Archive June 2005

Invincibility, Irrefutability, and Infallibility

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

(The following is an edited email correspondence.)

You always claim that your writings are invincible. I am not even saying I disagree with you, but sometimes you come off kind of strong, maybe a little too strong. The point is that couldn't your writings contain errors? You even said yourself that you have taken some of your past writings off your site because they were not on target.

Perhaps there is a misunderstanding as to precisely what I am claiming and about what I am making the claim, and there seems to be some confusion about the meanings and implications of invincibility, irrefutability, and infallibility. But it is good that you asked this, because other people might also have a similar misunderstanding and confusion.

I do claim that a number of things that I have written are invincible and irrefutable. Many of these things I have said are in fact in agreement with many other theologians, and in those cases, especially when they have also presented similar arguments, I would just as readily affirm that they are also invincible and irrefutable on those points.

For example, I would affirm that Luther on divine sovereignty, Charles Hodge on justification by faith, Robert Reymond on the deity of Christ, and many other theologians on many other topics, are invincible and irrefutable. They have correctly built their arguments for these doctrines from Scripture, and Scripture is invincible and irrefutable. So when I claim that I am invincible and irrefutable on certain points, I am not claiming something that is exclusive or unique to me.

This is very different from claiming infallibility. As an example, take my claim that my apologetic method is invincible and irrefutable. Now, to say that a certain apologetic method is invincible and irrefutable is very different from saying that the person is infallible, and that a person is fallible does not mean that he is wrong all the time. It is possible for me to write "1 + 1 = 2" a hundred times in an essay without making a mistake, and this essay would indeed be invincible and irrefutable (even if not very interesting), but this doesn’t mean that I am infallible.

I have stopped making some of my earliest materials available because they "contain errors." This is true, but I never claimed infallibility, and I don’t need infallibility to be invincible and irrefutable on some points. Also, I never said that they were full of errors, but only that I have improved and have written better materials to replace them. This also implies that I hold myself to a very high standard, and thus if it is relevant at all, it tends to confirm my credibility rather than to undermine it. These old materials contained a number of deficiencies and errors because: (1) When I wrote them, I was practically a kid, and (2) At the time of their writing, I had not yet considered the relevant topics with nearly as much thoughtful and even prolonged agonizing consideration as I have done since. In addition — and this is an important point — I never claimed invincibility or irrefutability for these old materials.

Also, this goes to show that I am willing to admit my mistakes, even to the point of pulling materials off the shelves and then publicly discussing it. Thus there is no intellectual hypocrisy or double standard here: I am just as ruthless toward the errors in my own works as I am toward those in the works of others. Anyway, those materials were produced at the earliest stage of my ministry, not long after my conversion, in fact, and while I was not nearly as well-known as I am now (not that I am very well-known now, only that I was still more obscure then). So I could easily forgo mentioning it and nobody would notice. Yet, I have not tried to hide past errors even though I have no moral obligation to tell everybody about them. It is with this same mindset, and the same willingness to admit error, that I insist that there is no possibility that my present apologetic method (among other things) can be defeated or refuted, either by reason or by revelation. This is the plain truth, and to say otherwise would not be humble, but dishonest.

In contrast to the old materials, all of my beliefs regarding the core issues in my theology and in my writings are conclusions resulting from careful consideration, diligent comparison, and rigorous deductions. For the rest of my life, there is zero possibility that I will change my mind regarding these points. For example, I will never abandon Calvinism to embrace Arminianism. This is not because I have become stuck to my personal preferences or traditions, but because Calvinism has been biblically and rationally established, and Arminianism has been biblically and rationally demolished. The result is conclusive, and I know it. Since I know it, I am going to talk about it with an assurance that matches my certainty. If I am sure, how can I say that I could be wrong? If I say that I could be wrong, then it means that I am not sure. Or should I not be sure about anything? Are you sure about that?

I come off strong because, at the risk of being misinterpreted as arrogant, I wish to impart my confidence toward the Scripture to people. And I repeatedly remind the readers that I am so sure only because my own confidence is derived from the infallibility of Scripture. So I am not going to undermine my own materials by adopting a false humility, even if it would be more socially acceptable. Christians so rarely witness any faith in their leaders that when one comes out and shows it, everybody thinks that he is just being arrogant. But they have been brainwashed by a non-Christian standard. If the Christians cannot claim invincibility and irrefutability because of the Scripture’s infallibility, then the non-Christians will always have a place to stand in the intellectual realm. But on the authority of Scripture and in the name of Christ, I allow the unbelievers no such place to stand.

(This is also related to why I use what many consider to be offensive invectives when describing the intelligence and the lifestyle of the unbelievers. I wish to make a sharp contrast between light and darkness, wisdom and folly, etc., not to mention that most of the invectives that I use are either directly taken from Scripture, or are appropriately derived from Scripture.)

If something is true and you affirm it, then you must be right on that point. If you are not sure that something is true, then don’t say it, and there is no problem. Too many theologians and preachers say, "This MUST be true…but I could be wrong." This is not humble, just stupid. Don’t be fooled by the constant self-abasement practiced by some people. It might be that they are in fact humble individuals, but on the other hand, they might just be spineless losers. They make an uncertain sound, and the people who hear them become confused and hesitant rather than focused and militant.

To illustrate, one can lose more faith listening to William Lane Craig defend the faith than one might gain. He makes his own arguments sound so uncertain. Everything is soft and merely probable, but nothing is certain, nothing is absolute and irrefutable. This is not humble — it is just pathetic. In terms of attitude, Norman Geisler is much better.

Now, other than my positions on the core issues, I admit that certain statements in my books could be wrong. But I have never claimed to be infallible, only that my method of apologetics is invincible (it will always defeat the opponent) and irrefutable (it cannot be defeated by any opponent). And it is invincible and irrefutable because it is biblical and rational. This is still true even if certain non-essential statements in my books are mistaken. Again, a general invincibility and irrefutability is very different from infallibility or absolute perfection, and I have never claimed to be infallible.

To illustrate, if you were to write an essay showing from the Scripture that Christ is God, then you better claim invincibility and irrefutability (even if your presentation is not the best, and even if not every statement in your essay is correct). Some things are just RIGHT, and you ought to know it and claim it, and try to pass on this confidence to others.

That said, there are indeed a number of things — some major and general, some minor and specific — that I am uncertain about. And if you will go through my writings, you will find that I always qualify those statements with words like "maybe," "probably," "it is possible," "it is my opinion," and so forth. Sometimes, I am uncertain because I am just being consistent with my epistemology; at other times, I am uncertain because I have not yet thoroughly studied and considered the relevant issues and arguments, so that I am unwilling to take a definite position. Moreover, there are some things that I refrain from mentioning altogether because I am not yet certain about the correct position; meanwhile, I continue to spend time researching those topics.

In fact, I qualify many statements regarding things that other people would claim to be sure about based on their false epistemology, but my standard is much higher. This also means that when I declare that a given position is invincible and irrefutable, I have already applied a much greater skepticism against the position than any of my critics and opponents could ever muster.

Recommended:

John Stackhouse and "Humble" Apologetics

Captive to Reason

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations

Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation

Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy

Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things

Carl F. H. Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief

Excluded by Necessity

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

(The following is an edited email correspondence.)

My friend has asked one of the most commonly raised objections to Christianity, and I've soberly realized that since I never took the time to read through any critiques of this argument, I find myself unprepared to answer him adequately.

His simple objection is this: why does the Christian God have to be the one true God, and not the God of any other religion/myth? I realize I could go through and point out the insufficiencies of each major religion's god, but is there also a way to positively demonstrate Christianity's sole claim to truth?

Your ministry has been an unimaginable blessing for me as I prepare to go off to a nominally conservative Christian university where liberal theology abounds in disguise. I've just bought two of your books (Presuppositional Confrontations and Apologetics in Conversation) and am absolutely anxious for them to arrive; until then, your blog keeps me well occupied. I thank God for your writings and pray that your ministry will continue to be blessed.

Thanks for your comments. It is enough just to call me "Vincent" in the future.

For any true proposition, there is literally an infinite number of possible errors related to it or deviations from it. For example, if 1+1=2 is true, then the possible errors and deviations would include 1+1=3, 4, 5,….n.

Therefore, it is impossible to make a specific refutation of every individual possible error or deviation from the truth. Instead, what we need is a positive claim or argument that excludes all errors or deviations by logical necessity.

