Arguing by Intuition, Part 6
"The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them."
What I have said above already covers this last statement. Here I will approach the argument from a slightly different angle.
The argument amounts to saying:
- If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible. (Remember that he fails to justify this statement, and we do not accept it. But this is what he asserts.)
- But we do hold each other morally responsible.
- Therefore, determinism is false.
The problem is that the conclusion is not a necessary inference from the premises. Even if we were to use the same premises, we could come to a very different conclusion:
- If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible. (Again, we deny this, but this is what he asserts without justification.)
- But we do hold each other morally responsible.
- Therefore, we are wrong in holding each other morally responsible.
Ganssle's version of the argument refuses to compromise the practice of holding each other morally responsible, whereas the second version of the argument refuses to compromise determinism. Both versions of the argument are fallacious, since the conclusions are not derived from the premises by necessary inference. Moreover, Ganssle provides no justification for the first premise, and it is a premise that I reject.
Anyway, we have said enough about this paragraph.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
Gordon Clark, God and Evil
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
Arguing by Intuition, Part 5
We are continuing our analysis of Ganssle's statements. Today we will examine the following: "Yet we do hold each other morally responsible."
To understand this statement, and to perceive what is so wrong about it, we need read it in the context of the entire paragraph. So here it is again:
If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.
To simplify the argument, we may paraphrase it as follows: "If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible. But we do hold each other morally responsible. Therefore, determinism is false." Even assuming we agree that "we do hold each other morally responsible," Ganssle says nothing to establish that this is in fact the right thing to do. Just because we do something does not mean that it is necessarily the right thing to do. Maybe we are wrong in holding each other morally responsible.
Note that the argument is supposed to show that determinism is false, and not to merely make sense of holding each other morally responsible. That is, the function of the argument is not just to explain something that we do, but that might be either right or wrong. Rather, the argument intends to refute determinism, and to do that, it depends on the premise "we do hold each other morally responsible," and on the assumption that this is the right thing to do. As it stands, the best that this argument can do is to explain why Ganssle and others like him would want determinism to be false! They want determinism to be false because they want to explain why they hold each other morally responsible. In other words, according to this argument, in order to justify what we do (whether what we do is right or not), we must reject determinism (whether determinism is in fact true or not). The argument is purely pragmatic, not rational.
Besides failing to establish that we should hold each other morally responsible in the first place, we have already pointed out that Ganssle also fails to establish the previous premises, especially the one claiming that if an action is not "up to" us, then we are not morally responsible for it. Thus what he intends to be a rational explanation for affirming "libertarian free will" turns out to be incomprehensible chaos.
In contrast, the biblical position is that God has revealed his moral laws to us, and he has declared that he will hold us accountable according to those laws. Then, he has also established human relationships and institutions by which we hold each other accountable in a relative and temporal way, to maintain a level of peace, order, and justice in human society, until absolute and perfect accountability may be rendered by God when he judges humanity. Rather than basing our arguments on intuition or even common practice (as Ganssle does), our foundation for moral responsibility is divine revelation.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount
Vincent Cheung, On Good and Evil
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
Gordon Clark, God and Evil
Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy
Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
Gordon Clark, Essays on Ethics and Politics
(See www.trinityfoundation.org)
John Murray, Principles of Conduct
Arguing by Intuition, Part 4
We are continuing our analysis of Ganssle's statements. For your convenience, I will quote the full paragraph again:
If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.
Today we will examine the following: "At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible."
Now things really get strange.
He says that the "up to"-ness must be high enough before it is "reasonable" to hold someone "responsible." Of course, my first reaction is, WHY? Even if we could understand his statement, we have no reason to believe it. But as we will see, it is not that easy to understand the statement.
Before we even know what he means by "up to," he now suggests that there are degrees of "up to"-ness. So, according to him, an action can be "up to" a person to a greater or lesser degree, but how he knows that, he does not explain.
Then, he indicates that the "up to"-ness must reach a certain degree before it is "high enough" to make it "reasonable to hold the person responsible." But even if we swallow the suggestion that there are degrees of "up to"-ness, how high is "high enough," and how does he know?
Also, if the "up to"-ness must be high enough to be "reasonable," what does he mean by "reasonable"? By "reason-able," does he mean something that is validly deducible from true premises, or something like "morally acceptable"? If he means something like the latter, then what would he mean by "acceptable"? "Acceptable" to whom? How does he know?
Or would we be completely unjustified in suspecting that by "reasonable," he is once again appealing to some intuitive standard that he cannot objectively project and support outside of his own mind, and in which case his intuition would once again take the place of God?
So why must the "up to"-ness reach a certain degree before it is "high enough" to be considered "reasonable" to hold someone responsible? This point remains unanswered.
Also, what does he mean by "responsible"? I will not even try to guess.
