More than a Potter (2)
Posted by Vincent Cheung on September 1, 2005It is always possible to neutralize any objection against Christianity before we even begin to answer it. After showing that the objection is careless and incomplete, we will now proceed to address the topic anyway, but not because the objection logically compels us, since it has already been neutralized.
First, the fact that God controls all of our thoughts and actions does not make us robots and puppets, because even when completely controlled by God, humans are very different from robots and puppets. Humans have minds — they reason, decide, and emote. In fact, since our identities are preserved even when we are disembodied, it is more accurate to say that humans are minds that live in bodies.3 Robots and puppets are not minds, but are entirely physical objects. They have no thoughts to be controlled, but only physical parts and properties to be manipulated.
Some of our thoughts are occasions for physiological events. There is no inherent and necessary relationship between mind and body, but it is God who directly controls both, usually correlating the two. Nevertheless, we are still different from robots and puppets, since they have no thoughts at all. Their physical movements are not occasioned by their own thoughts, since they have none, but by the thoughts of those who use their hands and instruments to control them. And it is in fact God who directly controls them all — the human mind, the relationship between the human mind and the human body, the human body itself, and the relationship between the human body and the instruments, the robots and the puppets. That is, on the occasion that God directly acts on one (for example, when he causes the human mind to decide to move a finger), he also directly acts on the other (in this case, he causes the finger to move).4
Remember that the objection does not explain why it is a problem for humans to be robots and puppets, and this is one reason why it fails before we even answer it. So we are pointing out the differences that humans have against robots and puppets not because the objection compels us, but because we are addressing the topic in spite of the objection. The differences are there to be noted, so that even if humans are completely controlled by God, they are unlike robots and puppets.
Second, although sometimes unstated, the objection falsely makes human freedom the basis of moral responsibility. The assumptions are: (1) It is necessary to affirm that humans are morally responsible; (2) Moral responsibility presupposes human freedom; and (3) Robots and puppets are not free. Given these assumptions, the objector rightly reasons that if God is absolutely sovereign, then humans are not free. Then, he likens these humans, who are not free, to robots and puppets, which are also not free. This in turn means that humans are not morally responsible if God controls all things, but since it is necessary to affirm that humans are morally responsible, it means that we cannot affirm that God controls all things.
We will first dispense with a less important problem with this reasoning, and that is the unnecessary analogy of controlled humans to robots and puppets. This step could be skipped altogether and the objection would still be intact; in fact, it would be clearer without the analogy. In other words, it would be simpler to just say, "If God controls all things, then humans are not free. But since moral responsibility presupposes human freedom, this necessarily means that if God controls all things, then humans are not morally responsible. But then, since it is necessary to affirm that humans are morally responsible, we must therefore deny that God controls all things."
The process of reasoning is sound in itself, so that the conclusion would be correct if all the assumptions were true. However, not all the assumptions are correct, and therefore the objection crumbles. The fatal error is in assuming that moral responsibility presupposes human freedom. This premise is explicitly contradicted by Scripture, and it has never been justified in the history of theology and philosophy. It is so ingrained in most thinkers that when they even bother to mention it or consider possible ways to justify it, they would often just say that it is intuitively known and then move on.
But as I have repeatedly stated elsewhere, the assumption is false. By definition, "responsibility" refers to accountability. In other words, for one to be morally responsible means that he is morally accountable to some person or standard. The issue of whether this person is free is irrelevant to the discussion. The only relevant issue is whether the one who has authority over this person has decided to hold him accountable. Since God rules over all of humanity, and he has decided to judge every man, this means that every person is morally responsible, regardless of whether they are free. Human freedom has no logical place to even enter the discussion.5 Moreover, the only reason to affirm that humans are morally responsible is because of this same reason in the first place – that is, that God has decided to judge all of humanity.
God could just as easily hold robots and puppets responsible, not in the sense that they could understand their actions, but in the sense that God could reward or punish them if he so pleases. Jesus cursed a fig tree for failing to bear fruit. The tree was not free, or even conscious, but it was punished, and Jesus was fully justified for doing it. Of course, the tree and the curse were symbolic, but the symbolic (what is apparent, on the surface) cannot contradict that which is symbolized, or the one would not really be symbolic of the other. The fact is that, whatever deeper meaning is intended, the tree failed to bear fruit, and Jesus cursed it for this reason. Likewise, if God so pleases, he could destroy a robot for malfunctioning, and since he is the sole standard of morality, he would be righteous by definition for doing so. He certainly does not need our permission or to satisfy our false assumptions.
In other words, humans are morally responsible for precisely the opposite reason assumed by the objection — we are responsible because God is sovereign and we are not free.
Notes
3 Peter refers to the body as a "tent" that could be "put aside" (2 Peter 1:13–14; also 2 Corinthians 5:4). See also "The Ching Ming Festival" in Vincent Cheung, Doctrine and Obedience.
4 For an explanation of the metaphysics assumed here, please see Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions and Captive to Reason.
5 I have discussed this extensively and repeatedly in my other writings. Please see Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology, Commentary on Ephesians, and The Author of Sin.
(to be continued)
Recommended
Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
Vincent Cheung, The Author of Sin
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations