Archive July 2005

A Call for Christian Rationality

By W. Gary Crampton
© The Trinity Foundation

We live in a day when the Apostle Paul’s sermon on Mar’s Hill to the first century philosophers concerning the worship of an unknown god (Acts 17) is all too relevant. Our age is awash in irrationalism; it may even be the "age of irrationalism." And far too many in allegedly Christian circles are espousing an irrational theology in the name of Christ. Nonsense, as C. S. Lewis once predicted, has come. Twenty-three years ago John Robbins correctly assessed the situation:

There is no greater threat facing the true church of Christ at this moment than the irrationalism that now controls our entire culture. [Totalitarianism], guilty of tens of millions of murders, including those of millions of Christians, is to be feared, but not nearly so much as the idea that we do not know and cannot know the truth. Hedonism, the popular philosophy of America, is not to be feared so much as the idea that logic – "mere human logic," to use the religious irrationalists’ own phrase – is futile.⁽¹⁾

How did we get where we are? How did irrationalism become so predominant even in allegedly Christian circles? It did not happen overnight. The failure of seventeenth century Rationalism and Galileo’s (1564-1642) questioning of the Roman Church-State’s official position on geocentricity fostered a spirit of skepticism. Who are we to believe on this subject — the Roman Church-State or Galileo (science)? How do we know? Is there truly a God who has created all things? If so, how can we be sure? Into this debate stepped David Hume (1711-1776).

Being an empiricist, Hume denied that reason can ever give us knowledge of the external world, including God. But he also showed, perhaps reluctantly, that sense experience cannot yield such knowledge either. Observation is unreliable. Causal relationships are never observed. Neither can we know the continuing reality of the self, for we have no experience of it. And, of course, no experience can ever prove that the God of Scripture exists.

David Hume created what Ronald Nash referred to as a "Gap." "Hume’s Gap," wrote Nash, "is the rejection of the possibility of a rational knowledge of God and objective religious truth."⁽²⁾ According to Hume, man can have no knowledge of the transcendent. Any belief in God, therefore, must be irrational. Knowledge and faith have nothing in common.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) acknowledged that reading David Hume awakened him from his "dogmatic slumbers." Kant attempted to go beyond rationalism and empiricism by claiming that all human knowledge begins with sense experience (content), but in itself, sense experience is not sufficient to give us knowledge. The content needs a form or structure. Kant taught that this form is supplied by the mind, in apriori categories of understanding. But since men can never know what cannot first be experienced, knowledge cannot extend beyond the phenomenal world. The real world, Kant’s "noumenal world," "things in themselves" rather than "things as they appear," therefore, can never be known. Thus, Kant constructed a "wall" between the immanent and the transcendent, and God is unknowable.⁽³⁾

It is ironic that Kant believed that this agnosticism was an aid to Christianity. He had "denied knowledge in order to make room for faith." Belief in God was still possible, but not on rational grounds. Like Hume before him, with Kant there is nothing in common between Christian faith and knowledge.⁽⁴⁾

G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) attempted to correct the errors of Kant. Whereas Kant had asserted with certainty that the real world could not be known, Hegel pointed out the absurdity of affirming the unknowable. He constructed a system of Idealism in which unity and plurality are rationally blended together. For Hegel, "the real is the rational and the rational is the real." All things, persons and objects, participate in the Absolute Mind or Spirit (Geist). Thought and being, essence and existence, are one and the same. As Hegel developed it, his philosophy is a form of pantheism. And in Hegel’s pantheistic philosophy, a problem exists. One cannot know anything without knowing everything; "the truth is the whole." But since we do not know everything, we do not know anything. Once again, we are left in a state of skepticism. Hegel cannot justify knowledge.⁽⁵⁾

Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), like Karl Marx, another irrationalist, was a student of Hegel. He strongly reacted against his teacher’s System. Reality, said Kierkegaard, cannot be obtained by reason. The real is not the rational. Truth is not something that can be taught; it cannot be communicated in a rational fashion. Truth does not exist in the form of propositions; it is inward and purely subjective. If one is going to know the real, he must grasp it by means of a "leap of faith." That is, he must make a commitment to that which is irrational. For Kierkegaard, faith and reason are mutually exclusive. Knowledge is personal and passionate; it is anti-intellectual. God and truth exist only for one who leaps.⁽⁶⁾

Irrationality also passed into the realm of theology through the liberals Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889), both of whom rejected the idea of God’s transcendence. God, they averred, is exclusively immanent. And being totally immanent, God is unable to speak divine truth to man. Hence, Schleiermacher and Ritschl both rejected revealed theology and the primacy of the intellect.

Schleiermacher, sometimes called the father of liberalism, taught that the essence of religion is to be found, not in knowledge, but in experience: the "feeling of absolute dependence." For Schleiermacher, God is unknowable to the human mind. To find God one must look within and experience Him. Ritschl, on the other hand, averred that the essence of true religion is ethics. A system of propositional truth is unattainable. Christianity needs to recognize that all knowledge has to do with value judgments, ethical decisions.⁽⁷⁾

Both of these immanentistic theologians denied an infallible standard by which to judge all things. By rejecting the divine propositional revelation of Holy Scripture, they cut the jugular of Christian theism. Man is left without an epistemic base. How does one know what he must "feel"? What is the standard of "ethics" by which man is to live? Schleiermacher and Ritschl leave men without answers. But to the irrational mindset, this is not a problem. In such an anti-system, what does it matter?

In the twentieth century, the Swiss Neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) condemned the immanentism of Schleiermacher and Ritschl as a denial of the Christian faith. Barth taught the divine transcendence of God, to the exclusion of His immanence. According to Barth, God is so transcendent that He is "wholly other." The Swiss theologian went so far as to deny not only natural theology, but general revelation as well. God can be known only through His self-revelation.⁽⁸⁾

But to Barth, and Emil Brunner (1889-1966) as well, God’s self-revelation is not to be found in the propositional statements of Scripture. In Neo-orthodoxy, revelation is non-propositional. Revelation is an event; it is an encounter; it is something that happens. Revelation is not objective; it is subjective.

According to Barth and Brunner, the Bible is not the Word of God in the usual sense; neither does it contain the Word of God. Rather, the Bible is a book that is full of errors. It contains errors of fact, doctrine, and logic. The Bible is merely a pointer to the Word, which is Jesus Christ. Christ is the only true revelation of God to man. The Bible, then, points to Christ. And when God makes Himself known to man through the fallible Biblical witness, then the "Christ event" occurs. Communication of truth takes place only in the personal divine-human encounter.⁽⁹⁾

Lamentably, irrationalism has greatly affected the visible church. The Charismatic movement is just one example of this. The primacy of the intellect and of truth has been replaced with emotionalism, ecstatic utterances, incoherent experiences, and anti-doctrinal statements (e.g., "give me Jesus, not exegesis"). Faith has nothing to do with thought, let alone logic. All too frequently we encounter what Ronald Nash referred to as "the religious revolt against logic."⁽¹⁰⁾ Augustine had claimed that God thinks logically, and that logic has been divinely ordained to be trusted and used by man as God’s image bearer, but much of alleged modern day "evangelicalism" demurs. Logic is not to be trusted. Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) is an example of one such thinker. Van Til maintained that there is no point at which man’s logic and knowledge are the same as God’s. Due to this lack of a point of contact, logical paradox must exist in Scripture.⁽¹¹⁾ Van Til went so far as to say that "all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory."⁽¹²⁾ Van Til’s irrational thought opened the door to all sorts of theological and philosophical errors in putatively Reformed circles.⁽¹³⁾

Donald Bloesch is a contemporary theologian who has attempted to find a middle ground between Neo-orthodoxy, on the one hand, and "right wing" orthodoxy on the other hand. He claims to have a very high view of Scripture. He denounces liberalism, for example, and calls for a creedal theology based upon Holy Scripture. He insists on the primacy of Scripture over "religious experiences," and he denies that the Apocrypha and church tradition have an equal standing with the Bible. But even though Bloesch attempts to remove himself from the Neo-orthodox camp, his writings betray him. The shadow of Karl Barth looms large across the pages of his works. And one of the points at which he finds himself in agreement with Barth is in his rejection of the trustworthiness of logic. For example, Bloesch is quick to take issue with the belief that human logic is identical with divine logic, that is, that God thinks the syllogism Barbara. Dr. Bloesch says we must never equate the two. He openly warns against "reducing the message of faith to axioms of logic."⁽¹⁴⁾

Gordon Clark corrected this error when he wrote:

To avoid this irrationalism…we must insist that truth is the same for God and man. Naturally, we may not know the truth of some matters. But if we know anything at all, what we must know must be identical with what God knows. God knows all truth, and unless we know something God knows, our ideas are untrue. It is absolutely essential, therefore, to insist that there is an area of coincidence between God’s mind and our mind.⁽¹⁵⁾

Dr. Clark was not denying that there is a difference in the degree of God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. God always knows more propositions than man. What Dr. Clark asserted is that there is a point where God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge are identical. There must be a point at which the mind of man coincides with the mind of God. Without this, man could never know any truth.

Hume’s Gap reappears in the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) and a number of his followers (the Amsterdam Philosophy group). These philosophers emphasize the transcendence of God to the point of erecting a "boundary" which exists between God and man. The laws of logic are valid only on man’s side of the boundary.⁽¹⁶⁾ If there were such a Dooyeweerdian boundary, of course, God could never reveal anything to His creatures, and man could never know anything about God, including the notion of the boundary. Dooyeweerd influenced Van Til greatly, and through Van Til, his many disciples.

