I affirm the words of Jesus in the verse, not the sensation of the Pharisees (of seeing the fig tree). But if Tom, on the basis of this verse, directly affirms the sensation of the Pharisees, then how can he reject other sensations or inferences from sensations?

That is, I know that "when you see the fig tree, you know that summer is near" only because Jesus said so. For all I know, the Pharisees could be wrong about every other instance of sensation.

If we are going to be logical and rational, then let's be strictly logical and rational. An inference is valid only if you can write it out as a syllogism and show that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Tom fails to do this in his defense of sensation as a way of knowing.

Recommended:

Occasionalism and Empiricism

The Transcendental Argument for Materialism

"But What is Knowledge?"

But Where is the Refutation?

Biblical Rationalism vs. Psycho Assertionism

The Author of Sin

The Author of Confusion

Compatibilist Freedom

Augustine and Compatibilism

"Soft" Determinism

Determinism vs. Fatalism