Now, since he contrasts the "up to"-ness of one's action against "determinism," and since the "up to"-ness can be of a greater or lesser degree, it follows that the "determinism" must also be in degrees — that is, it is not absolute, but relative.
But this puts the God who is the subject of "determinism" in a similar position with the creatures who are the objects of the "determinism." That is, some things are "up to" (determined by) him, but some things are not. He might be more powerful than we, so that more things are "up to" him than "up to" us, but it remains that when it comes to "up to"-ness and determinism, he differs from us only in degree and not in kind.
So again, we have lost the God of the Bible.
In contrast, the biblical position is that we are "morally responsible" in the sense that we are morally accountable to God; that is, God will judge us. Our beliefs and actions will have consequences because God will cause these consequences.
Moreover, it is "reasonable" for God to hold us morally responsible in the sense that it is both logically valid and morally acceptable for him to do so. It is logically valid because this is a conclusion deducible from his own will and decree, and it is morally acceptable because God is the sole and ultimate moral standard, and he accepts his own decision to hold his creatures morally responsible.
In this explanation, the issue of human freedom does not even enter into the discussion. It is thoroughly consistent with absolute divine determinism, in which God controls all things, including every human thought and decision.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gorodn Clark, Christian Philosophy
Gordon Clark, Predestination
Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
Comments on "Intuition" (2)
(The following is an edited response to an inquiry on the topic.)
Thanks for continuing your topic on "Arguing by Intuition." I am realizing that this method of argumentation is in fact widely used by many debaters, both Christians and non-Christians. I would like to suggest that the last part of your series be a suggestion on what other more valid forms of argumentation should directly replace that which you consider invalid.
Yes, appealing to bare intuition is all too common. And when one side of a debate does it, it is frequently left unchallenged by the other side, because the other side often intuitively agree (whether in content or in method). But both have no reliable basis for the premise.
As for the proper way to argue, this concerns one of the main thrusts of my approach to apologetics. I contend that the only way that a true and coherent worldview is obtained is by strict deduction from an infallible, undeniable, self-authenticating, and self-contained first principle. Therefore, instead of appealing to sensation or intuition, we should appeal to revelation — revelation is the only way out of epistemological skepticism.
I will mention some of this throughout the remaining articles in the series, but to get more details, please see the recommended readings, such as my Ultimate Questions and Presuppositional Confrontations.
While I agree that revelation is a much stronger basis for ideas (being objective rather than subjective), couldn't someone argue that the road to revelation, (this is, either to discerning true revelation from false, or to receiving and comprehending revelation) by necessity demands some level of intuition? And if this is so, and intuition is invalid as a basis, what makes the interaction with revelation valid at all?
That someone could try to argue this is different from giving a sound argument for it. My brief answer is "No, no one could successfully argue this."
In any case, note that if this is true, then we are back to intuition again as our starting point. But if the same problems still apply (and they do), then we will never get to revelation at all, but we will again get stuck in arbitrariness and skepticism. If we must depend on intuition (or anything other than revelation, such as sensation) to "verify" or "get to" revelation, then the reliability and the breadth of revelation will never rise above the reliability and the breadth of the intuition (or sensation, etc.) that supposedly verifies or confirms it. You have pointed out as much.
No, it depends on your doctrine of revelation, how you argue for revelation, and how your worldview is structured. If a person is a consistent presuppositionalist, then this is not a problem. But many presuppositionalists are not consistent; therefore, you will see appeals to sensation and intuition in their arguments. But if you do not start from revelation, but start from something else on your way to make the claim that you start from revelation, this means that you do not really start from revelation at all, but something else. Remember, if there is a "road to" revelation at all, that means you do not start from revelation, and your ultimate authority is really not revelation, but whatever you depended on on your way there. But I am saying that we should really start from revelation and make valid deductions on that basis.
I do mention "innate knowledge" in my books, so to avoid confusion, I will explain the relationship between revelation and intution in the final parts of the series, although my books on philosophy and apologetics already explain this. (See the recommended readings.)
Moreover, there are several short articles planned for the blog that are also related to this.
For example, the law of contradiction (or non-contradiction) is undeniable. It is known not by arbitrary intution, but self-evident and undeniable "intuition" — that is, purely and directly in and by the mind apart from sensation. Why, then, is it not possible to make the law of contradiction our first principle? I will explain this in a future article. But again, if you can't wait, this is also already explained in Ultimate Questions and other books.
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
Arguing by Intuition, Part 3
I originally planned to address only the problems with basing one's arguments on intuition. The quote from Ganssle has provided us with a good example. However, in it he also brings up several points that are not directly connected with intuition, but are nevertheless problematic. So we will point them out before we move on to something else.
We will first turn our attention to the following statements:
If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.
