Archive March 2005

Arguing by Intuition, Part 2

Continuing from "Arguing by Intuition, Part 1," we have been discussing the problems with basing the premises of our arguments on intuition, and we cited an example from Gregory E. Ganssle.

When debating Arminians, or when reading their literature, you will notice that many of them base a number of their crucial premises on intuition, and often on intuition alone. Ganssle's pattern of argument is very common with them — they just assume that their needed premises are true because to them they seem to be true. They say that they are convinced that these premises are true (often they say that we are all convinced), and then they proceed on that basis. One of these premises is that we all seem to have free will; another is that it would seem unjust to hold someone morally accountable who does not have free will. At least in these instances, their ultimate standard of truth and morality is not God's revelation but their own intuition. Their "seems like" seems unquestionable to them.

However, all the "seems like" could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don't know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone.

Many atheists also argue this way. For example, since they reject revelation, they cannot depend on it as a foundation for ethics. Then, when they turn to sensation, those who are less stupid realize that they cannot derive anything from sensation. Thus some turn to intuition, and claim that by it they know certain ethical principles. But other than the problems already mentioned (that intuition is subjective, non-universal, fallible, etc.), why must we obey intuition?

It is most unfortunate that many Reformed/Calvinistic writers also appeal to intuition to construct their arguments and their systems. When they do this, it is often because they are trying to assert some of the very same ideas and premises that the Arminians and the atheists affirm, such as unbiblical concepts of freedom and justice. But since these false premises cannot really be derived from biblical revelation, and since we can derive nothing at all from sensation, they take refuge in intuition. However, as we have shown, this is to banish themselves to subjectivism and irrelevance, and when Reformed/Calvinistic writers do this, they are being inconsistent with their otherwise biblical and rational theology.

One example is William G. T. Shedd. Although he is to be highly commended for being one of the least empirical among theologians, he fails to depend solely on divine revelation. Rather, appeals to intuition pervade his Dogmatic Theology, and he does this to establish premises and principles that in fact only Arminians should affirm, and that only Arminians need, such as a version of free will and an unbiblical basis for moral accountability.

As Reformed/Calvinistic Christians — as Christians whose views on God, man, and salvation are truly biblical — we must not and need not appeal to sensation or intuition, which can only lead to irrationalism and self-contradictory skepticism. Rather, we must cling to God's written revelation, which alone comes from Logos, the Reason of God, and which alone can save us and those who hear us.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation
Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Now part of Christian Philosophy)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
(See www.monergismbooks.com)

Arguing by Intuition, Part 1

(The following is an edited response to an inquiry on the topic.)

Let me say something about arguing by intuition.

Gregory E. Ganssle recently published a book called Thinking about God. In one chapter, he explains freedom and determinism, and concludes by stating that he favors "libertarian free will." Note how he argues (p. 136-137):

Now, why should you agree with me about the nature of human freedom? Let me give you two reasons. First, it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him. If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.

Second, libertarian free will makes the most sense of our deliberation. We often find ourselves deliberating between alternatives, and we are convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome. The decision we come to, upon deliberating, seems to be up to us. If freedom is not of the libertarian kind, then deliberation does not make as much sense. Thus, libertarian freedom is the better concept of freedom, and compatibilist freedom is no freedom at all.

This is terrible, terrible! I feel dirty just for typing it. There are numerous falsehoods and fallacies in these two paragraphs (my books have already addressed all of them), but I will deal with only those words that are relevant to our topic, which is intuition.

Note the words that I have highlighted in red. If we were to debate the issue of human freedom, or Calvinism vs. Arminianism, is Ganssle going to come at me with "seems strange," "we are convinced," and "seems to be"? I can just as readily say it "seems right," "I am not convinced, and "seems not to be"! Well, he is convinced of the premises that seems to him as true, but I can be just as convinced of the opposite.

Once you mix "seems like" as an essential part of your argument (instead of a non-essential part of your presentation, such as in a mere illustration), you have departed from the realm of strict rational argumentation. Also, you have just lost the right to forbid your opponent from using exactly the same argument, and to him it "seems like" that you are wrong.