Another contemporary theologian of irrationalism is John Frame, formerly of Westminster Seminary, now of Reformed Seminary in Orlando, Florida. Professor Frame would have us believe that "Scripture, for God’s good reasons, is often vague." Therefore, wrote Frame, "there is no way out of escaping vagueness in theology." He continued:

Scripture does not demand absolute precision of us, a precision impossible for creatures…. Indeed, Scripture recognizes that for sake of communication, vagueness is often preferable to precision…. Nor is theology an attempt to state truth without any subjective influence on the formulation. Such "objectivity," like "absolute precision," is impossible and would not be desirable if it could be achieved.⁽¹⁷⁾

Apparently clear and precise theology is a perspective that Professor Frame’s "Perspectivalism" cannot accommodate. But is it true that "Scripture, for God’s good reason, is often vague?" Not according to Reformed orthodoxy, which holds to the perspicuity or clarity of Scripture. The Westminster Confession of Faith (1:7) says it this way:

All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them.

All things in Scripture are not equally clear to all, the Confession says, but it never asserts that they are vague or imprecise or confused. It says different readers will be puzzled by some things that other readers will find to be clear. The problem is with our understandings, not with Scripture.

Vagueness in theology, which is what Frame is defending, is not something to be applauded. Obscurity is not a virtue. God is not the author of confusion (1 Corinthians 14:33). He does not speak to us in vague, illogical, paradoxical statements, as the Van Tilian school asserts. He reveals himself to us in rational, propositional statements that can be understood. The Bible is a divine revelation that God intends us to understand. Obviously, if it cannot be understood, if we cannot understand it, then it is not a revelation. But David writes: "The commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes" (Psalm 19:8). John writes: "And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us an understanding, that we may know Him who is true" (1 John 5:20). The Psalmist knows more than his teachers, more than the ancients, because he knows God’s Word (Psalm 119:99-100). The triune God of Scripture is a God of truth: Father (Psalm 31:5); Son (John 14:6); and Holy Spirit (1 John 5:6). The Bible refers to Christ as logic, wisdom, and reason incarnate (John 1:1; 1 Corinthians 1:24, 30; Colossians 2:3). Logic is the way God thinks, and the laws of logic are eternal principles. Because man is an image bearer of God, these laws are part of man. There must be, then, a point of contact between God’s logic (and knowledge), and man’s.

Carl Henry wrote:

The insistence on a logical gulf between human conceptions and God as the object of religious knowledge is erosive of knowledge and cannot escape a reduction to skepticism. Concepts that by definition are inadequate to the truth of God cannot be made to compensate for logical deficiency by appealing either to God’s omnipotence or to His grace. Nor will it do to call for a restructuring of logic in the interest of knowledge of God. Whoever calls for a higher logic must preserve the existing laws of logic to escape pleading the cause of illogical nonsense.⁽¹⁸⁾

What I am pleading for is a return to the Christian rationality of Augustine, Calvin, Clark, and the best of the Puritans. Such a system does not exalt the human mind as autonomous; rather, it affirms Biblical revelation as axiomatic. The divine revelation of Holy Scripture is a rational revelation. It is internally self-consistent. It is non-contradictory and non-paradoxical. Christian rationality reasons from revelation, not to it or apart from it. The Christian faith is intellectually defensible. In fact, as John Robbins has stated, "it is the only intellectually defensible system of thought,"(19) for the God of Scripture "has made foolish the wisdom of this world" (1 Corinthians 1:20).

Notes

1 John W. Robbins, The Trinity Manifesto, 1978.

2 Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982), 22. Dr. Robbins had used this phrase in his 1974 book Answer to Ayn Rand to refer to the logical gap between the is and the ought by which Hume destroyed all theories of natural moral law, secular and religious. (See page 136.) Perhaps other writers use the phrase in still other senses.

3 Gordon H. Clark, Thales to Dewey (The Trinity Foundation, 2000), 309-328.

4 Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 25-28.

5 Gordon H. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation (The Trinity Foundation, 1995), 63-68.

6 Clark, Thales to Dewey, 377-382.

7 Colin Brown, Philosophy & the Christian Faith (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1968), 108-116, 154-155.

8 See Gordon H. Clark, Karl Barth’s Theological Method (The Trinity Foundation, 1997).

9 Robert L. Reymond, Introductory Studies in Contemporary Theology (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1968), 91-153.

10 Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 91-101.

11 Robert L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1998), 95-110.

12 Cited in John W. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth (The Trinity Foundation, 1986), 25; see also W. Gary Crampton, Why I Am Not a Van Tilian, The Trinity Review, September 1993.

13 See John W. Robbins. Marstonian Mysticism, The Trinity Review, January/February 1980, reprinted in Against the World, The Trinity Foundation, 1996.

14 Donald G. Bloesch, Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration, & Interpretation (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 121, 293, 298; see W. Gary Crampton, The Neo-orthodoxy of Donald Bloesch, The Trinity Review, August 1995.

15 Gordon H. Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy (The Trinity Foundation, 1993), 76-77.

16 Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 96-99.

17 John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987), 226, 307. These thoughts are echoed by Professor Vern Poythress of Westminster Seminary, and Clark’s comments on them may be found in Clark Speaks from the Grave, The Trinity Foundation, 1986.

18 Cited in Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 95.

19 John W. Robbins, The Trinity Manifesto, 1978.

The Heresy Matrix

By John W. Robbins
© The Trinity Foundation

Editor’s Note: This essay is taken from our newest book, A Companion to The Current Justification Controversy. This excerpt is part of a discussion of the roots of the current controversy over the Gospel. To this point in the book, Dr. Robbins has discussed the influence of Neo-orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, the New Perspective on Paul, Reconstructionism, and the Biblical Theology movement; and after this excerpt he discusses some of the fruit of the justification controversy in the Kinnaird case in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, and the theology of the Auburn Avenue Presbyterian Church in the Presbyterian Church in America. In this essay he discusses the heresy matrix: the theological irrationalism that has given rise to the false gospels being taught in churches today.

Richard B. Gaffin, Jr.

As Palmer Robertson noted in The Current Justification Controversy, the Faculty of Westminster Seminary reacted angrily to the May 4, 1981 open letter signed by 45 theologians.[1] One member of the Faculty, Professor Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., wrote a seven-page response addressed to "those concerned for the ministry of Westminster Seminary."

In his May 19, 1981 letter, Mr. Gaffin first raised the usual procedural objection: "Is this communication [the May 4 letter] the constructive or even proper way to prosecute concerns about doctrinal error? Does it really serve the well-being of the church to widely publicize loosely supported allegations of serious doctrinal error?… One thing is certain: the effect of this communication has been to undermine, without due process, what is most precious to Mr. Shepherd as a seminary professor, the confidence in him of the churches he is seeking to serve."

Now of course, confidence in Norman Shepherd had been undermined six years earlier, when his students, examined by presbyteries for ordination, had confessed that justification is by faith and works. Confidence in Professor Shepherd was not first undermined by a letter sent in 1981, but by Professor Shepherd’s faithful students in 1974 and 1975. That loss of confidence in 1974 and 1975 marks the beginning of the controversy.

Furthermore, charges had been filed against Shepherd in the Presbytery of Philadelphia in 1977, four years before Gaffin alleges that there was a lack of due process in this case. Moreover, as Robertson’s history shows, the Seminary Faculty, Board, and administration had been engaged in discussions and conferences with Shepherd for six years prior to Gaffin’s sending his May 19 letter. Gaffin knew all this, yet he wrote, "without due process."

Dr. Robertson’s history also shows that the allegations against Shepherd were not "loosely supported." There was ample documentation of his views in audiotapes of his classroom lectures, various papers he had written for the Faculty and Board of the Seminary, and essays that he had published. What apparently made the May 4, 1981 letter so disturbing to the Westminster Faculty was the fact that it informed the larger church – not just the Seminary community, which had largely succeeded in keeping the controversy contained within its walls for years – of serious doctrinal problems in the teaching at Westminster Seminary.

The bulk of Mr. Gaffin’s letter, after he raises the procedural objections, is a labored attempt to ferret out theological precedent for Shepherd’s erroneous views on justification in Herman Bavinck (Gaffin includes a page of newly translated material from his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek with his letter), in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and even in John Calvin.

With regard to Calvin, Mr. Gaffin spends more than a page discussing a single paragraph from Calvin’s commentary on Ezekiel. This is a pattern that Peter Lillback, who received his Th.D. from Westminster Seminary in 1985 for his dissertation, The Binding of God, also used in his attempt to transform Calvin into a teacher of justification by faith and works.[2] And Samuel T. Logan, Jr., a member of the Faculty since 1979, and a defender of Shepherd who became president of the Seminary in 1991, published an essay in The Westminster Theological Journal in 1984 maintaining that Jonathan Edwards held a similar view of justification.[3] Dr. Logan concluded:

Edwards believes that full justice must be done to Biblical passages such as this [Matthew 25:31-46] and he correctly does that justice in identifying feeding the hungry and visiting the sick and clothing the naked as conditions of justification. With obedience such as this, justification shall be and without it justification shall not be [45, emphasis in the original].

From the 1980s on, these revisionist efforts by Shepherd sympathizers received a boost from the growing influence of the so-called New Perspective on Paul. According to this new school of thought, dating from 1977, we modern Protestants have misunderstood Paul (due to the influence of Luther, who had misunderstood Paul by reading him autobiographically) by first misunderstanding "Second Temple" (really first century a.d.) Judaism as a works-righteousness religion. Once we rid ourselves of that error about Judaism, we can understand justification as Paul and James intended – the key to how Gentiles are now included in the covenant. They enter by faith and baptism, and they maintain their position in the covenant by their faithful obedience. For the past 20 years the pages of The Westminster Theological Journal have been peppered with articles by men who espouse some variation of this viewpoint, either in its Shepherd variation or its New Perspective variation: Don Garlington, Joseph Braswell, Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., Peter Leithart, Samuel T. Logan, Jr., John M. Frame, and R. J. Gore, to name several.

Herman Bavinck

Professor Gaffin’s appeal to Herman Bavinck is more plausible than the theological revisionism of Calvin that he and Shepherd pioneered in their attempt to find precedent for their views. Appeal to Bavinck is plausible, because Bavinck reveals the profound theological irrationalism that gave rise to Shepherdism in the first place. One should not be surprised if Bavinck’s views on justification were confused as well.

His Doctrine of God (also translated from the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek) begins with a chapter on "God’s Incomprehensibility" in which the first paragraph asserts that "the idea that the believer[4] would be able to understand and comprehend intellectually the revealed mysteries is equally unscriptural.[5] On the contrary, the truth which God has revealed concerning himself in nature and in Scripture far surpasses human conception and comprehension. In that sense Dogmatics is concerned with nothing but mystery."[6]

Apart from the fact that Bavinck here uses the word "mystery" in a sense not found in Scripture – for in Scripture, mysteries are divine secrets revealed to men for their understanding and knowledge[7] – Bavinck tells us that we cannot know what we are talking about in theology, for the subject matter of theology "far surpasses human conception."

Bavinck does not shrink from the implications of his theological skepticism, which is a direct attack on divine propositional revelation. He writes for several pages, quoting various medieval theologians with approval:

Accordingly, adequate knowledge of God does not exist. There is no name that makes known unto us his being. No concept fully embraces him. No description does justice to him. That which is hidden behind the curtain of revelation is entirely unknowable…. Justin Martyr calls God inexpressible, immovable, nameless. The words Father, God, Lord, are not real names "but appellations derived from his good deeds and functions…." "God is known better when not known…."

The fact that God exists is evident, but "what he is in his essence and nature is entirely incomprehensible and unknowable.…" When we say that God is unborn, immutable, without beginning, etc., we are only saying what he is not. To say what he is, isimpossible. He is nothing of all that which exists….[8] There is no concept, expression, or word by which God’s being can be indicated. Accordingly, when we wish to designate God, we use metaphorical language….[9] We cannot form a conception of that unitary, unknown being, transcendent above all being, above goodness, above every name and word and thought….

Negative theology is better than positive…. Nevertheless, even negative theology fails to give us any knowledge[10] of God’s being, for in reality God is exalted above both "negation and affirmation.…"[11] "For it is more correct to say that God is not that which is predicated concerning him than to say that he is. He is known better by him who does not know him, whose true ignorance is wisdom…."[12] Indeed, so highly is he exalted above all creatures that the name "nothing" may justly be ascribed to him….[13]

The statements: "God cannot be defined; he has no name; the finite cannot grasp the infinite," are found in the works of all the theologians. They unanimously affirm that our God is highly exalted above our comprehension, our imagination, and our language…. "Whatever is said concerning God is not God, for God is ineffable.…"

There is no knowledge of God as he is in himself…. No name fully expresses his being; no definition describes him. He is exalted infinitely high above our conception, thought, and language.

Now, any informed Christian, actually any sane person, reading these pages in Bavinck, would stop and lay his book aside. The reader has just been told, repeatedly and emphatically, that no thought or language adequately and accurately describes God, that we have and can have no knowledge of God. If that is so, there is obviously no point in reading further, unless it is to attain a clinical understanding of how a mind can become so disordered as to write a book on a subject about which he can know and say nothing.

This is the Antichristian irrationalism that passes for Christian theology in both Protestant and Catholic, "conservative" and "liberal" seminaries. It explains a great deal about the "dialectical," that is, contradictory, pronouncements that issue forth from every modern school of theology. In such a turbid atmosphere, anything goes, including the simultaneous affirmations that justification is by faith alone and also by faith and works. No Christian doctrine, none whatsoever, can be maintained in such a mystical, skeptical, and irrational framework. It is a black hole that swallows and extinguishes all light and all rational thought. It is the medieval mother of all heresies, for the rejection of propositional revelation is the root of all error. Bavinck was a conduit carrying this rubbish into Reformed theology in the twentieth century.

Vantilianism

This writer has some sympathy for those followers of Cornelius Van Til who ignored the warnings about Van Til’s philosophy and theology from Gordon Clark and The Trinity Foundation and have now been embarrassed by their mentor’s defense of Norman Shepherd, and, in particular, his heretical doctrine of justification. Their embarrassment might have been avoided.

Beginning in the 1940s, Dr. Clark warned the church about the pernicious nature and effects of the dialectical theology and philosophy of Professor Van Til. The Trinity Foundation has published several essays and books on the subject, including God’s Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics; The Clark-Van Til Controversy; and Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth. A few Vantilians listened, but most did not. Now the dialectical Dutch chickens have come home to roost, and their homecoming has become an embarrassment to those Vantilians who unequivocally believe and defend the Gospel of justification by faith alone.

Randy Booth, a Vantilian pastor and author who recently spoke at Shepherdfest 2003, a conference on the covenant sponsored by followers of Vantilian Greg Bahnsen at the Southern California Center for Christian Studies (SCCCS), recently published an essay titled "Caution and Respect in Controversy." In this essay, Booth asserts that "Unsubstantiated charges of heresy have been leveled at both Professor Shepherd and those associated with the AAPC" (3). Now if one reads Palmer Robertson’s Current Justification Controversy, or recent issues of The New Southern Presbyterian Review, or the several essays in The Trinity Review on the topic, and more at The Trinity Foundation website, he will find all the substantiation needed to justify the charges against both Shepherd and the Auburn Avenue Presbyterian Church. Booth has apparently failed to do this, and so he asserts, falsely, that these charges are unsubstantiated.

What Booth has read is what he presents as "a transcription of a speech by Cornelius Van Til at the Justification Controversy meeting of the Committee of the Whole of the OPC Philadelphia Presbytery" (7). Although he does not date the speech, it was obviously delivered sometime during the Shepherd controversy in the OPC more than 20 years ago. Booth quotes Van Til’s speech to support his statements that

Van Til was, from the beginning and all the way through the Shepherd controversy, an unashamed supporter of Norman Shepherd, as was the majority of the Westminster faculty, including Richard Gaffin and John Frame…. As Van Til vigorously and publicly supported Shepherd, he refuted the errors of those who opposed him, arguing that those opposing Shepherd were attempting to separate faith and works [7].

Booth also quotes John Frame as saying: "Van Til and others, including myself, believed that Shepherd’s formulations were orthodox."

Here are Van Til’s words, as provided by Booth:

I think that when we begin with the idea of faith, we have to think first of all that the devils also believe and tremble. Now we have faith by which we need not to tremble because Christ on the cross said, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" so that His people might not be forsaken. It is finished! It was finished, once for all. Now that is, I think, beautifully expressed in this word of our Lord [discussion of John 6:22ff].

When the multitudes wanted to make Him king because He had given them bread, and they thought it would be easy to have a handout, Jesus said, when they found the other side, "Rabbi, when did you get here?" Jesus said, "Truly I say to you, ye seek me not because ye see signs but because you ate the loaves and were filled."

Now then comes the crucial point. "Do not work for food which perishes but for food which endures to eternal life which the Son of Man shall give to you, for of him the Father even God has been sealed." They therefore said, "What shall we do, that we may work the works of God?" Jesus answered and said unto them, "This is the work of God, that ye may believe on Him Whom He hath sent."

Here faith and works are identical. Not similar but identical. The work is faith; faith is work. We believe in Jesus Christ and in His salvation, that’s why we do not tremble. He died for us, in our place, and the Scotsmen would say "in our room and stead," for that substitutionary atonement, on the basis of which we are forensically righteous with God and are now righteous in His sight and shall inherit the kingdom of heaven in which only the righteous shall dwell. And I’m going to ask John Frame if he will quote the Greek of this particular passage.

[Frame works through it reading both the Greek and English.]

I thank you. Well now, you see faith alone is not alone. Faith is not alone. Faith always has an object. The faith, your act of believing, is pointed definitely to God in Jesus Christ, and by the regeneration of the Holy Spirit, and conversion. It’s all one. It’s not a "janus-face" [Janus-faced—JR] proposition, but it is not possible to give exhaustive statements in human words, human concepts. And that’s why we have to be satisfied merely to do what the Scriptures and confessions of faith say that they [i.e., we] ought to do, and that then we are on the way, and I think that Norman Shepherd is certainly in the line of direct descent of [i.e., on the topic of] faith. Thank you. [Emphases noted are Van Til’s.]

More important than Van Til’s confused, rambling defense of Norman Shepherd is the influence of his thought at Westminster Seminary and in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from the 1940s to the present. One can see, running through the Shepherd controversy, the influence of Van Til in, for example (1) Shepherd’s repeated affirmation of contradictory and conflicting statements, such as that Adam’s obedience (had Adam in fact obeyed God’s command) would have been meritorious; and Adam’s obedience would not have been meritorious;[14] (2) Shepherd’s repeated affirmation of the teaching of the Westminster Standards on justification, while at the same time teaching contrary to the Westminster Standards on justification; (3) Shepherd’s abuse of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God in order to deny to men knowledge revealed in Scripture, in an attempt to justify his contention that "covenantal election" can be lost; (4) Shepherd’s assertion of the "free offer of the gospel" – meaning the fictitious doctrine of the sincere desire of God to save all men, elect and reprobate[15] – in order to justify his contention that evangelists should tell every man, "Christ died for you." These are four specific examples; but the influence of the paradoxical, dialectical theology of Van Til pervades Shepherd’s thought, as well as the thought of his defenders, who with their "Biblical theology" and "multiperspectivalism,"[16] have turned Reformed theology into a Babel of confusion.

Worse, Van Til’s influence is seen not only as the context and form of Shepherd’s thought, but also as the context and form of his critics’ thought – at least those critics affiliated with Westminster Seminary and the Presbytery of Philadelphia.

It is clear from Dr. Robertson’s history of the Shepherd controversy that neither the Seminary nor the Presbytery, over a seven-year period, could deal definitively and decisively with the theology of Norman Shepherd. Why not? The Philadelphia Presbytery of the OPC, the Seminary Board, and the Seminary Faculty were paralyzed by the influence of Van Til’s dialectical theology, which subverts logical, noncontradictory thought. So when the Executive Committee of the Seminary Board, writing its Reason and Specifications explaining why Norman Shepherd was finally dismissed after seven years of discussion, points out that "The Faculty report [of February 1977] called attention to the responsibility of teachers to avoid confusing statements," the reminder was not only several decades too late, but contrary to the practice of Westminster’s most famous professor, Cornelius Van Til.

For decades, Professor Van Til’s stock-in-trade, both in the classroom and in his books, had been confusing statements. Worse, this confusion was not inadvertent; it was deliberate. Van Til had written:

It is precisely because they [the colleagues and followers of Van Til] are concerned to defend the Christian doctrine of revelation as basic to all intelligible human predication that they refuse to make any attempt at "stating clearly" any Christian doctrine, or the relation of any one Christian doctrine to any other Christian doctrine. They will not attempt to "solve" the "paradoxes" involved in the relationship of the self-contained God to his dependent creatures.[17]

Notice the four appearances of "any" in that first sentence: They – the Westminster Faculty – refuse to make any attempt to state clearly any Christian doctrine, or the relation of any one Christian doctrine to any other Christian doctrine.

Furthermore, this is stated as a "refusal": They refuse to state clearly any Christian doctrine. It is a deliberate act, not an error of omission or oversight.

Furthermore, this refusal is made into a fundamental principle of theology: They refuse to state any doctrine clearly, because such a refusal is fundamental to the whole enterprise of Christian apologetics: "It is precisely because they are concerned to defend the Christian doctrine of revelation." Defending the doctrine of revelation demands that Christian apologists deliberately and principially refuse to state any doctrine clearly, and principially requires them to be vague, ambiguous, and confusing.

Professor Van Til practiced what he taught. His unintelligibility was legendary, so much so that it was the object of foolish admiration and jesting. One admiring jest at a Westminster Seminary banquet is recounted by William White, Jr., in his book Van Til: Defender of the Faith, An Authorized Biography:

"There is a controversy today as to who is the greatest intellect of this segment of the twentieth century," the m.c. said. "Probably most thinking people would vote for the learned Dr. Einstein. Not me. I wish to put forth as my candidate for the honor, Dr. Cornelius Van Til." (Loud applause.) "My reason for doing so is this: Only eleven people in the world understand Albert Einstein…. Nobody – but nobody in the world – understands Cornelius Van Til."[18]

Van Til taught that logical paradox is an ineradicable characteristic of divine revelation, and hence a sign of Christian spirituality. He wrote, "All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory."[19] That phrase "all teaching" includes, of course, the doctrine of salvation. So when Norman Shepherd asserts that faith is the sole instrument of justification, and that works are also instruments of justification, he is merely following Van Til’s prescription: All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory. Van Til’s writings are peppered with paradoxes, meaningless phrases, undefined terms, and misleading analogies. He wrote: "Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical."[20] Our knowledge must be paradoxical. It can never make sense. So if Professor Shepherd blows hot and cold, that is a sign of confusion, and therefore of Christian spirituality.

As an example of his own contradictory thought, Van Til both affirmed and denied the proofs for the existence of God. He wrote: "I do not reject the ‘theistic proofs’ but merely insist on formulating them in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture. ‘That is to say, if the theistic proof is constructed as it ought to be constructed, it is objectively valid….’ "[21] On the other hand, he also wrote, "Of course Reformed believers do not seek to prove the existence of their God. To seek to prove or to disprove the existence of this God would be to deny him…. A God whose existence is ‘proved’ is not the God of Scripture."[22]

Van Til’s disdain for "mere human logic" was well-known. He warned about squeezing the events of history into the forms of logic: "We fall into logicism. We reduce the significance of the stream of history to the static categories of logic."[23] We hear the echoes of this phrase ("the static categories of logic") in the Neolegalists: Norman Shepherd and his disciples, Douglas Wilson, Steven Schlissel, Steven Wilkins, Andrew Sandlin, John Barach, and so on. They contrast the "static categories of God’s decrees" with the "covenant dynamic." They decry "rationalism," "logicism," and "gnosticism." They assert the inadequacy of human language to express divine truth, and the futility of using human logic to understand it. But the Second Person of the Trinity, the Logos, had no difficulty expressing divine truth in the human languages of Aramaic, Greek, and Hebrew while he walked on Earth; and the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, wrote the perfect, completely accurate, fully adequate, and inerrant Scriptures in human language.

The Vantilians’ disdain for systematic thought, their preference for "Biblical theology" (which is not Biblical at all), which frees its practitioners from the constraints of logic and allows them to interpret Scripture willy-nilly, without regard to context or other passages of Scripture,[24] is a result of their disdain for "mere human logic."

Writing of the statement in chapter 1, paragraph 6, of the Westminster Confession that "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture," Van Til said: "This statement should not be used as a justification for deductive exegesis."[25] But deductive exegesis is precisely what this Confessional statement endorses. In fact, correct exegesis is impossible without using logical deduction.

Norman Shepherd’s subversion of chapter 11 of the Westminster Confession on Justification both depends upon and is required by Cornelius Van Til’s subversion of chapter 1 of the Westminster Confession, on Scripture. In many ways, Norman Shepherd is the theological child of Van Til, working out in the field of soteriology Van Til’s philosophical rejection of rational, systematic, noncontra-dictory revelation. It is not unexpected that those who begin with a medieval denial of divine propositional revelation—such as one finds in Bavinck’s Doctrine of God—end with a medieval doctrine of salvation.

The fundamental problem with the theories of Bavinck, Van Til, Shepherd and their disciples is that divine revelation is given in human concepts, language, and words, so human concepts, language, and words are ipso facto adequate to express, discuss, and ponder all the divine truth that God has given to us. To deny that is to deny divine propositional revelation in toto.

Language, Logic, and Theology

The Dark Age views of Bavinck and Van Til on language, logic, and the knowledge of God are so radically Antichristian that they subvert all Christian doctrine. The doctrine of salvation was not the first doctrine to be corrupted by this irrationalism, which is a revival of the mysticism of the Dark Ages, nor will it be the last. The rejection of literal, propositional truth about God, the assertion that human language cannot express divine truth adequately or accurately, the rejection of "mere human logic," the assertion that God is beyond "affirmation and negation," are denials of the first principle of Christianity, which is literal, propositional revelation from God, given in human language and thought categories, using human logic.

The Westminster Confession of Faith makes Scripture the first principle of Christianity by placing the doctrine of Scripture in its first and longest chapter. All the rest of Christianity — all 32 subsequent chapters of the Confession — rest on the foundation of Scripture alone. Nothing is to be added to or removed from Scripture.

In its first chapter, the Confession, quoting Scripture itself, asserts the infallibility and sufficiency — not the inadequacy and inaccuracy — of the human words God himself put in Scripture. The Confession, echoing Scripture itself, asserts that Scripture is to be studied and understood, not blindly accepted. The Confession, echoing Scripture itself, asserts that logical deduction — "good and necessary consequence" — is the principal tool of understanding Scripture. Logical deduction must be used to compare Scripture with Scripture, for Scripture is its own infallible interpreter — it does not need a pope, priest, seminary professor, or psychologist in order to be understood.

Bavinck’s and Van Til’s view of language and logic is a rejection of the doctrine of Scripture. Rather than the inerrancy, infallibility, sufficiency, clarity, and authority of Scripture, their view asserts the inadequacy, inaccuracy, insufficiency, and murkiness of Scripture, to the point that, to quote Bavinck,

adequate knowledge of God does not exist. There is no name that makes known unto us his being…. The words Father, God, Lord are not real names…. what he is in his essence and nature is entirely incomprehensible and unknowable…. To say what he is, is impossible…. There is no concept, expression, or word by which God’s being can be indicated…. We cannot form a conception of that unitary, unknown being….even negative theology fails to give us any knowledge of God’s being….Whatever is said concerning God is not God…. There is no knowledge of God as he is in himself….

Bavinck’s and Van Til’s view of language and logic is a rejection of the Christian doctrine of God, for God is omnipotent, he is able to speak — and he has spoken in Scripture, in human words — exactly what he intends to say. Far from being hampered by human logic and language, God reveals himself as he is by human logic and language.