First, let us acknowledge that Ganssle is not trying to construct a detailed case for his position in this portion of his book; it represents only a summary of his reasons for his position on freedom. However, this does not prevent us from criticizing what he has written, since he provides enough information here to tell us what kind of arguments he considers as valid rational support for his position.
Unless he completely changes the direction of his whole presentation, then even if given the time and space to elaborate, he would still argue his case using the same type of arguments. That is, even if given the time and space, he could give us only a more detailed version of the same fallacious thinking.
(Just before I put the following criticisms into writing, I carefully checked his book again, and paid special attention to the chapter in which these statements appear. Ganssle does try to provide more details and arguments in the prior pages. However, nothing that he says can serve to fend off the criticisms below. Readers who wish to verify this can check p. 129-137 of his book. An upcoming revised version of this series of articles will provide additional comments and documentations in the footnotes.)
In order to treat his points in some detail, we will deal with each of these statements individually.
"If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it."
This statement is so ambiguous that it is hard to know what to do with it. In particular, the crucial expression, "up to" is undefined. Depending on what he means, the expression can refer to anything from a volitional freedom relative to other creatures or a volitional freedom relative to God himself, which is absolute freedom.
Now, it appears that the language demands the latter interpretation. For one's action to be "up to" himself is contrasted with "determinism." The context of the book suggests that the "determinism" here is inclusive of, if not restricted to, divine determinism, or the idea that it is God who determines all things, including all human decisions. That is, if one's action is "up to" himself, then it is not determined by God.
But if this is true, then Ganssle is no longer talking about the God of the Bible. At this point, I must refer you to my previous works for detailed explanations on this subject. In any case, the expression "up to" remains ambiguous.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians
Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Malachi
Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil"
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
Arthur Pink, The Sovereignty of God
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
Church Shooting and The Problem of Evil
At the end of a news article on the recent church shooting, we read:
Don Free's niece, Angel Varichak, was one of the wounded. Free said she was expected to survive. "I wanted to know where God was when this happened," Free told the Chicago Sun-Times. "He was supposed to be everywhere. He could have at least been there."
I do care about the victims and have sympathy for them, but I care first about the truth and the honor of God, and it is this latter issue that I wish to address.
The article does not state whether Mr. Free is a Christian; in any case, what irritates me is that even professing Christians will talk like he does in similar situations (and this is also why I do not assume that Mr. Free is a self-admitted non-Christian even when he speaks as he does). But just because God is "there" does not mean that he must do what you think he should do.
How about saying, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him" (Job 13:15)? Of course an atheist would not say that, but a Christian ought to have such an attitude. To Mr. Free's way of thinking, we must reply, "I want to know where your faith/reason was when you said this. You were supposed to be rational and trust God. You could have at least reasoned correctly and trusted him on this."
There is no such thing as the "problem" of evil. The only problem here is in unbiblical/irrational thinking.
Related:
Vincent Cheung, "Tsunami and The Problem of Evil"
Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil"
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, God and Evil
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
The article mentioned above is at:
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=519
The Grand Old Book
Here is a short post for Sunday.
I would to God that we ministers kept more closely to the grand old Book! We should be instructive preachers if we did so, even if we were ignorant of "modern thought," and were not "abreast of the times." I warrant you we should be leagues ahead of our times if we kept closely to the Word of God.
Charles H. Spurgeon, Counsel for Christian Workers
(Christian Focus Publications, 2001), p. 89-90.
The "Arguing by Intuition" series of articles will continue on Monday.
Arguing by Intuition, Part 2
Continuing from "Arguing by Intuition, Part 1," we have been discussing the problems with basing the premises of our arguments on intuition, and we cited an example from Gregory E. Ganssle.
When debating Arminians, or when reading their literature, you will notice that many of them base a number of their crucial premises on intuition, and often on intuition alone. Ganssle's pattern of argument is very common with them — they just assume that their needed premises are true because to them they seem to be true. They say that they are convinced that these premises are true (often they say that we are all convinced), and then they proceed on that basis. One of these premises is that we all seem to have free will; another is that it would seem unjust to hold someone morally accountable who does not have free will. At least in these instances, their ultimate standard of truth and morality is not God's revelation but their own intuition. Their "seems like" seems unquestionable to them.
However, all the "seems like" could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don't know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone.
Many atheists also argue this way. For example, since they reject revelation, they cannot depend on it as a foundation for ethics. Then, when they turn to sensation, those who are less stupid realize that they cannot derive anything from sensation. Thus some turn to intuition, and claim that by it they know certain ethical principles. But other than the problems already mentioned (that intuition is subjective, non-universal, fallible, etc.), why must we obey intuition?
It is most unfortunate that many Reformed/Calvinistic writers also appeal to intuition to construct their arguments and their systems. When they do this, it is often because they are trying to assert some of the very same ideas and premises that the Arminians and the atheists affirm, such as unbiblical concepts of freedom and justice. But since these false premises cannot really be derived from biblical revelation, and since we can derive nothing at all from sensation, they take refuge in intuition. However, as we have shown, this is to banish themselves to subjectivism and irrelevance, and when Reformed/Calvinistic writers do this, they are being inconsistent with their otherwise biblical and rational theology.