When it comes to Calvinism vs. Arminianism, you may have heard something like, "If God is absolutely sovereign, then he controls even our decisions, and in this sense we do not have freedom or free will, but we sense (we are convinced, we feel, we think, it seems like, etc.) that we do have freedom or free will in our daily activities; therefore, Calvinism must be wrong." My response is that I sense or intuit, or it seems to me, that this person is an idiot; therefore, he is an idiot.

If he disagrees with my intuition, then why do I have to agree with his? If he tells me that I do not really sense or intuit that he is an idiot, then I can just as readily tell him that he does not really sense or intuit freedom. That is, if he can claim to know what is really going on in my mind, then I can just as readily claim to know what is really going on in his mind.

He is claiming to know what we all intuit. Among other things, he says:

1. I intuitively hold to a standard of ethics such that "it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him,"
2. I am "convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome," and
3. The decision that I come to, upon deliberating, "seems [to me] to be" up to me.

However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, if he can claim to know what I intuitively affirm in my own mind, then why can't I also claim to know what he intuitively affirms in his mind? Thus I affirm that "we are convinced" that he is wrong, and that he "seems to be" quite confused and arbitrary. Unless he stops arguing by intuition as he does, he cannot with consistency reject my claims.

So the whole thing amounts to purely subjective nonsense.

(To be continued.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation
Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"
(See www.rmiweb.org)

Gordon Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Now part of Christian Philosophy)
(See www.monergismbooks.com)

God and Language

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

(The following is an edited response to an inquiry on the topic.)

Briefly, my position is that language is always adequate to express anything — the problem is whether the mind can conceive it. If you can think it, you can always designate any arbitrary sign to represent it. Thus in principle, you can use X to represent the contents of an entire book. There is nothing inherently contradictory or impossible about that.

It follows that language itself is always adequate to say anything about God — I am sure that God always knows how to verbalize something about himself. Again, "X" is language, and it can represent any thought, so the limitation is in one's mind, not in language itself. Thus I do not say that we can always think everything about God (he is "incomprehensible"), but whatever we can think, we can say of him.

As for positive and negative language about God, there are those who insist that at least some things about God can be expressed only in negative language. However, so far it seems that I can easily turn into positive language any example that they give in support of this assertion.

For example, even Sproul once said that to say that God is "immutable" is negative language, that since we are human, we know only what "mutable" means, and that God is not "mutable," so that it is impossible to express this divine attribute in positive language. This was awfully careless of him — what about saying, "God always stays the same"?! That's positive language, and we know what it means.

Some people might think that it sounds more pious or reverent to say that we cannot talk about God in positive terms, but I would maintain that this is both biblically and philosophically false and unnecessary.

Related:

1. Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology (PDF version), p. 44, fn. #45.

2. Vincent Cheung, Prayer and Revelation (PDF version), p. 21.

3. Gordon Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation.
(This book is now part of Christian Philosophy; portions of it deal with religious language.)

4. Gordon Clark, Language and Theology

Active vs. Passive Reprobation

(The following is an edited response to an inquiry on the topic.)

The motive (of passive reprobation), of course, is to distance God from direct contact or involvement with evil and yet to keep God in control over evil in some way. Most modern Reformed writers commit this error. As I show in my Commentary on Ephesians, Reformers such as Luther and Calvin gave strong hints and at times even direct assertions that reprobation must be active, but even they were not always consistent, since the motive to "exonerate" or "excuse" God was still present at times.

My objection, in short, is that it is biblically wrong and metaphysically impossible to distance God from evil like this. It is implicit deism or dualism.

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians.

Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil."

Gordon Clark, God and Evil.

Jay Adams, The Grand Demonstration.

"Professional Morons"

Download at: http://www.vincentcheung.com/other.htm.

I had wanted to write this article for a while. It provides examples on how non-Christian philosophers are really no better than the most incompetent non-Christians in the substance of their arguments.