In our case, if Christianity (the Bible) is true, and this same Christianity declares that all non-Christian claims and worldviews are false, then all non-Christian claims and worldviews are therefore false by logical necessity.

Now, to eliminate all non-Christian claims and worldviews by logical necessity would demand that your positive demonstration be correct by logical necessity. Supposing that we have such an apologetic, the situation would become thus:

1. Christianity is true by logical necessity.
2. Christianity excludes all non-Christian views.
3. Therefore, all non-Christian views are false by logical necessity.

So the key is (1) — the rest are easy and automatic. And to attain (1), you will have to read my works on apologetics and learn how to skillfully apply the method. I recommend reading Ultimate Questions (at least ch. 1 and 2), Presuppositional Confrontations, and Apologetics in Conversation, probably best in this order.

Then, this forces your opponent to interact with the Christian's positive construction, rather than allowing him to evade the force of your presentation just by throwing mere possibilities at you — since you have destroyed those possibilities, not by specific refutations, but by logical necessity.

Now, if you are dealing with someone with a specific non-Christian worldview, you might also perform a refutation of his particular belief system. This would function to show that you are not trying to avoid his own positive arguments, and (since some might be confused about elimination by logical necessity) to show him that you are not hiding behind mere sophism.

But remember that you need to actually have a positive case to execute the above. For this, I would prescribe my works on theology and apologetics.

I hope that this is helpful.

— /// —

And I hope that it is OK to edit your message and my response for a blog entry, so that others may benefit. As usual, I will eliminate all personal details, and include only what is necessary for readers to understand the context, as well as any comments that would encourage people to give my works their careful consideration.

Absolutely. Thank you so much for your prompt response. (And I keep forgetting that all of your books are in PDF format…brilliant idea.)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations

Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation

Vincent Cheung, The Light of Our Minds

Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy

Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things

Carl F. H. Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief

Man's Innate Knowledge

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

(The following is an edited response to a question from a reader, sent to me some time ago. The question was brought up in the context of my Systematic Theology, but it is also relevant to the previous entry, Common Ground.)

I affirm that man has an innate knowledge of God, with enough clarity and content so that he is without excuse in denying or disobeying God.

However, I deny that a system of theology can be based on our innate knowledge of God. Or, to say it another way, I deny that our innate knowledge of God can be the first principle of the biblical worldview — there is insufficient content, clarity, and objectivity, among other reasons.

This is why I never appeal to intuition to justify any part of my theology or to perform apologetics. An accurate understanding of the content and the extent of our own innate knowledge of God comes from verbal revelation in the first place.

To say this yet another way, although I affirm that we have an innate knowledge of God, we do not base our faith and assurance or our theology and apologetics on this innate knowledge; rather, we must base these things on verbal revelation.

I do "appeal" to man’s innate knowledge in my writings, but I never do this as if the truth of Christianity rests on this as its foundation, or as if this innate knowledge is itself proof that Christianity is true. Otherwise, this would become an appeal to man’s intuition, and the argument would become subjective.

Rather, I appeal to this innate knowledge only to explain why biblical presuppositions are not denied in practice but are implicitly assumed even by unbelievers, and to explain in what sense we have common ground or a point of contact with the unbelievers when preaching the gospel to them.

So, although I affirm that Scripture is indeed logically undeniable, when I use "undeniable" in the context of discussing man’s innate knowledge, the emphasis then is not on the logical undeniability of Scripture, but that some core biblical premises cannot be denied in practice despite the unbelievers’ claim to the contrary.

Thus, we refer to man’s innate knowledge not to prove Scripture (rather, it is Scripture that proves the innate knowledge), but only to explain why we can communicate with unbelievers and how to properly relate to them.

In other words, when we are speaking of the innate knowledge of God, we are considering the strategic aspect of apologetics, and not the strictly rational aspect. That the Scripture is logically undeniable is demonstrated by engaging the contents of Scripture itself, and not man’s innate knowledge.

Some people have failed to note this distinction in my writings (or mistakenly think that I have failed to make this distinction in my writings), so that they falsely accused me of being incoherent on this point (that is, as if I deny intuition and then appeal to it anyway). Rather, in my system of theology and apologetics, (if not for the fact that Scripture teaches it) we can throw out man’s innate knowledge altogether and it will remain essentially unaffected (although some practical adjustments will be needed), since it does not depend on man’s innate knowledge.

Then, you wrote, "I'm thinking maybe what is suppressed is the innate knowledge of God which is written on every man's heart." This is exactly right. But you would like to know why this is still called knowledge, if it is suppressed to the point of being denied. The explanation is that just because you know something does not mean that you consciously think about it all the time. However, if you know something, it does imply that it can potentially be recalled.

This has similarities to what people mean when they refer to repressed memory, although I am wary of the implications that can come from using the word. When it comes to our innate knowledge of God, Scripture teaches that sinners know God in their minds, but they have, in a morally culpable way, suppressed or repressed this knowledge. Greg Bahnsen called this the sinner's "self-deception."

In regeneration, the elect sinner is awakened, as if from a deep slumber away from wisdom and knowledge, and into the light of Christ and Truth:

But everything exposed by the light becomes visible, for it is light that makes everything visible. This is why it is said: "Wake up, O sleeper, rise from the dead, and Christ will shine on you." (Ephesians 5:13–14)

To read more about man’s innate knowledge of God, and its implications and uses, please see my Systematic Theology, Ultimate Questions, and Presuppositional Confrontations.

Recommended:

Common Ground

Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations

Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation

Common Ground

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

(The following is an edited email correspondence.)

I am most interested in a point that you put forth in your book, Presuppositional Confrontations. My hope is that you will further expound upon this point for me:

"The real common ground that the Christian has with the non-Christian is that they are both made in the image of God. However, the non-Christian suppresses and denies this common ground in his explicit philosophy. Therefore, in terms of our explicit philosophies, there is no common ground between the Christian and the non-Christian. But the knowledge of God is inescapable, and surfaces in distorted form at various point of the non-Christian's philosophy. Thus the Christian argues that the non-Christian already knows about the true God and denies it, which means that the non-Christian is without excuse and subject to condemnation." (PDF, p. 29)

We must never say that there is absolutely no common ground between believers and unbelievers, but we can say that there is no explicit common ground, since unbelievers deny what they already know about God. But since they already know something true about God, then there is common ground at least in this sense, although unbelievers suppress or deny this in their explicit philosophy.

If there is absolutely no common ground in any sense, then unbelievers would not even be human. However, we have at least the image of God in common with them, and also the universal and inescapable knowledge about God and his moral laws.

There is no explicit agreement between Christian and non-Christian philosophy, and in this sense, there is no common ground. This is in opposition to classical and evidential apologetics, which say that unbelievers have "common ground" in the sense that they do not even need to reject their basic principles to reach God, and that they just need to use those principles a little better.

But there is really zero common ground in our explicit philosophy, because even 1 + 1 = 2 means something different to me than to an unbeliever. I think of it in relation to God, but the unbeliever doesn't, and it is possible to write out this "relationship" in propositional form. Therefore, "1 + 1 = 2" is a shorthand for something that has different meanings and implications for the believers and unbelievers. In this sense, there is no common ground. Thus the unbelievers must give up their basic principles to convert.

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations

Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation

Gordon Clark, Karl Barth’s Theological Method (ch. 4)

Compromise, Then Apologize

This week, the Internet has been buzzing with Joel Osteen’s compromise of the gospel on Larry King’s show. Now it is buzzing again with Osteen’s apology. In one moment the Christians denounce him as a compromiser, if not a heretic, and in the next the same Christians advertise him as the very picture of humility.

This is a great strategy: compromise to the unbelievers, and then apologize to the believers. This way, you score points on both sides.

When both the unbelievers and the believers are listening, you don’t insist that faith in Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation, and that all unbelievers will go to hell. Then, when you apologize to the believers, you tell them that you really do believe that Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation. This way, you appear tolerant to the unbelievers, and you appear humble to the believers. The brownie points gained from this are astronomical, and the free publicity is not bad, either.

Yes, we should accept his apology at its face value (Luke 17:4), and I do. But the real test is what Osteen will say the NEXT time he has the opportunity to address such a big audience.

Consider this: Peter compromised, then he repented, but his repentance was shown to be genuine when he boldly preached the gospel in Acts 2, and this included charging the Jews with murder (Acts 2:23, 36), and later, he explicitly stated that Jesus was the only way to salvation (Acts 4:12).

Next time, when Osteen is asked the same questions again, will he give the biblical, uncompromising, and offensive answers? Will he say that Christians will go to heaven, but non-Christians will go to hell, to be tormented forever? We hope so. But even if we forget about this entire Larry King incident (since we accept his apology), his record discourages us from expecting too much GOSPEL from him. As it is, my judgment is that he is not one tenth of the man that his late father was. Like him or not (some people opposed his Charismatic and Word of Faith theology), JOHN Osteen never compromised the doctrine of salvation by Christ alone, and certainly never like this.

I am not really interested in writing about Osteen, so he is not in fact the main point of this post. Rather, I am concerned that Christians are too often fooled by apologies. I can become a bigger hero in the eyes of many Christians if I would kill, rape, and pillage, and then apologize, than if I were to live a holy lifestyle all of my life in obedience to Christ. This is wrong.

Now another famous charismatic personality comes to mind. It was exposed that he was having a homosexual relationship with his personal assistant. So he apologized and took only three months off, and then went back to preaching again. Now, those who oppose him oppose him still, but by his apology, he actually obtained greater favor with many people. And no one seems to care about the homosexual relationship, that he only took three months off, or whether he has genuinely changed after this.

Consider another example: Jim Bakker published I Was Wrong, and now droves of Christians (mostly Charismatics?) flock to hear him. In the Christian world, you can become an instant celebrity if you will first become a criminal, and then apologize.

We should accept an apology at its face value (since we cannot judge the heart), and we should rejoice over genuine repentance, but we should not make the person into a hero. Rather, after accepting the apology, we should demand real change in the person's doctrine and lifestyle, and call for him to make reparations to the cause of Christ (for example, by going back to the unbelievers and preach the real, biblical, and offensive gospel to them).

In some cases, the person should repent, and then just resign from the ministry, either permanently, or until he gains the proper qualifications (in terms of doctrine and character).

We should not be fooled by a "compromise, then apologize" strategy. I am not saying that this is necessarily what Osteen has done, since it might really be the case that he has realized his error and has determined to change — but don’t be totally surprised if he compromises again the next time.

The Word and Prayer

The means of sanctification may be comprehended under two general heads: the Word of God and prayer. The first is the food which is provided for the nourishment of the soul and by which it lives. Christ himself is indeed the bread of life — the manna that came down from heaven; but it is only in the Word, that we can find Christ; there He is revealed — there His dignity and glory are manifested — there we behold His holy life, miracles, sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension, and intercession. The whole object of faith, love, and hope is found in the Word of God. Therefore, it is by the assiduous study of the Word, and meditation on its truths, that we are to expect an increase of faith and a real growth in grace.

The other principal means of growth is prayer; especially, prayer for the influences of the Holy Spirit. Without the Spirit, as we have seen, there can be no progress; but this sum of blessings is graciously promised in answer to prayer. And these two means are harmonious; for the Word is the "sword of the Spirit" (Eph. 6:17). The Spirit operates only by the Word. Therefore, though we read that sanctification is of the Spirit, we also read that effectual prayer of Jesus Christ, "Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth" (John 17:17).

Archibald Alexander,
A Brief Compendium of Bible Truth
(Reformation Heritage Books), p. 144–145.

Recommended:
Prayer and Revelation

Half Empty, Half Full

~ Taken from Vincent Cheung, Captive to Reason. Footnotes excluded. ~

I was dialoguing with someone and he stated that "truth is just a matter of one's own perception."

He explained with an illustration. Take a glass of water which is half full. One person looking at the glass may say it is half full, and another person looking at it may say it is half empty. Which person is right? That was his line of argument.

Please show me how to answer something like this.

I have addressed relativism (and subjectivism, etc.) in several places in my books, so you should review what I have already written on the subject. You should also read my Apologetics in Conversation to learn how to deal with people in conversation.

A basic response to relativism is that it is self-refuting. If he says that "truth is a matter of perception," then even this statement is only a matter of perception, so that it cannot be universally true that truth is a matter of perception. In other words, that truth is a matter of perception is nothing more than the person's perception. It does not mean that it is necessarily the case, and it does not mean that you have to accept it.

Then, the illustration consists of statements that are too ambiguous to prove his point, since they leave out vital information such as the reference point and the objects being considered, but once you insert the missing information, the statements become clearly absolute. That is, considering the full capacity of the glass, half of it contains water, and half it contains non-water (let us just say air). I am referring to only the water when I say, "The glass is half full," and I am referring to only the air (non-water part) when I say, "The glass is half empty," but both are absolute statements.

The claim is also sophistical. You mean something definite and different by "truth" (X) and "perception" (Y), and all he does is to change the meaning of "truth" so that it attaches to Y rather than to X. In other words, he is saying, "The word that you use to designate X should be used to designate Y instead." But then, what about X? Is there such a thing as X or not? Is X coherent or not? He evades this matter of truth without refuting it. In effect, his illustration merely explains to you what he means by Y, rather than refuting your conception of X.

It is possible to change the word "car" so that it now refers to a bicycle by declaring, "a car is just a bicycle," and then you can describe a bicycle to illustrate your meaning, but this has nothing to do with whether or not there are four-wheeled motorized transportation devices. Taking away the word "car" from you does not actually take away the car.

Moreover, once he has affirmed his premise, that "truth is a matter of perception," from now on everything that he says should be taken as just "a matter of perception." This is the logical consequence of his philosophy. You should not only tell him this, but you should really act like it and treat him by this standard in all your conversations and interactions with him.

That is, argue with him according to the logical implications of his philosophy, and then treat him according to its practical implications. Insist on this even when there will be serious or even dangerous consequences for him, for example, in matters that have to do with money, legality, or safety, and each time, remind him that you are only following his standard. He must either surrender, or suffer the consequences of his own philosophy.

Although I will be the first to tell you that only logical consequences matter in intellectual debate, and that practical consequences never amount to a logical refutation, he should indeed endure these consequences if he stands by his philosophy of relativism. If he will not heed rational arguments, perhaps this non-rational (practical) means of persuasion will make him reconsider the rational merits of his position. On the other hand, since he has not proved his premise (and he cannot, because any proof would just be a matter of perception), and since you have not affirmed it, the things that you say do not need to be taken as just a matter of perception.

Depending on his attitude and response (he might not surrender so easily), you might need to shock and offend him. So, with tape recorder in hand, ask him to restate his premise, that "truth is only a matter of perception." Then, you can say, it follows that it is only a matter of perception that his mother is not a slut and a whore, and that from a certain perspective, it is indeed "true" that his mother is a slut and a whore. Force him to admit it without evasion and qualification. After that, call his parents and play the tape back to them.

Repeat the procedure for other situations and relationships in his life. Make him admit that it is only a matter of perception that he is not stealing company property at his place of employment, and that from a certain perspective, it is indeed "true" that he is stealing company property. Then, call his employer and play him the tape.

Then, make him admit that he is an adulterer and that his wife is an ugly pig (as a matter of perception, of course), and then play the tape back to his wife. Make him admit that he is a murderer and a rapist, and that he wants to murder and rape his own children (again, as a matter of perception), and then play the tape back to his children, or also to everyone who knows him.

Of course, you should tell him that you are recording him and what you are going to do with the tape, giving him a chance to recant his philosophy. You are not trying to trick him, or to make him admit anything that is contrary to his own explicit philosophy. You are not really the one saying these things (since you deny that truth is just a matter of perception), but you are asking him whether these are some of the things that he would say, as he should, given his philosophy. He ought to be fine with the consequences, brought upon him by his own philosophy. Perhaps he should defend himself to those he thus offends by teaching them relativism.

If anything bad happens to him, he has done it to himself by his philosophy. If trouble befalls him because of this, then it is still just "a matter of perception" that these consequences are undesirable. He does not have to be a relativist, and he can surrender at any time when you confront him as above. So it is his fault if he remains stubborn.

In any case, this procedure is a pragmatic method, making his life unlivable by his philosophy, and nothing in it amounts to a logical refutation of relativism. Thus, even if he surrenders under these circumstances, it does not mean that you have logically refuted relativism by pragmatism, since pragmatism cannot refute anything. However, by employing this non-rational method, you might successfully force this irrational person to engage you again in debate, and to reconsider the rational merits of the biblical view.