Bavinck’s and Van Til’s view of language and logic is a rejection of the doctrine of the Incarnation, for the Second Person of the Trinity, the Logos, became man, and expressed his divine thoughts in human words, using human logic and categories. Jesus Christ spoke and wrote Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek; and the human words he spoke and wrote expressed his meaning perfectly, exactly, and fully.

Bavinck’s and Van Til’s view of language and logic is a rejection of the doctrine of man’s creation in God’s image, for God created Adam and gave Adam the gifts of language and logic so that he might talk to God, and God might talk to him. Communion with God was then and is still intellectual communion. That is why the Apostle Paul says of believers: "We have the mind of Christ."

Bavinck approvingly quoted medieval theologians attacking the Christian doctrine of revelation. The anti-theology he and they espouse led, and will always lead, to a Dark Age, when the light of God’s Word and Gospel are virtually lost. The current and growing rejection of the Gospel of justification by faith alone is one result of that rejection of divine, literal, propositional revelation. That rejection is the heresy matrix, the source of all error and heresies.

Notes

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The Biblical View of Science

By W. Gary Crampton
© The Trinity Foundation

Many non-Christians, and all too many Christians, are of the opinion that science, (i.e., the physical or natural sciences) is an ever-growing body of truth about the universe. The progress of science, its technological triumphs, so we are told, demonstrate its truth. Science is seemingly unassailable. After all, it works doesn’t it? And isn’t success the measure of truth?

This being the case, so it goes, when the Bible and science appear to be at odds, we need to re-interpret the Bible. For example, since science tells us (and the pope agrees) that (some sort of) evolution is a fact, not just a theory, we need to take a fresh look at Genesis 1. No longer can we assert with the Westminster Shorter Catechism (Q 9) that "the work of creation is God’s making all things of nothing, by the Word of His power, in the space of six days, and all very good." Six-day creationism needs to be re-examined. It is, we are assured, an obscurantist view of things.

To speak against this sort of scientific thinking is almost blasphemous in some circles, because, for many, science is the god of this age. Yet, that is what this paper intends to do, that is, to blaspheme the god of science. Science, it will be seen, is not the main revealer of truth. In fact, science is not capable of revealing any truth at all.

What then is the Biblical view of science? Science enables us to fulfill the mandate of Genesis 1:28: "Then God blessed them [Adam and Eve], and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply; fill the Earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the Earth.’ " Science gives us directions for doing things, or "operating," in this world. It does not explain how the laws of nature work, nor does it accurately define or describe things. Science does not discover truth; it is a method for dominating and utilizing nature; it is merely a practical discipline that helps us live in God’s universe and subdue it.

As strange as it might sound to the reader that science never gives us truth, it is precisely that belief that has been held by leading scientists and philosophers.¹ Albert Einstein, for example, speaking of our knowledge of the universe, said: "We know nothing about it at all . . .. The real nature of things, that we shall never know, never." The British philosopher Karl Popper wrote: "We know that our scientific theories always remain hypotheses . . .. In science there is no knowledge, in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle understood the word, in the sense which implies finality; in science we never have sufficient reason for the belief that we have attained the truth." Popper went on to say: "It can even be shown that all [scientific] theories, including the best, have the same probability, namely zero." Then too, Bertrand Russell, who will be quoted below, asserted that all scientific laws are based on fallacious arguments. And philosopher Paul Feyerabend, in his book Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, writes:

"On closer analysis we even find that science knows no ‘bare facts’ at all but that the ‘facts’ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as are the minds of those that invented them."

John Robbins has pointed out that there are at least five logical difficulties with science, i.e., five reasons why science can never give us truth:²

(1) Observation is unreliable. Scientists do not perform an experiment only once. Experiments are always repeated, and the results most always differ in some way. Why? Because the senses tend to deceive us; they are not to be trusted. Hence, numerous readings are taken in an attempt to guard against inaccurate observation. So much is this the case in science, that tests with unrepeatable results are never taken seriously. But if observation is unreliable, if the senses are so easily deceived, if the results frequently differ, why should one ever believe that he has discovered truth through observation?

(2) All scientific experiments commit the fallacy of asserting the consequent. In syllogistic form this is expressed as: "If p, then q. q; therefore, p." Bertrand Russell, certainly no friend of Christianity, stated it this way:

All inductive arguments in the last resort reduce themselves to the following form: "If this is true, that is true: now that is true, therefore this is true." This argument is, of course, formally fallacious. Suppose I were to say: "If bread is a stone and stones are nourishing, then this bread will nourish me; now this bread does nourish me; therefore it is a stone, and stones are nourishing." If I were to advance such an argument, I should certainly be thought foolish, yet it would not be fundamentally different from the argument upon which all scientific laws are based.

In the laboratory scientists work with a hypothesis. In this case the hypothesis is: "If bread is a stone and stones are nourishing, then this bread will nourish me." The scientist then attempts to deduce the predicted results that should occur if the hypothesis is true, such as "this bread nourishes me." He then performs an experiment to test the hypothesis to see if the predicted results occur. So he sits down at the table and eats the bread, and wonder of wonders, the bread does nourish him. The hypothesis, he concludes, is confirmed: "This bread is a stone and stones are nourishing." Silly you say? Yes! Yet, as Russell has asserted, it is not "fundamentally different from the argument upon which all scientific laws are based." That is to say, all scientific laws are based on fallacious arguments.

(3) Science commits the fallacy of induction. Induction is the attempt to derive a general law from particular instances. Science is necessarily inductive. For example, if a scientist is studying crows, he might observe 999 crows and find that they all are black. But is he ever able to assert that all crows are black? No; the next crow he observes might be an albino. One can never observe all crows: past, present, and future. Universal propositions can never be validly obtained by observation. Hence, science can never give us true statements.

(4) Equations are always selected, they are never discovered. In the laboratory the scientist seeks to determine the boiling point of water. Since water hardly ever boils at the same temperature, the scientist conducts a number of tests and the slightly differing results are noted. He then must average them. But what kind of average does he use: mean, mode, or median? He must choose; and whatever kind of average he selects, it is his own choice; it is not dictated by the data. Then too, the average he chooses is just that, that is, it is an average, not the actual datum yielded by the experiment. Once the test results have been averaged, the scientist will calculate the variable error in his readings. He will likely plot the data points or areas on a graph. Then he will draw a curve through the resultant data points or areas on the graph. But how many curves, each one of which describes a different equation, are possible? An infinite number of curves is possible. But the scientist draws only one. What is the probability of the scientist choosing the correct curve out of an infinite number of possibilities? The chance is one over infinity, or zero. Therefore, all scientific laws are false. They cannot possibly be true. As cited above, the statement of Karl Popper is correct: "It can even be shown that all theories, including the best, have the same probability, namely zero."

(5) All scientific laws describe ideal situations. As Clark has said, "At best, scientific law is a construction rather than a discovery, and the construction depends on factors never seen under a microscope, never weighed in a balance, never handled or manipulated."³ Clark uses the law of the pendulum as an example:

The law of the pendulum states that the period of the swing is proportional to the square root of the length. If, however, the weight of the bob is unevenly displaced around its center, the law will not hold. The law assumes that the bob is homogeneous, that the weight is symmetrically distributed along all axes, or more technically, that the mass is concentrated at a point. No such bob exists, and hence the law is not an accurate description of any tangible pendulum. Second, the law assumes that the pendulum swings by a tensionless string. There is no such string, so that the scientific law does not describe any real pendulum. And third, the law could be true only if the pendulum swung on an axis without friction. There is no such axis. It follows, therefore, that no visible pendulum accords with the mathematical formula and that the formula is not a description of any existing pendulum.

From our study of these five logical difficulties, it can be readily seen that science is not capable of giving us any truth. And if the scientific method is a tissue of logical fallacies, why should Christians seek to argue from science to the truth? Simply stated, they should not. Science is useful in accomplishing its purpose, i.e., subduing the Earth. But that is all it is useful for, nothing more.

The question arises, "If science never gives us truth, how can it be so successful?" It all depends on how one defines success. We are now able to put a man on the moon; we are also able to destroy our fellow man with one push of a button. Are these measures of success? Scientific theories are always changing (whereas truth is eternal). Is constant change a measure of success?

Science is successful when one understands its purpose, and when one understands that false theories sometimes work. Newtonian science, for example, worked for years. It has been replaced by Einstein’s theory. But even though he believed his theory to be a better approximation of the truth than Newton’s, Einstein declared that his own theory was false.

Science has its place in a Christian philosophy, an important place. But science is never to be seen as a means of learning truth. Truth is found in the Scriptures alone; the Bible has a monopoly on truth. It is God’s Word that must be believed, not the experiments of men. As Robbins has said: "Science is false, and must always be false. Scripture is true and must always be true. The issue is as clear, and as simple, as that."

Notes
1. The quotes used here are cited in the Foreword of Gordon H. Clark’s The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God (The Trinity Foundation, 1987), and in the December 1994 edition of The Lofton Letter, edited by John Lofton, 10, 11.
2. John W. Robbins, Logic Seminar, Westminster Institute, July 1995.
3. Clark, 57.

Recommended:

A Gang of Pandas
Science is essentially, pervasively, undeniably, incurably, and often arrogantly, irrational. To believe that it can discover truth is nothing other than superstition.

Professional Morons
Examples on how non-Christian philosophers are really no better than the most incompetent non-Christians in the substance of their arguments.

Biblical Rationalism vs. Psycho Assertionism
Vincent Cheung crushes an atheist who trusts in sensation, induction, and science.

For the complete collection of our publications, please see the online library.

Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought

By W. Gary Crampton
© The Trinity Foundation

It must be said of John Frame, Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology at Westminster Theological Seminary (Escondido, California), that he is a very brave man, a hearty soul. In his latest book, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought,¹ presented in celebration of Van Til’s one hundredth birthday, Professor Frame, as the title suggests, attempts to codify the thoughts of his mentor. Earlier writings from the Trinity Foundation have pointed out not only the eclectic concepts of Frame,² but also the paradoxical thoughts of Van Til³–writings that indicate that the professor’s task is not possible. Undaunted, Frame has written some 400-plus pages in which he, to quote the back cover of this volume, "combines deep appreciation with incisive critical analysis of the renowned Westminster apologist’s ideas."

The book is divided into six major parts, followed by two appendices (Appendix A is a reprint of Frame’s review of Classical Apologetics, authored by Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; Appendix B is an article by Edmund Clowney on Van Til’s preaching). Part One has to do with "Introductory Considerations." Here the author names some scholars who sympathize with Dr. Van Til and others who don’t ("debunkers"), speaks about his method of analyzing Van Til , presents a warm and abbreviated history of "Van Til’s life and character," and gives us his opinion regarding his mentor’s "place in history." He concludes that although Herman Dooye-weerd and Gordon Clark were great Christian thinkers, Van Til is superior. In fact, says Frame, even though Van Til is not the most comprehensive, clearest, or influential thinker of our time, he is "perhaps the most important Christian thinker since [John] Calvin" (44). In this review, we will see if this superlative is justified.

On page 47 Frame makes the claim, not uncommon among Van Tilians, that Gordon "Clark gave to Aristotle’s logic the same authority as Scripture." This is a caricature, at best. Rather, like Augustine before him, Clark taught that the laws of logic are the way God thinks, and that these laws are embedded in Scripture. On the same page, Frame writes:

Unlike Van Til, he [Clark] took the term presupposition to refer to a hypothesis that could not be ultimately proved, but which could be progressively verified by logical analysis. This indicates some unclarity in Clark’s mind as to what the ultimate standard of proof really is. If the ultimate standard is God’s revelation, then the presuppositions of the Christian faith not only are provable, but also are the criteria by which all other proofs are to be measured.

The unclear thinking here is not Clark’s, but Frame’s. By definition, that which is a presupposition is not provable. That would have to be a postsupposition. Or is Frame taking a Humpty-Dumpty view of words? Clark’s point is that the axiom (or presupposition) of all Christian thinking is that the Bible is the Word of God. Axioms (or presuppositions) cannot be proved; if they could be proved, they would not be axioms. It is interesting, however, that Frame here, as he does later in this book (chapters 10, 14, and 23), acknowledges the fact that Van Til, who is touted as "Mr. Presuppositionalist," is not really a presuppositionalist after all. Why? Because, unlike Clark, he believes that there are proofs for the existence of God and the truth of his Word.

Part Two is entitled "The Metaphysics of Knowledge." According to Frame, this is the strongest part of Van Til’s system. Here the author discusses "Van Til’s view of the basic nature of human knowledge within a Christian worldview" (51). It also includes "his teaching about the nature of God, the Trinity, the Creator-creation distinction, and the necessity of presupposing God’s revelation in all human thought" (398).

But is Van Til really orthodox in this area of Christian theism? What about, for instance, his doctrine of the Trinity? Van Til believed that God is at the same time both one person and three persons. As Frame says: "For Van Til, God is not simply a unity of persons; he is a person" (65, italics his). This, to be sure, is not the teaching of orthodox Christianity, which maintains that God is one in essence (or substance) and three in persons. As the unity of the Godhead there are three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost."

Van Til denied that his concept of the Trinity was a contradiction, yet he "embraces with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory" nature of this view (67). Frame admits that his mentor’s view is somewhat novel; he calls it "a very bold theological move" (65). But his attempt to clear up the "apparent contradiction" only aggravates the problem; he retreats with the incredible claim that the Bible is imprecise regarding this essential doctrine of Christianity: "Scripture itself often fails to be precise about the mysteries of the faith" (69). (As a point of interest, in this section [77-78] it becomes quite evident that Frame, and Van Til as well, believe that science can give us knowledge, i.e., true facts and true laws. For a Biblical refutation of this, see Gordon Clark’s The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God.)

Then there is Van Til’s concept of "analogical knowledge" (Chapter 7). He taught that all human knowledge is (and can only be) analogical to God’s knowledge; there is no univocal point, no point of coincidence, between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. Propositions, then, cannot have the same meaning for God that they do for man. (As incredible as it may sound, Van Til even went so far as to deny that all truth, with regard to God, is propositional. He did not explain what the phrase "non-propositional truth" might mean.)

The problem here is that if there is no univocal point at which man’s knowledge meets God’s knowledge, then man can never know the truth. Why? Because God is omniscient, i.e., he knows all truth. Hence, if man does not know what God knows, his ideas can never be true. Or, to say it another way, if Van Til’s concept of analogical knowledge were true, then it would not be possible for man to do what Van Til calls on him to do, i.e., "to think God’s thoughts after him" (92). In fact, it would not be possible for his theory of analogy to be true.

Even though Frame denies it, Clark was correct when he maintained that Van Til’s concept of analogical knowledge is much closer to that of Thomas Aquinas than Van Tilians are willing to admit. Such a view, if taken to its logical conclusion, leads to skepticism. Simply stated, an analogy of the truth is not the truth.

The issue of analogical knowledge brings us to "The Clark Controversy" (chapter 8). In 1944, Cornelius Van Til and eleven other presbyters lodged a complaint against the action of the Presbytery of Philadelphia regarding the licensure and ordination of Gordon Clark in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. There were several matters involved in the "Complaint," but the major items had to do with analogical knowledge and "the incomprehensibility of God." Clark taught that there is a quantitative, but not a qualitative distinction between the contents of God’s knowledge and the contents of man’s knowledge; that is, the difference in knowledge is one of degree, not of kind. The twelve presbyters disagreed. They denied that there is a univocal point at which God’s knowledge meets man’s knowledge.

The controversy went on for some time. Finally the General Assembly of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church sided in favor of Clark. For an in depth study of the whole issue, one should read The Clark-Van Til Controversy,⁴ by Herman Hoeksema. Hoeksema’s analysis of the debate is excellent. In it he exposes the errors of Van Til and his associates. Much to the credit of John Frame, he does criticize Van Til’s approach to the Clark controversy. And he concludes the chapter by stating: "Clark and Van Til are together in heaven now. I am pleased to announce that they are reconciled" (113).

In Chapter 11, entitled "The Primacy of the Intellect," we find another flaw in Van Til. He and Frame oppose this principle as it is traditionally expressed by men such as Augustine, Calvin, Machen, and Clark. Van Til averred that there is a three-fold distinction between the powers of the soul: intellect, will, and emotion. According to Frame, Van Til posits that "the human intellect, will, and emotions" are "ontologically equal," but the intellect is "economically" primary (144). This view, as Hoeksema points out, has always been "strongly opposed" by Reformed theologians.⁵ Professor Frame, on the other hand, goes so far as to say that "I think it is advisable for Reformed theologians to avoid advocating the primacy of the intellect" (148). He considers "the traditional concept of the primacy of the intellect" to be "untenable" (170).

According to the Bible, however, the intellect is primary because a person is his mind, his soul, or his spirit. Persons have bodies and emotions, but persons are not bodies or emotions. As Clark and Augustine would say, the body is the instrument of the soul or spirit or mind, which is the person. As a man thinks (not emotes) in his heart, so is he. Revelation is conveyed, not to the body or emotions of man, but to his mind, by means of Biblical propositions. It is the mind (the intellect) of man that needs to be "transformed" (Romans 12:1, 2) and "girded up" (1 Peter 1:13). It is the mind of fallen man that is at "enmity" with God (Colossians 1:21). Men walk in "the futility of their mind" (Ephesians 4:17); they are "futile in their thoughts" (Romans 1:21).

Van Til embraced the "apparent contradictions" in the Bible. Perhaps this is due to his unbiblical view of logic. Van Til’s deprecation of logic, not the misuse of logic, but logic itself, is well known.⁶ In chapter 12, Frame concedes that Van Til believes that many of the doctrines of Scripture are "apparently contradictory." Further, they are not able to be resolved before the bar of human reason. Whereas the Bible claims that "God is not the author of confusion" (1 Corinthians 14:33), and that there is nothing which is written in it that we "cannot read or understand" (2 Corinthians 1:13), Van Til even goes so far as to say that "all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory" (159), i.e., logically paradoxical.

Robert Reymond, in defense of a rational Christianity, argues against the irrationality of Van Til when he writes: "If such is the case [that all Christian truth will finally be paradoxical], [then] . . . it condemns at the outset as futile even the attempt at systematic (orderly) theology . . . since it is impossible to reduce to a system irreconcilable paradoxes which steadfastly resist all attempts at harmonious systematization."⁷ In other words, if Van Til’s view of logic and Scripture is taken to its logical conclusion, there could be no system of Biblical truth. At every point, Van Til’s peculiar views undermine the Bible.