One example is William G. T. Shedd. Although he is to be highly commended for being one of the least empirical among theologians, he fails to depend solely on divine revelation. Rather, appeals to intuition pervade his Dogmatic Theology, and he does this to establish premises and principles that in fact only Arminians should affirm, and that only Arminians need, such as a version of free will and an unbiblical basis for moral accountability.
As Reformed/Calvinistic Christians — as Christians whose views on God, man, and salvation are truly biblical — we must not and need not appeal to sensation or intuition, which can only lead to irrationalism and self-contradictory skepticism. Rather, we must cling to God's written revelation, which alone comes from Logos, the Reason of God, and which alone can save us and those who hear us.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation
Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Now part of Christian Philosophy)
Gordon Clark, Predestination
(See www.monergismbooks.com)
Comments on "Intuition"
The following refers to the blog entry, Arguing by Intuition, Part 1:
Your latest post "Arguing by Intuition, Part 1" was very interesting. While this is completely out of the precise subject you are dealing with, I hope that in the near future you can comment on this portion of Ganssle's remark:
"If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them."
I am subscribed to your feed through Atom, it has been very interesting this far. I will continue reading your contributions. Thanks.
Thank you for taking the time to write.
Yes, although I originally planned only two articles for "Intuition," afterwards I also thought that it would be a good idea to address the portion you quoted, at least to briefly state what's wrong with it. So this will probably appear as part 3 of "Intuition."
Again, thanks for writing, and please tell your friends.
Arguing by Intuition, Part 1
(The following is an edited response to an inquiry on the topic.)
Let me say something about arguing by intuition.
Gregory E. Ganssle recently published a book called Thinking about God. In one chapter, he explains freedom and determinism, and concludes by stating that he favors "libertarian free will." Note how he argues (p. 136-137):
Now, why should you agree with me about the nature of human freedom? Let me give you two reasons. First, it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him. If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them.
Second, libertarian free will makes the most sense of our deliberation. We often find ourselves deliberating between alternatives, and we are convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome. The decision we come to, upon deliberating, seems to be up to us. If freedom is not of the libertarian kind, then deliberation does not make as much sense. Thus, libertarian freedom is the better concept of freedom, and compatibilist freedom is no freedom at all.
This is terrible, terrible! I feel dirty just for typing it. There are numerous falsehoods and fallacies in these two paragraphs (my books have already addressed all of them), but I will deal with only those words that are relevant to our topic, which is intuition.
Note the words that I have highlighted in red. If we were to debate the issue of human freedom, or Calvinism vs. Arminianism, is Ganssle going to come at me with "seems strange," "we are convinced," and "seems to be"? I can just as readily say it "seems right," "I am not convinced, and "seems not to be"! Well, he is convinced of the premises that seems to him as true, but I can be just as convinced of the opposite.
Once you mix "seems like" as an essential part of your argument (instead of a non-essential part of your presentation, such as in a mere illustration), you have departed from the realm of strict rational argumentation. Also, you have just lost the right to forbid your opponent from using exactly the same argument, and to him it "seems like" that you are wrong.
When it comes to Calvinism vs. Arminianism, you may have heard something like, "If God is absolutely sovereign, then he controls even our decisions, and in this sense we do not have freedom or free will, but we sense (we are convinced, we feel, we think, it seems like, etc.) that we do have freedom or free will in our daily activities; therefore, Calvinism must be wrong." My response is that I sense or intuit, or it seems to me, that this person is an idiot; therefore, he is an idiot.
If he disagrees with my intuition, then why do I have to agree with his? If he tells me that I do not really sense or intuit that he is an idiot, then I can just as readily tell him that he does not really sense or intuit freedom. That is, if he can claim to know what is really going on in my mind, then I can just as readily claim to know what is really going on in his mind.
He is claiming to know what we all intuit. Among other things, he says:
- I intuitively hold to a standard of ethics such that "it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him,"
- I am "convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome," and
- The decision that I come to, upon deliberating, "seems [to me] to be" up to me.
However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, if he can claim to know what I intuitively affirm in my own mind, then why can't I also claim to know what he intuitively affirms in his mind? Thus I affirm that "we are convinced" that he is wrong, and that he "seems to be" quite confused and arbitrary. Unless he stops arguing by intuition as he does, he cannot with consistency reject my claims.
So the whole thing amounts to purely subjective nonsense.
(To be continued.)
Recommended:
Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions
Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations
Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation
Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"
(See www.rmiweb.org)
Gordon Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Now part of Christian Philosophy)
(See www.monergismbooks.com)