Recommended
Ultimate Questions
Presuppositional Confrontations
Apologetics in Conversation
Captive to Reason
Professional Morons
A Moron By Any Other Name
Commentary on First Peter (p. 146-149)
The Context of 1 Peter 3:15
Power Apologetics
John Stackhouse and "Humble" Apologetics
Biblical Rationalism vs. Psycho Assertionism

Short Answers to Several Criticisms

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

The following includes a number of objections against my anti-empiricism. They were taken from an Internet discussion board, and sent to me by one of my readers a while ago. Although these objections are weak and careless, they represent some of the frequent misunderstandings and fallacious reasonings that Christian empiricists (or at least Christians who embrace some version or some degree of empiricism) have toward my position. So what follows should still help a number of people.

I have performed some minor editing to make both the objections and my answers more presentable. The objections are in blue and my answers are in black.

Although the objections were written by several different people, it is not important to designate the author of each objection, so for the sake of clarity and convenience, I have edited my answers as if all the objections were written by "Tom" (not anyone’s real name).

Also, since the reader who sent me the objections was already familiar with my writings and my arguments, most of my answers to him were short. I have expanded on some of these answers in what follows, but not by much. Thus, for more details, please consult the recommended readings at the bottom of this blog entry.

— 01 —

One thing that makes me unable to understand how anyone could hold that belief of Clark's is that the nerves in the brain are sensory, and thus by making the decision to think specific things and change thought processes in their minds, are they not thus relying on their senses in order to even think, and thus relying on their senses to deduce with logic and attain knowledge?

This badly begs the question. It already assumes that science is right and/or that any/all thinking occurs in the brain. Who says?

In fact, I deny that any thinking occurs in the brain, but that whatever coincidentally occurs in the brain while someone thinks, thinking itself occurs only in the incorporeal mind.

— 02 —

Here's something that's problematic: one uses his senses to read the words in the Bible. If the senses allow us to recall what we already know about God, then what of other parts in the Bible? For example, David's adultery. It is hard to imagine that we already knew about this adultery via some innate knowledge. David's adultery is not something we know about God (what would this mean even). So, we can't know that David committed adultary even though it is the infallible word of God.

This entails a very bad misunderstanding of both Gordon Clark and me. We never said that all knowledge is innate, only that all knowledge must come from God apart from sensation, but some knowledge comes from God on the occasion of sensation (but still apart from sensation).

As for the claim that we must use the senses to read the Bible, I have already answered this in several places.

Also, note even if it is true that we need the senses to read the Bible (although, again, I have refuted this), this observation alone does not prove empiricism, so that unless Tom can prove empiricism, we would just end up with skepticism, which means that no one can read the Bible.

But whereas Tom cannot read the Bible before proving empiricism, I can, and precisely because I reject empiricism.

See:

Ultimate Questions, p. 38-43.

Presuppositional Confrontations, p. 68-74.

Occasionalism and Empiricism

The Transcendental Argument for Materialism

— 03 —

I don't see how he can deny that we can know ANYTHING through sense perception. Surely, we can even know certain things about God through sense perception (Romans 1).

I have already dealt with Romans 1 in my books, showing that it does not entail empiricism.

— 04 —

I'd be interested in seeing if a third man argument would work against this, since it is one of the most devastating argument against Plato's theory of knowledge (recollection) which seems to be, with some modifications, similar to Cheung's.

If we must compare, I am closer to Augustine, and the Logos doctrine of various Church Fathers, not Plato.

But I am in fact just applying the necessary implications of the biblical doctrines of divine sovereignty, providence, etc. Or is God sovereign over all things, except sensations?

— 05 —

Your critiques are only against one view of sense perception. I don't have the view that facts bear their own meaning. I would tend more towards Quine's "web" program. But nonetheless, you use your senses to obtain knowledge. Tell me, how would you know how many ants were in your backyard? Did you know this previously?

Note that he never tells us exactly how any knowledge can come from sensation. He just keeps on saying that it must be so. But none of the things that he says necessarily entails that any knowledge can come from sensation.

He accuses me of following Plato (which I deny) — but is he now following Quine (which he admits)?

He should give an account of how he can support sensation from Scripture, keeping in mind that to show that somebody saw something does not support sensation. I never deny that we see (that is, the act occurs), but that knowledge does not come from what we see; rather, God must work.

And who says we know how many ants are in our backyard? Does he know?

As for knowing "previously," this is again the misunderstanding that we say that all knowledge is innate, which we never taught.

— 06 —

But since, in some cases, our senses are required to obtain knowledge (e.g., how many ants are in my back yard), then I would say that in those cases senses are a necessary feature of gaining knowledge.

How true! If the senses are necessary, then the senses are necessary.

But are the senses necessary? And necessary for what? What exactly do they do? How?

Now if knowledge can rationally be derived from sensation, then it could be written out as a propositional argument or a syllogism. I want him to write out the syllogism so that we can examine its validity.

— 07 —

Sorry, brother, but you just proved too much! If God conveys ALL things, then he conveys "John's" belief that a heretic is correct, and also "Tim's" belief that he is not correct! God is not the author of confusion. I think this is devestating to what you just argued.

So are heretics autonomous? As I repeatedly point out, such inconsistent Calvinism results in dualism — two opposing power of good and evil, instead of one God who reigns supreme.

See:

The Author of Sin

The Author of Confusion

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

— 08 —

Furthermore, the observations are not dependent on the molecules! The molecules are the same, regardless. It is the way man’s brain interprets the collection of molecules which results in hallucination.

This does not directly attack my position, but it betrays the person’s fallacious thinking.

That is, it begs the question. He is leaning on science again, and he assumes premises that, if empiricism is false, could never be established.

What are molecules anyway? Do we know that there are such things? Really, we know that? We are sure? How?

I would ask that he first proves empiricism, and then science, before using these premises, since empiricism and science are precisely the things being questioned.

As for the comment on "the way man’s brain interprets the collection of molecules," how does he know that? Does the brain "think" at all? Does it interpret anything at all?

— 09 —

Lastly, if God is in control of EVERYTHING, and conveys EVERYTHING to people, then, what about this: John "sees" a bee on a rose, but "Tim" doesn't see it. John believes that his observation was true. Tim believes the converse. So, God conveyed A and not-A?

Of course. So what?

There is only a problem if we say that God affirms both A and not-A.

But note what Tom is thinking. His question implies that God does not really control EVERYTHING. In fact, if we take his words seriously, he is saying that God is not even "in control" of everything.

So our problem is not really first about sensation or empiricism, but that Tom does not even affirm divine sovereignty, or to speak charitably, he is at least being very inconsistent here.

Tom speaks as if false information occurs autonomously! But how? By spontaneous generation? By autonomous sensation? By free will?

If Tom cannot believe that God controls false information, then how can he believe that God is even now directly sustaining Satan himself? Or as Luther affirms, that God even now controls (not only sustains) Satan?

See:

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will

— 10 —

Now, of course God can tell you how many ants are in your backyard, but is this the normal operation of how things work? Indeed, I'm very interested in exploring this concept and the view that there is no new revelation.

I do not say that there is "new revelation." I am saying that God’s control over all knowledge and all mental acts is the normal operation of things. It is a matter of ordinary providence.

Here it is as if Tom is saying that if God controls anything today, then that must be a miracle. And if he controls knowledge, then there must be new revelation (in the same sense as biblical revelation). Is Tom a deist?

Just as I believe that the death of a sparrow is still controlled by God, without calling that a miracle (since a miracle is special providence, but the death of a sparrow is ordinary providence), I merely include knowledge in the category of ordinary providence, as anyone must who affirms the biblical doctrine.

But Tom wants to protect sensation and autonomous evil and errors, and therefore his position becomes inconsistent.

— 11 —

But, the whole faculty of man, which God created with eyes and ears in order to learn and know things about his environment, does use his senses to aquire knowledge, but this cannot be separated from his rationality (i.e. seeing a tree and coming to a conclusion also involves a chain of reasoning).

Just because God created something does not mean that it is for the purposes and functions that Tom thinks. Tom’s statement begs the question. He says that God created eyes and ears "to learn," but this is precisely the point we are arguing about. Asserting it again does not make it true.

Then, Tom admits that seeing a tree and coming to a conclusion involves a chain of reasoning. Good! This gets closer to my point: Is the chain of reasoning logically valid? Write it out as a syllogism and let us examine it.