Sadly, Van Til and others have branded Gordon Clark a rationalist because he believed that we should refuse to accept the "apparent contradictions" found in the Bible. We should, taught Clark, attempt to solve the so-called "paradoxes," to harmonize Scripture with itself. The present reviewer agrees with Hoeksema when he writes: "There is here, indeed, something that is more than amazing, that is really unbelievable, that might almost be catalogued as another paradox: the phenomenon that theologians [Van Til and others] accuse a brother theologian of heresy because he tries to solve problems."⁸

Part Three of this volume is entitled "The Ethics of Knowledge." Here the author deals with Van Til’s teaching regarding "the effects of the Fall upon our knowledge" (51). In his own words, Frame says: "I am rather more critical of him [Van Til] in this area than I was in the area of the metaphysics of knowledge" (187). He concludes that here we have "an area of both strength and weakness" (398).

Notably, Frame points out Van Til’s inconsistency in positing his concept of the antithesis which exists between Christian and non-Christian thought: "My evaluation is that . . . these formulations are not altogether consistent with one another" (192). Frame doesn’t say it, but this is a constant problem with Van Til. Inconsistencies abound.

In chapter 16 we come to Van Til’s teaching about "Common Grace." Here again, his position is errant. This is especially true in his view of "the free offer of the Gospel." That is, Van Til speaks of a "well meant offer of salvation to a generality of men, including elect and non-elect" (220). Or to put it another way, Van Til believes that God sincerely desires the salvation of those whom he has not foreordained to be saved.

John Frame, although he has some criticisms of his mentor in this area, likewise believes that "God wants all individuals to repent, whether or not he has foreordained them to do so" (223). Simply stated, this is preposterous. It is not conceivable that God sincerely seeks the salvation of those whom from eternity he has determined not to save. What is Frame’s solution? Simple: "Here we must invoke Van Til’s doctrines of paradox and analogical thinking" (223). Quite clever, eh? Whenever Van Tilians run into a problem they call it a paradox and move on. Call it whatever you like, it is irrational. Moreover, as Hoeksema correctly says, it is a form of incipient Arminianism.⁹

The final chapter of Part Three deals with "Rationalism and Irrationalism." Van Til taught that all non-Christian thought, contrary to Christian thought, consists of a constant dialectic of rationalism and irrationalism. It began in the Garden of Eden with Adam and Eve, and it has been that way ever since. Frame writes: "In my view, Van Til’s analysis of the history of non-Christian thought in terms of rationalism and irrationalism, together with its theological justification, is one of his best accomplishments. It is scripturally based in its accurate account of the Christian worldview and the unbeliever’s negation of it. It is confirmed by analysis of the secular texts themselves" (236).

Part Four is entitled "The Argument for Christianity." In it the author shows "how, on Van Til’s view, a believer should argue and defend the gospel to an unbeliever in the light of the metaphysics and ethics of knowledge" (51). But before we learn the "how" of Van Til’s way, first we learn the "how not to." So chapters 18-21 give us Van Til’s analysis and critique of "the traditional method" of the Church fathers (including Augustine), Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Butler, and Edward J. Carnell. According to Frame, there are positive and negative elements in Van Til’s critique of these other systems of apologetics.

Then in chapter 22 we are told that the argument for Christianity must of necessity be circular or "spiral," always resting on the presupposition of God’s revelation to man in the Bible. In Van Til’s own words: "To admit one’s own presuppositions and to point out the presuppositions of others is therefore to maintain that all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting-point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another" (302). In this sense, of course, what he says is correct.

Finally, in chapter 23, "Reasoning by Presupposition," in the words of the author, "we come now to Van Til’s recommended methodology for apologetic witness. Here is, at last, his actual argument–his ‘absolute certain proof’ of Christian theism" (311).

As seen earlier, Van Til is not a presuppositionalist. Presuppositionalism, by definition, excludes the use of proofs for the presupposition. In his book, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth, John Robbins cites numerous examples where Van Til speaks favorably concerning the proofs of God’s existence. Writes Van Til:

"Men ought to reason analogically from nature to nature’s God. Men ought, therefore, to use the cosmological argument analogically in order thus to conclude that God is the creator of this universe. . . . Men ought also to use the ontological argument analogically. . . . The argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity is objectively valid. We should not tone down the validity of this argument to the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be adequately stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound. . . . Thus there is an absolutely certain proof for the existence of God and the truth of Christian theism."¹⁰

These statements are noticeably Thomistic.

What is Van Til’s "absolutely certain proof" of "Christian theism"? Says Frame, it is an "indirect" argument: the impossibility of the contrary. In Van Til’s words: "The theistic proofs therefore reduce to one proof, the proof which argues that unless this God, the God of the Bible, the ultimate being, the Creator, the controller of the universe, be presupposed as the foundation of human experience, this experience operates in a void. This one proof is absolutely convincing" (313). Van Til seems to confuse "convincing" with "valid."

Van Til goes on: "The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent, assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument sake, in order to show him that on such a position the ‘facts’ are not facts and the ‘laws’ are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument sake in order that he may be shown that only on such a basis do ‘facts’ and ‘laws’ appear intelligible" (313, 314).

The problem here is that if the Christian is formulating his arguments on the presupposition of Biblical revelation, then there is no "theistic proof" at all. It is simply divine revelation, not an argument for God or his Word. Hence, to suggest, as Van Til and some of his disciples do, that the traditional "theistic proofs" can be reformulated in a Biblical fashion, under which they are valid, is absurd.

On the other hand, if the transcendental argument is being used as an ad hominem argument, i.e., a reductio ad absurdum, then again it proves nothing with regard to the truth of Christian theism. Reducing the opponent’s arguments to absurdity, thereby showing him the futility of his own method, is an excellent apologetical tool. But it does not prove the truthfulness of the Christian system. In fact, if all other "systems" could be shown to be false, this would still not prove Christianity to be true. Van Til and his disciples are confused.

What, then, is the conclusion? The "absolutely certain proof" of the "transcendental method" is non-existent. There is no proof for God and his Word. A Christian epistemology begins with the Bible as the Word of God; this is the indemonstrable axiom, from which all true theories are to be deduced. Being an axiom, it cannot be proved. If it could be proved, it would not be the starting point. Why do we have to keeping repeating the obvious for the benefit of the Van Tilians?

In Part Five we read about "Van Til as Critic." Here the author studies "Van Til’s offensive apologetics, his critical analysis of unbelieving systems and of the influence of unbelief upon Christian theology" (51). Writes Frame: "Van Til is at his worst in his critiques of other thinkers, but even here he provides valuable insight" (399). In this section, which will not be analyzed by this reviewer, we have Van Til’s interaction with "Greek Philosophy and Scholasticism," Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth, and Herman Dooyeweerd. Suffice it to say, in Frame’s own words, here Van Til "does point out some genuine and serious errors and confusions in those systems, and even more in the system of Karl Barth. For giving the church such clear warning about these errors, he deserves the commendation of all Christians" (400).

Finally, in Part Six we come to "Conclusions." Chapter 28 is an interesting study of "Van Til’s Successors," which includes his immediate successors, the Theonomists, as well as some others. Then in chapter 29, "Van Til and Our Future," the author gives us a summary of his conclusions. He is critical in some areas, but supportive in most. "I believe, therefore," says the author, "that we can learn much that is good and valuable from Van Til without being slavish devotees. It is not necessary for the Van Tilian movement to maintain a movement mentality. Nor is it necessary to stand in stark antithesis against all our fellow Christians who have thus far not joined that movement" (400).

Conclusion

Among other things, Professor Frame has concluded that Van Til "is perhaps the most important Christian thinker since Calvin." He is not alone with such a superlative statement. Van Til has been called "undoubtedly the greatest defender of the Christian faith in our century." It has been said that "in every area of thought, the philosophy of Cornelius Van Til is of critical and central importance." Other of his admirers say that Van Til "is a legendary giant," "of unquestioned orthodoxy."¹¹

But, as we have seen, these comments are unwarranted. It turns out that a great deal of Van Til’s teaching is far from "unquestioned orthodoxy." It does not pass the Berean test of Acts 17:11. Worse, much of Van Til’s thought is not only errant, but dangerously so. Robbins has said it well: "Let us turn from Van Tilianism and ‘embrace with passion’ the Scriptural ideals of clarity in both thought and speech; let us recognize, with Christ and the Westminster Assembly, the indispensability of logic; let us believe and teach, with Augustine and Athanasius, the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity; and let us defend the consistency and intelligibility of the Bible. Then, and only then, will Christianity have a bright and glorious future in America and throughout the Earth."¹²

Endnotes

1. John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (P & R Publishing, 1995).

2. John W. Robbins, "A Christian Perspective on John Frame," The Trinity Review, Number 93.

3. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth and W. Gary Crampton, "Why I Am Not a Van Tilian," The Trinity Review, Number 103.

4. Herman Hoeksema, The Clark-Van Til Controversy (Trinity Foundation, 1995).

5. Ibid., 19.

6. See, for example, Robert Reymond, Preach the Word (Rutherford House, 1988), 16-35, and Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Zondervan, 1982), 99-101.

7. Reymond, op. cit., 29.

8. Hoeksema, op. cit., 24.

9. Hoeksema, op. cit., chapters 9 and 10.

10. Robbins, Van Til, 13.

11. Cited in Robbins, Van Til, 1, 2.

12. Ibid., 40.

Clark Speaks from the Grave

By Gordon H. Clark
© The Trinity Foundation

Editor’s note: More than a year before he died in April 1985, Dr. Gordon H. Clark had prepared an essay entitled Clark Speaks from the Grave, intending it to be published after his death. The Trinity Foundation has now published the lecture as a small book. What follows are brief excerpts from the lecture in which Dr. Clark replies to some of his critics: Cornelius Van Til, Vern Poythress, Robert Reymond, Gordon Lewis, and John W. Montgomery.