— 12 —

You missed my point about John and Tim. I said that God told one a LIE and the other a TRUTH. Does God lie?

This betrays a strange confusion. Telling is different from facilitating or controlling. I am talking about metaphysics, and he is talking about (it seems) an interpersonal relationship. Yes, God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches), but that is different from him telling a lie as if he claims that it is the truth.

— 13 —

I would still need that verse refuted for as it stands: the Lord of Glory has told us that "when you SEE the fig tree you KNOW that summer is near."

Right. When you see a mirage, there must be water (or whatever you see). Hallucinations never happen. Nonsense.

It is fallacious to infer from this verse a simplistic "I see, therefore I know" epistemology. Otherwise, it would be impossible to make a mistake, so that when I SEE water, I KNOW that there is water, and that it must not be a mirage.

Also, as I have pointed out in Presuppositional Confrontations when refuting Ronald Nash, when the Bible acknowledges that someone saw something, it is not the same as affirming sensation as a means to knowledge.

For example, if John writes, "Peter saw the resurrected Christ," I can accept John's statement about what Peter saw without accepting sensation itself as a way to knowledge. The object of my belief is John's inspired statement, not Peter's fallible sensation. For all I know, Peter’s sensations could be wrong in all instances but this one, and I only know that he is right this time because John infallibly (by inspiration) says so.

In other words, I agree that when I think that I am looking at a red car, it is possible that I am indeed looking at a red car (but it is also possible that I am dreaming, or looking at the blue sky). The problem is, how do I know in this instance whether I am indeed looking at a red car? Now, if God infallibly affirms that I am indeed looking at a red car, then I know that in this instance what I think I see indeed corresponds to physical reality.

But from this, it would be fallacious to infer, "Therefore, sensation yields knowledge." No, it is God's infallible affirmation (that I am looking at a red car) that gives me the knowledge (that I am looking at a red car), and not my act of looking at the red car. That is, the sensation provides the occasion for God's infallible affirmation, not knowledge itself.

This is the kind of invalid inference that Tom has made with the verse from Jesus. That is, from Jesus' infallible affirmation of something, Tom infers that the very means that the Pharisees thought that they had obtained the information is also reliable.

Does Tom want to prove that sensations are in fact infallible? I am guessing that he does not. But then how can the verse that he quotes allow for mistakes in sensation, if Jesus is approving sensation itself instead of making an infallible judgment about the sensation (of seeing the fig tree)?

I affirm the words of Jesus in the verse, not the sensation of the Pharisees (of seeing the fig tree). But if Tom, on the basis of this verse, directly affirms the sensation of the Pharisees, then how can he reject other sensations or inferences from sensations?

That is, I know that "when you see the fig tree, you know that summer is near" only because Jesus said so. For all I know, the Pharisees could be wrong about every other instance of sensation.

If we are going to be logical and rational, then let's be strictly logical and rational. An inference is valid only if you can write it out as a syllogism and show that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Tom fails to do this in his defense of sensation as a way of knowing.

Recommended:
Occasionalism and Empiricism
The Transcendental Argument for Materialism
"But What is Knowledge?"
But Where is the Refutation?
Biblical Rationalism vs. Psycho Assertionism
The Author of Sin
The Author of Confusion
Compatibilist Freedom
Augustine and Compatibilism
"Soft" Determinism
Determinism vs. Fatalism
"Forced to Believe" (1)
"Forced to Believe" (2)
"Forced to Believe" (3)
"Forced to Believe" (4)
Ultimate Questions
Presuppositional Confrontations
Apologetics in Conversation
Systematic Theology
Commentary on Ephesians
Chosen in Christ
The Problem of Evil
Arguing by Intuition

Apologetics for Christian Students

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

The following is an edited email correspondence. I hope that it will encourage high school and college students to study my works on theology and apologetics.

I am a Junior philosophy major at an university in Texas. The school is associated with the Disciples of Christ Church (an incredibly liberal church), and the philosophy department is made up of six atheist professors.

Last semester I took a class on modern epistemology and found myself somewhat disappointed by the lack of Reformed Christian materials in that area. It was a rough semester for me being constantly bombarded by my professors.

Your essays have given me hope and courage once again. They are straightforward, easy to read, and in no way sugarcoat or compromise the truth. My summer reading so far has been so exciting and full of joy.

Praise God for the amazing gifts he has given you as well as your boldness to stand up for the truth. I just wanted to let you know how extremely valuable I have found your books.

Five minutes ago I ordered the paperback copies [here] of your Systematic Theology, Ultimate Questions, and The Light of Our Minds. I stumbled upon Apologetics in Conversation from Monergism.com a few weeks ago and have since been reading your essays virtually every day.

What other books of yours would you recommend I get?

Thanks so much for doing what you are doing.

Thanks for your message.

First, I recommend that you MASTER the approach, and the very way of thinking, that I outline in my books. Just by doing this, you will become forever invincible to any unbelieving professor or philosophy that you will encounter.

Remember that a complete and effective approach to biblical apologetics demands that you become increasingly knowleageable about your own biblical worldview. So studying reliable systematic theologies and biblical commentaries is a big part to becoming a better apologist.

Besides those books of mine that you listed, I recommend that you also read, Presuppositional Confrontations, The Sermon on the Mount, Prayer and Revelation, Commentary on Ephesians, and Commentary on Philippians, perhaps in this order, but that’s up to you.

Then, since you are a philosophy major, I also recommend Gordon Clark’s Thales to Dewey in addition to my usual recommendations on apologetics.

Thanks so much for writing me back!

I just can’t explain to you what a blessing your books have been to me so far this summer. You are definitely the master apologist I pray and dream to become, and I say that not to feed your ego but rather to give GOD the glory for it.

I also find it kinda funny that you use "moron" in your work and provide justification for doing so. I actually got in trouble in my existentialism class for calling Nietzsche a moron in my final paper. I did my paper on Nietzsche's view of Jesus (he believed he was an awesome teacher who never claimed to be a savior, God, or Lord). I used scripture and wrote about how Nietzsche was not at all justified in making his claims about Jesus and how his entire worldview did not hold any water. Needless to say, the professor didn’t like my paper and my use of terms like "moron."

I will definitely get those books you recommended.

Thanks.

The Bible is the ultra-rational infallible Word of God, so anyone can more or less become a master apologist when he firmly stands on it and faithfully argues from it. As I wrote in Presuppositional Confrontations (PDF, p. 31):

Christians today are too quickly embarrassed by the intellectual challenges thrown at them by the unbelievers. Although we are not divinely inspired like the prophets and the apostles, if we will wholly depend on the revelation of Scripture, we will indeed be the master philosophers of this world. Because we have revelation as the foundation of our philosophy, unbelievers are not in fact competing against our own wisdom, but the very wisdom of God. Thus if we will only learn to apply divine revelation with skill when answering their challenges, there can be no real contest, but we will be able to destroy every unbelieving argument, and embarrass the gainsayers.

Any believer can become invincible against unbelief because of the inherent superiority of the biblical worldview. You just need to learn how to unleash the overwhelming rational power of divine revelation in writing and in conversation.

Now, in some contexts, it is doubtless biblically acceptable to call someone a moron, or to call someone like Nietzsche a moron in a paper. As I show in my article, "A Moron by Any Other Name," passages like 1 Peter 3:15 have been universally misapplied, in a way that would condemn even the prophets and the apostles, and also Christ himself. The error also results in a weaker confrontation against unbelief.

If you have argued your case, and calling Nietzsche a "moron" is the proper conclusion of your presentation, then it would be irrational for a professor to reject it. "Name-calling" is a fallacy only if it is unsupported by rational argument, but if a derogatory label is the product of a valid argument, then it is a logical conclusion, not a fallacy. The argument must be refuted before the label can be rationally rejected. Still, calling him "moron" might not be the only way to state your conclusion, so you will have to exercise wisdom as to whether this is the best way to say it in a college paper.

In any case, as I show in the same article, there is indeed a proper application of 1 Peter 3:15, and that is when you are dealing with authority figures. College professors would qualify (as would parents, government officials, employers, etc.), so even as you seek to boldly confront unbelief in the university, take care that you do not challenge your professors in an unbiblical manner, and even unnecessarily jeopardize your grades (but some offenses are necessary and unavoidable, and in these cases, you must not compromise even if it damages your grades).

I see what you mean by respecting authority figures. It definitely is important.

— // —

Comments:

The biblical system is inherently rational and invincible. You don’t need a whole lot of add-ons to patch it up or to support it. It cannot be successfully attacked, but it contains all the needed ingredients to destroy all other worldviews.

So if a person understands the content and the structure (as in the relationships between its various parts) of the biblical system, and if he is able to grasp the content and the structure of his opponent’s worldview, he will always be able to seize a decisive victory in every debate.

There is no chance that this person will lose, or even fail to decisively win, against anyone in all of human history — or against all of them combined. He will be able to crush the devil himself in debate, for the devil is not greater than the mind of Christ. This is the person that you can become, and must strive to become, through diligent study and persistent prayer, and by God’s grace.

On this matter, parents can help their children by starting to teach them early about biblical doctrines and about rational thinking. The non-Christian world will not wait until they are in high school before teaching them evolution or trying to desensitize them to homosexual relationships.

One of your advantages as parents is that you have ready access to your children while they are yet young, so you should teach them to think biblically now. And teach them the whole package — the whole Christian life — that is, including biblical reading (Scripture and Christian literature), spiritual habits (prayer, meditation), and such traits as compassion, boldness, contentment, and humble service. One reason that you should teach your children biblical apologetics in the first place is to preserve faith, and training them in all aspects of the biblical lifestyle will do much to further this end.

Recommended:

Protecting Your Faith

PDF vs. Paperback

Vincent Cheung, Systematic Theology

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations

Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation

Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount

Vincent Cheung, Prayer and Revelation

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Philippians

Vincent Cheung, The Light of Our Minds

Vincent Cheung, Preach the Word

Vincent Cheung, "The Problem of Evil"

Vincent Cheung, "Professional Morons"

Vincent Cheung, "A Moron by Any Other Name"

Gordon Clark, Thales to Dewey

Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy

Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things

Gordon Clark, The Christian Philosophy of Education

Gordon Clark, Philosophy of Science and Belief in God

Carl F. H. Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief

"But What is Knowledge?"

NOTICE:
This is an outdated and unofficial item. The article was released as a draft/preview to Captive to Reason. For the current and official version of the article, please download the book from the online library.

As my readers are aware, I deny that induction, sensation, and science can yield any knowledge, and I have provided biblical and rational justification for this denial in my writings. Besides the typical fallacious replies and evasions, one response is to ask, "But what is knowledge?" That is, if we cannot define knowledge, or cannot justify our definition of knowledge, then it would seem meaningless to say that induction, sensation, and science cannot yield any knowledge.

I have tolerated this sophistry for a while, but since I have been asked about it several times, and since I have been made aware that this point is sometimes brought up in discussions about my writings (as if it totally destroys my arguments!), I will briefly address it here.

It is true that when we use a word, we should often have a proper and justifiable definition for it. This is especially important when we are using it in the context of precise arguments and syllogisms. However, the above objection misses the point.

The point is that induction, sensation, and science involve fallacious reasonings such that they can never produce logically valid conclusions from the premises. That is, it is impossible to use induction, sensation, and science to validly reason from premises X and Y to conclusion Q regarding any subject P. Thus our main point stands even if we never define or even mention "knowledge."

Assuming the premise, "I see a red car," how is it possible to validly reason from this premise to, "There is a red car"? You need another premise to fill in the gap between "I see" and "There is," but how is this premise to be rationally obtained and justified, rather than just stubbornly assumed? This is the point.

As it stands, there is no rational difference between jumping from "I see a red car" to "There is a red car," and jumping from "I imagine a red car" or "I desire a red car" to "There is a red car." What is the rational difference between sensation, imagination, and expectation? How come one can jump from "I see" to "There is," and cannot jump from "I imagine" or " I desire" to "There is"? What is the additional premise that makes the difference? And how is this premise rationally obtained and justified? The issue is not even the definition of knowledge, but the validity of the reasoning process.

The objection is sophistical and irrational. Whether or not we define knowledge, and whether or not our opponents define knowledge, the objection has not even started to justify induction, sensation, and science, but it seeks to distract us from the main point.

But if the challenge is to define "knowledge" in a proposition such as, "Science cannot yield any knowledge," then let our opponents first define "science," and then logically demonstrate how it can validly reach any conclusion about anything, and then we can proceed to examine our denial. For if our science-loving opponents have never claimed that science can reach rational conclusions about anything, or even yield "knowledge" (whatever that is), we would have never needed to make the denial in the first place.

In other words, I can affirm everything that I have said regarding induction, sensation, and science without ever using the word "knowledge" — I just have to say some things differently. In fact, I have already done this a number of times in my books. For example, I would say that science cannot validly deduce anything about reality. And even "reality" does not need to be defined to make this point, since any X will do — "affirming the consequent" is fallacious regardless of what you are talking about.

So let’s get back to the real issue and press our opponents to show how induction, sensation, and science can validly reason from premises to conclusion.

To those who agree with me: We are right about this. Our position is biblical, rational, irrefutable, and so obviously so that it is laughably easy to defend. Just don’t let intellectual tricksters bully or distract you, and don't let them smuggle in their irrational theories by falsely claiming biblical support, as if false assumptions can be founded on true presuppositions, or the lie justified by the truth. Instead, let us continue to crush the man-centered epistemologies of induction and sensation, and to exalt biblical revelation as the sole infallible source of true premises from which we would validly deduce conclusions about the many things that God has chosen to disclose to us.

Recommended:

Occasionalism and Empiricism

The Transcendental Argument for Materialism

The Atheistic Argument from Existence

Vincent Cheung, Ultimate Questions

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations

Vincent Cheung, Apologetics in Conversation

Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy

Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things

Gordon Clark, The Lord God of Truth

Gordon Clark, Clark Speaks from the Grave

Gordon Clark, Philosophy of Science and Belief in God

Sin and Foolishness

The following is an edited email correspondence related to Making, Keeping, and Breaking Promises (3).

I recently found your blog and started reading some of your commentary on Ephesians, and I have been edified and enlightened by your godly counsel. I pray that God continues to use your diligent work so powerfully in the lives of other believers.

I have a question I’ve been considering for a while, and since you made a certain comment in your latest post about promises, I wondered if you might briefly inform me. You say, "Then, some promises might not be outright sinful, but they are unwise."

Does this mean that someone can really make a foolish decision or action and not be in sin? Shouldn’t foolishness qualify as a failure to conform to God's commandment to love him with all of our minds? I’ve often thought that after I make a foolish (but not outright sinful) decision I should repent for it.

Thanks for your message.

Yes, I agree that many unwise decisions are also sinful, and all sinful decisions are necessarily unwise (e.g. Proverbs 6:32, 7:7; Ecclesiastes 7:25); however, I am uncertain that all unwise decisions are also necessarily sinful.

A sinful decision entails breaking an actual commandment. Now, the commandment to love God with all our minds is certainly a commandment, but what this commandment implies must be defined by the other parts of Scripture. Also, to love God with all our minds might not necessarily imply that we will never make any foolish decisions, just as to love God with all our body might not mean that we will never physically fail, or to have unlimited physical strength. Moreover, some individuals are naturally sharper than others about some of these things that we are talking about, but this does not automatically make them morally superior.

Thus to love God with all our minds does not imply that you must get a perfect score on every math test in your life (even as you seek to glory God in your school work), or that you are morally forbidden to make even foolish mistakes on those tests — failing to get a perfect score each time might be due to the noetic effects of sin, but might not be sinful in itself. (On the other hand, it would be sinful for you to neglect your studies and thus do poorly on the tests.)

Similarly, to love God with all our minds might not mean that we must be all-wise, but that we must use everything and every part in us to obey God's commandments. But this means we need an actual commandment against something like co-signing.

In this case, I am uncertain that it is justifiable (from how the Scripture describes it) to call co-signing a loan an outright sin. I think one's motive and knowledge must be taken into account here. If it is done out of plain defiance to Scripture, or out of a mindset that thinks it is wise when the Scripture says that it is not, then it is clearly sinful. But short of this, I am not sure, since the Bible does not clearly describe it as sin. At least on the superficial level, it is more of a practical issue than a moral one; however, many practical decisions involve moral motives, whether good or evil, and that’s why I say that this is true "on the superficial level."

Or, there might be a scenario where it is neither sinful nor unwise to co-sign — that is, if the person thinks of it as if he is taking on the whole loan, or as if he is taking out the loan himself, and in effect, as if he is directly lending the money to the person he is co-signing with. And since the person might be unable to pay (that's why he needs a co-signer in the first place), the co-signer should consider himself as practically giving the other person the money, never to be repaid again.

Now, if the co-signer is prepared to think of the transaction this way from the very beginning (but this is almost never what people have in mind when they co-sign), then for him there is no difference between co-signing and giving the money away. And if he can afford it, then it is his money to lose. There is no sin here, except if the situation is such that, it would be sinful for him to give that money away, or to give it to this particular person. Assuming that this is not the case, the passage from Proverbs does not exactly apply, since there Scripture is describing the unexpected effects of co-signing — the co-signer is foolish because he ought to expect those effects, namely, to be left with the whole responsibility to repay the loan.

So, I think you are right in principle, that many foolish actions are also sinful actions, but not always. Sometimes people commit foolish actions just because of their own limitations — that would be the noetic effects of sin, but not necessarily sinful in themselves. This distinction is important.

We must take the Scripture seriously, and thus we must take sin seriously. But taking sin seriously means that we must define sin very precisely and with good warrant, so that when we call something sin, we should have ample biblical justification to do so; otherwise, we risk becoming legalistic.

In this case, I am sure that some or even many instances of co-signing are sinful, and I would wonder why someone would still do it after reading that passage, but I don't think there is enough scriptural warrant to say that it is always sinful, as if it is like murder, adultery, or blasphemy.

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount

Jeremiah Burroughs, The Evil of Evils

Ralph Venning, The Sinfulness of Sin

John Owen, The Mortification of Sin

Making, Keeping, and Breaking Promises (3)

(continued from the previous entry in this series)

Principle 5 is easy to explain and illustrate.

When it comes to what Scripture teaches about promises, one of the main questions people wish to settle is this: Is it true, as one would initially tend to assume, that you should always keep every promise you’ve made, no matter what it is? The answer is no, because some promises are nullified by a higher authority, and some are morally wrong to keep.

However, this does not automatically mean that you have not sinned in a situation where you must break a promise. In many cases, you have already sinned in making the promise in the first place, only that to keep the promise would be to commit another sin, and you cannot undo one sin by committing another one.

For example, if for some reason I promised to rob a bank for you or to murder someone for you, then of course I must not keep that promise. I have already sinned in making such a promise in the first place, and it would be an even greater sin to keep it.

Or, if you make a promise to someone in the name of your company when you have no authority to make such a promise, then you have already done wrong by making the promise, but it would also be wrong to keep a promise that you had no right to make. In this case, the company has prior claims over whether you could carry out the promise. In fact, to protect its reputation, which you have now jeopardized, it might honor your illegitimate promise anyway, but it is certainly not obligated to do so. In some cases, and when possible, the right thing to do might be to honor the promise with your personal resources.

God always has prior claims over every promise. Secondarily, some human authority figures may have prior claims over your promises, such as parents, husbands, fathers, pastors, and employers.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that you should always break every promise that you have no right to make. For example, for you as a Christian to marry an unbeliever would be a great sin, but it would be another great sin for you to divorce the unbeliever once you have married him. This is because although God preceptively opposes this sinful marriage, it is still God himself who oversees it, and what he has joined together, let no man put asunder (1 Corinthians 7:12–13; see also The Sermon on the Mount).

There are applicable principles in Scripture to every situation that you will face, and to every promise that you make. It will tell you what is right and what is wrong in each case, and even once you have done wrong, it will tell you the next step to follow.

Our discussion on principles 4 and 5 should not complicate things so much that principles 1–3 become obscured. In fact, principles 1 and 2 should be enough to guide most of your decisions about making and keeping promises — that is, don’t make rash or unnecessary promises (many promises are unnecessary — if you intend to do something, just do it), but once you’ve made a promise, keep it. There are exceptions, but exceptions are rare, although they can happen. Of course, then, the best thing to do is to avoid making promises that you have no right to make, or that you cannot or should not keep.

Then, some promises might not be outright sinful, but they are unwise, and the Bible says that you should beg to be released from them. One such example is when you co-sign someone’s loan:

My son, if you have put up security for your neighbor, if you have struck hands in pledge for another, if you have been trapped by what you said, ensnared by the words of your mouth, then do this, my son, to free yourself, since you have fallen into your neighbor's hands: Go and humble yourself; press your plea with your neighbor! Allow no sleep to your eyes, no slumber to your eyelids. Free yourself, like a gazelle from the hand of the hunter, like a bird from the snare of the fowler. (Proverbs 6:1–5)

Before he retired, my father’s profession had a lot to do with contracts, documents, and their ramifications. And ever since I was only several years old, he has repeatedly told me that I should never guarantee someone’s loan.

He was speaking from experience, but Scripture is the only true and reliable guide. Yet in this instance, my father did something that was scriptural, namely, he taught me this correct (and what seems to many an "adult") principle at a very early age. In Proverbs, the writer is teaching his child some of the basic lessons of living, and this is one of them — never guarantee someone’s loan, and if you have already done it, beg to get out of it.

It is never too early to warn your child against drunkenness, adultery, co-signing, and other things that unbelievers and irresponsible believers consider "adult" lessons. Start teaching your child these things when he is three or four, and repeat it a couple of times each month until he leaves home as a adult, and it just might stick.

In any case, from now on you should never be in a situation where you would need to be released from a guarantee, for why would you even consider co-signing someone’s loan after reading this passage? Just don’t do it. And if you insist on doing it, then be prepared to pay for the whole thing, for you have trapped yourself, and your family with you.

(end of series)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

Gordon Clark, Essays on Ethics and Politics

John Murray, Principles of Conduct

Related (but inconsistent in quality):

Alexander Hill, Just Business: Christian Ethics for the Marketplace

Michael Zigarelli, Management by Proverbs: Applying Timeless Wisdom in the Workplace

Scott Rae, Beyond Integrity: A Judeo-Christian Approach to Business Ethics

Wayne Grudem, Business for the Glory of God

Making, Keeping, and Breaking Promises (2)

(continued from the previous entry in this series)

Some passages in the Bible are intended as "case laws," similar to the idea of "precedence" in our legal system, so that their applications are not limited to the immediate context; rather, they set forth the principles upon which similar cases should be judged.

For example, Paul uses the law, "Do not muzzle an ox," as something like a case law and teaches from it the right of a minister to receive money from those to whom he ministers:

Who serves as a soldier at his own expense? Who plants a vineyard and does not eat of its grapes? Who tends a flock and does not drink of the milk? Do I say this merely from a human point of view? Doesn't the Law say the same thing? For it is written in the Law of Moses: "Do not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain." Is it about oxen that God is concerned? Surely he says this for us, doesn't he? Yes, this was written for us, because when the plowman plows and the thresher threshes, they ought to do so in the hope of sharing in the harvest. If we have sown spiritual seed among you, is it too much if we reap a material harvest from you? (1 Corinthians 9:7–11)

When it comes to principle 4, which is rarely taught, one of the relevant biblical passages is Numbers 30:1–16. It reads as follows:

Moses said to the heads of the tribes of Israel: "This is what the LORD commands: When a man makes a vow to the LORD or takes an oath to obligate himself by a pledge, he must not break his word but must do everything he said.

"When a young woman still living in her father’s house makes a vow to the LORD or obligates herself by a pledge and her father hears about her vow or pledge but says nothing to her, then all her vows and every pledge by which she obligated herself will stand. But if her father forbids her when he hears about it, none of her vows or the pledges by which she obligated herself will stand; the LORD will release her because her father has forbidden her.

"If she marries after she makes a vow or after her lips utter a rash promise by which she obligates herself and her husband hears about it but says nothing to her, then her vows or the pledges by which she obligated herself will stand. But if her husband forbids her when he hears about it, he nullifies the vow that obligates her or the rash promise by which she obligates herself, and the LORD will release her.

"Any vow or obligation taken by a widow or divorced woman will be binding on her.

"If a woman living with her husband makes a vow or obligates herself by a pledge under oath and her husband hears about it but says nothing to her and does not forbid her, then all her vows or the pledges by which she obligated herself will stand. But if her husband nullifies them when he hears about them, then none of the vows or pledges that came from her lips will stand. Her husband has nullified them, and the LORD will release her. Her husband may confirm or nullify any vow she makes or any sworn pledge to deny herself. But if her husband says nothing to her about it from day to day, then he confirms all her vows or the pledges binding on her. He confirms them by saying nothing to her when he hears about them. If, however, he nullifies them some time after he hears about them, then he is responsible for her guilt."

These are the regulations the LORD gave Moses concerning relationships between a man and his wife, and between a father and his young daughter still living in his house.

This is directly applicable to Christians. And although the immediate context refers to "a vow to the LORD," the principles applies to all kinds of promises, since the entire passage is God’s command "concerning relationships between a man and his wife, and between a father and his young daughter still living in his house." So not only is it applicable, but it is even more obviously applicable than some of the case laws.

(Concerning the applicability of the OT law, please see my Commentary on Ephesians and The Sermon on the Mount. And for more on the authority structure in the home, please see my Commentary on Ephesians and Renewing the Mind.)

Let us apply the above to an example.

Suppose a relative or a friend of a married woman wishes to borrow money. The woman has no right to promise a loan without first asking her husband. If the woman nevertheless promises the loan and the husband is present, then he has the right to immediately nullify the promise. The husband has not sinned by nullifying the promise illegitimately made by the wife, and the wife would not sin by withholding the loan that she has initially promised, since the promise has been nullified by the husband. Yet, the wife has indeed sinned by making the promise without asking her husband. Now if the woman promises the loan and her husband is not present, then he has the right to nullify the promise once he hears about it, and the rest is the same.

But whether or not the husband is present when the woman makes the promise, if he says nothing once he hears about it, then it is as if he has given his approval and confirmed the promise. Both the husband and the wife are then morally obligated to make good the promise and grant the loan. However, if the husband changes his mind and decides to withhold the loan once he has explicitly or implicitly confirmed the promise, then he commits sin, and it is as if he has personally made and then broken the promise. In this case (that is, when the husband changes his mind after confirming the promise), the wife should obey the husband and withhold the loan — she does not sin by doing this, but the blame falls upon her husband. On the other hand, if the wife decides to make good the promise even after the husband has changed his mind, then both the husband and the wife commit sin — he sins by breaking the promise, and she sins by disobeying her husband.

As for the husband, he has the right to promise the loan without first discussing it with his wife; however, out of love and respect for his wife, to protect the trust and intimacy of the marriage relationship, and to maintain order in the home, it would be wise for him to discuss it with his wife anyway, and he should usually (practically always) make the promise only if they both agree to it. Yet, the final decision always rests with the husband.

Of course, feminists don't like this, but I don't like feminists, so we are even. But I am still right.

Note not only the tremendous authority of the husband, but also the tremendous responsibility that is placed upon him. It is up to him to assess whether or not the family can afford to offer the loan, as well as to determine all the likely spiritual, social, and financial consequences of making the promise. Whether or not he thinks that it is a good idea (and especially if he thinks that it is not a good idea), if he approves and confirms the promise made by the wife (or if he is the one who makes the promise), and then if severe hardship strikes the family because of the loan — since the needed money is not there — then, assuming that there is no moral justification for making the family undergo such hardship, the blame again falls upon the husband, not the wife.

It is true that some wives are better than their husbands at analyzing the family’s financial situation. In such cases, the husbands should acknolwedge this, and discuss the matter with their wives, and then make their decision. But whether or not they do this, they must make the final decision and assume the moral responsibility for it. They are the ones with the greatest authority in the home, but they are also the ones who are most accountable for what happens in and to their families.

We have used the marriage relationship and a loan in our example, but the principle applies also to the relationship between a father and a daughter, and regarding other types of vows and promises.

Also, notice that although we have used it to illustrate principle 4, this passage also addresses other individuals and relationships, such as a man, a widow, and a divorced woman. A full exposition of the passage should not neglect these.

(to be continued)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount

Vincent Cheung, Renewing the Mind

Martha Peace, The Excellent Wife

Elizabeth Handford, Me? Obey Him?

J. David Pawson, Leadership is Male

John Piper, Wayne Grudem, ed., Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood

Stephen Clark, Man and Woman in Christ

Werner Neuer, Man and Woman in Christian Perspective

George W. Knight III, The Role Relationships of Men and Women

John Benton, Gender Questions

Andreas J. Kostenberger, God, Marriage, and Family

Kostenberger, Schreiner, Baldwin, ed., Women in the Church

Wayne Grudem, Evangelical Feminism and Biblical Truth

Susan Foh, Women and the Word of God

Mary Kassian, Women, Creation, and the Fall

Mary Kassian, The Feminist Gospel

Mary Kassian, The Feminist Mistake

Richard Hove, Equality in Christ?

Daniel Doriani, Women and Ministry

Wayne Grudem, ed., Biblical Foundations for Manhood and Womanhood

Wayne Grudem, Dennis Rainey, ed., Pastoral Leadership for Manhood and Womanhood

Nancy Leigh DeMoss, Biblical Womanhood in the Home

Gordon Clark, Essays on Ethics and Politics

Gordon Clark, The Pastoral Epistles

John Murray, Principles of Conduct

Wayne Grudem, Evangelism Feminism: A New Path to Liberalism? (not yet released)

Divine Power to Change Society

We ought to vote. We ought to be good citizens in every way. And we should cast our votes conscientiously and with discernment. But if your hope for the future of our society rests in the democratic process, or if you think the fortunes of the church rise or fall according to which party is in power, you need to look again at how the people of God have historically made their influence felt in society. You’ll discover that those times when the church has grown the most and when revival has spread furthest are times when believers have been most concerned about personal holiness and evangelism. The church’s real influence comes from the power of the gospel and the testimony of changed lives.

On the other hand, when influential Christians have tried to steer the church into the political process, their testimony has failed, and they have actually lost influence.

It’s no wonder. In Matthew 20:25–28 Jesus says, "You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them. It shall not be so among you. But whoever would be great among you must be your servant, and whoever would be first among you must be your slave, even as the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many."

If the church is going to influence a hostile secular society like the one in which we live, political clout is not what we need. All the power, politics, and public policies in the world will never force unbelievers to yield their hearts to Christ as Lord.

Phil Johnson, "Let Your Light So Shine"
in Fool’s Gold, (Crossway, 2005; John MacArthur, general editor), p. 147.

Of course, there is really no need to "look again at how the people of God have historically made their influence felt in society" to make this point. (I also question the relevance and application of the biblical passage cited.) The Bible teaches as much, and that’s what matters. If the Bible does not say it, history cannot prove or confirm it.

There is no need to withdraw from the "democratic process," or to unnecessarily surrender political influence to the enemies of God; nevertheless, all the political power in the world can only produce superficial and temporary changes.

A real and lasting change in society is effected only when more and more individuals are regenerated by God’s sovereign grace, and the preaching of the gospel is the means by which God regenerates his elect. Therefore, the gospel is the power of God for salvation, and for real and lasting change in society.

Thus if we want to impact the world, we cannot do it through politics, (secular) education, science, or various social programs. Rather, we can do it only by following Paul’s command to "preach the word," patiently and persistently.

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations (ch. 2)

Vincent Cheung, Preach the Word

Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things

Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy

Gordon Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education

Gordon Clark, Essays on Ethics and Politics

John MacArthur, Why Government Can’t Save You

Making, Keeping, and Breaking Promises (1)

(The following is an edited email correspondence.)

I have a question regarding what the Bible says about promises, such as what we should do with promises that we made before we became Christians, etc.

Here are several biblical principles:

1. Do not make rash or unnecessary promises.

2. If you have made a promise, keep it.

3. If the promise that you’ve made turns out to be disadvantageous to you, you should still keep it (Psalm 15:4).

The above are sufficient to cover many cases, if not most. But there are other biblical principles that cover additional situations and conditions:

4. There may be a person who is above you in authority that has the right to prevent you from making a given promise, or to annul it even after it has been made.

5. If a promise violates the Word of God (so that you should not have made it in the first place), then, depending on the nature of the promise and other relevant factors, there are times when you still have to keep it, while at other times, you are strictly forbidden to keep it.

Many people already know principles 1–3 and their biblical basis, so I will elaborate on only principles 4 and 5.

(to be continued)

Recommended:

Vincent Cheung, The Sermon on the Mount

Vincent Cheung, Commentary on Ephesians

Gordon Clark, Essays on Ethics and Politics

John Murray, Principles of Conduct

Copyright © 2012 Vincent Cheung. All rights reserved.