In all his critics he finds two failures: a "basic refusal to say what they mean," and a basic refusal to defend Christianity against worldly philosophy. Christian apologetics in the twentieth century, insofar as it is anti-Clark, is a failure. It fails either because it is empirical, or irrational, or both. With defenders of the faith like Van Til, Poythress, and Montgomery, Christianity needs no enemies.

Criticisms against the work of Gordon H. Clark made by Reformed theologians, and some others, hardly mention the details of his theology as stated in his What Do Presbyterians Believe? and his several commentaries on New Testament books. If there are some theological objections, such as those against his view on the incomprehensibility of God in A Complaint Against the Philadelphia Presbytery of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (a complaint lodged by Clark’s detractors against the presbytery because the presbytery voted in 1944 to ordain Clark), these theological objections quickly become more philosophical and epistemological. Rather than being strictly exegetical, they are directed against his alleged "rationalism." Naturally the theology and the philosophy permeate each other. This controversy, in which after five years the General Assembly refused to rebuke the presbytery, continued on academically to his death. Since Clark’s many publications were read and criticized by scholars outside that denomination, the philosophic or apologetic controversy is worthy of careful study.

From the philosophic point of view, so far as one can appeal to antiquity, it was a controversy between Plato and Aristotle, or, in Christian terms, between Augustine and Aquinas. Naturally this appeal cannot be interpreted too exactly, for Cornelius Van Til, who furnished the basic content of the Complaint, is best known as a Presuppositionalist and not as an Aristotelian. Nevertheless, and inconsistently as it would seem, he always maintained that the cosmological argument for the existence of God, though faulty as expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas, can be rephrased so as to be logically compelling. Unfortunately he never explained how.

Van Til’s deficiency at this point is one reason, albeit a minor reason, by which to recognize that the controversy basically and fundamentally concerns the nature of logic and its use in theology. But the context is far wider than the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and Westminster Seminary. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Soren Kierkegaard denounced logic and installed passion on the throne of theology. To be a Christian one must believe contradictions. Karl Barth continued with Paradox; and Emil Brunner declared that God and the medium of conceptuality schliessen einander aus—are mutually exclusive. Dooyeweerd and his followers, including Van Til, are not usually so extreme. Even so, Van Til asserted that "we dare not maintain that his [God’s] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point" (A Complaint, p. 5, col. 3, italics his or theirs). Some of Van Til’s students have since tried to produce a Christian apologetic by rejecting the law of contradiction and combining empiricism, apriorism, and irrationalism into a synthetic diamond of many facets. One thing at any rate cannot be gainsaid: The nature and use of logic in theology is in this century a matter of great importance.

In addition to the usefulness and indispensability of the "trivial," the "platitudinous," and the "empty" logical forms, which alone determine that two statements are contradictories, or contraries as the case may be, the more common use fills the empty a’s, b’s, and c’s with bears, stars, and the federal headship of Adam. There is no way to establish any article of the creed, much less a system of doctrine such as the Westminster Confession, without filling the form with Scriptural content. In view of Clark’s commentaries on several New Testament books, it is ridiculous to charge him, as some of the more benighted apologists have done, with proceeding on the basis of logical one. Logic alone gives, A(ab) A(bc) implies A(ac). Theology argues, All sinners are under the wrath and curse of God, All men are sinners, therefore all men are under God’s curse. Or, All who are justified like Abraham are justified by faith, All who are justified are justified like Abraham, there fore all who are justified are justified by faith. This may sound academic, platitudinous, useless; but Paul did not think so in his letter to the Galatians. Steps such as these must be used in the formulation of every Christian doctrine. Another step, even a previous step, is the definition of justification. On the grounds that Poythress proposes, one would not know when, or even if, a respondent meant what Calvin and Hodge meant, and when, or even if, Poythress meant the Roman Catholic definition which confuses justification with sanctification.

This technical, professorial, academic platitudinarianism has serious implications for the ordination of prospective candidates for the ministry. The ordination vows of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, to which the most active of Clark’s opponents belong, contain the question, "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of this church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" Now, quite aside from the fact that without the law of contradiction "sincerely" can mean "insincerely," the ordinand thinks to himself—or, rather, has already thought—that the term system has several meanings. It can mean the arithmetical system of numbering from one to thirty-three; why, of course I believe it is a system. If the previous presbyterial examination questioned him about justification as a judicial, divine sentence, he can say, so it is, and (to himself) it is also a life-long process of good works. It is both instantaneous and temporally extended. One must not subject oneself to the platitudinous trivialities of the law of contradiction. Besides, "receive and adopt" is a phrase of no precise meaning. They are fuzzy terms, and in some sense or other I receive and adopt the Confession as containing the vague terminologies of Scripture.

Actually this was done, though not so professorially, by hundreds of ordinands in the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. until they altered the ordination vows in 1967.

Since Clark’s complaints here so frequently depend on the absence of definitions and the refusal (of his critics) to defend an alternate theory, the injured apologete might reply that it is unnecessary to have any positive philosophy in order to show that Clark’s views are unacceptable. He violates common sense, he severely restricts knowledge, he even contradicts himself. What he says just cannot be true. Of these objections the charge of self-contradiction seems even less than the others to require an alternate system to support it.

However, if the critic uses the law of contradiction, Clark can ask, By what theory do you justify your use of this law? How did you come to learn the requirements of logic? The critic is then faced with the necessity of justifying his own method, for merely asserting that Clark contradicts himself is not, alone, a sufficient refutation. It assumes without foundation one of the points in question. This should be all the more evident since the days of Kierkegaard and Barth. Both of them explicitly accept and defend contradictory positions. The one supports himself on infinite passion and the other on Paradox. If the empirical apologetes could convict Clark of self-contradiction—and their attempts are far from successful—they would still have to defend some theory or other in order to refute his existential neo-orthodoxy. Therefore Clark can legitimately ask them whether they base their logic on sensory observation, and this is impossible, or whether they are Kantians to be destroyed by Hegel. One must on this account reject the idea that Clark can be refuted without one’s accepting any definite systematic basis for the refutation, and hence his objections to their omissions are justified.

There is one further point that needs to be mentioned. It must be in the form of a footnote, or parenthesis—because, while so far everything has been well documented—this depends more on conversations, a letter or two, and perhaps some small article, than on published material. Even so, it is of tremendous importance. To avoid and to confute Clark’s position, some of Van Til’s disciples contend that God does not think in propositions, and hence dependence on "mere human logic" is an untrustworthy crutch. To this Clark made two replies. First, he remarked that his opponents cited no Biblical passage in which this is stated, nor did they deduce it by any "good and necessary consequence" from a group of such premises. Indeed, since the Bible is ninety percent propositional—commands and ascriptions of praise being the exceptions—it would be rather peculiar if the Bible would deny its own truths. Then, second, if God does not think in propositions how could he have given us all the information now contained in the sixty-six books? If he does not think that "David was King of Israel," how could he have framed that proposition for our instruction? Or, worse, if we say that God cannot think in propositions, we deny his omnipotence. And if we think in propositions and God does not, then Van Til’s statement will be true, that God’s knowledge and ours do not coincide at any single point. Since we "know" that "David was King of Israel," God cannot know it, and therefore it is false. So are all the Gospels, and Christianity is a delusion.

After so much vigorous argumentation, is it necessary to engage in repetition so as to produce a concluding paragraph or two? If not necessary, it may yet be useful for those who have short memories, and also for those of the public who make no claim to competence in apologetics. Here then are some of the points on which Clark used to insist.

From beginning to end, Clark has given numerous examples of his critics’ failure to define their basic terms. Poythress took pride in being ambiguous. The others at least omit the pride; but this does not atone for their ignorance of what sensation is, nor for the absence of any account of perception and imagery. Virtually all the essential components of a reasoned argument against Clark are missing. That is to say, they depend on unsubstantiated assertions.

Next, they allege scientific corroboration without having studied physics. One of them made ridiculous remarks on operationalism. Another discussed the law of gravitation without knowing what it is. None of them analyzed the actual methodology and procedures used in the laboratories. Then too, where one would most expect competence, their appeals to Scripture exemplify impossible exegesis; and where the Scripture supports Clark, they remain silent.

Some more than others misunderstand and therefore misrepresent Clark’s position. The body of the text has indicated a few such cases. There are also logical blunders, as when one of the critics confused contraries with contradictories. Then there was the concluding discussion of individuation. Though it looms so large, almost the main point in some of their books, and omitted in very few, the reply has shown the critics’ lack of any clear notion of what an individual is.

Underlying all these other complaints against the apologists, and permeating all their writings, is the basic refusal to say what they mean. They do not define their terms, with the result that their objections against Clark are unintelligible. Of course, Clark was happy enough that they were unable to refute his views; but he was genuinely sad at another result. These men were self-styled apologists; and however much it is proper to refute a poor defense of Christianity, an apologist, if we remember 1 Peter 3:15, must mainly direct his arguments against non-Christians. Colossians 2:8, where the King James Version is weak, really says, "See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ" (NIV). They must engage and refute the arguments of John Dewey, Herbert Feigl, Ernst Nagel, B. F. Skinner, Gilbert Ryle, and so on. Otherwise the world has grounds for sneering at the apologists’ incompetence, and Christianity suffers. Of course, omniscience is a bit hard to come by, but the first and absolutely indispensable step is the definition of terms.

Immediate Obedience

Be consistent in your administration of discipline. Never, never, never issue a warning or a command without following it through.

We should expect instant obedience on the part of our children, and we should reinforce that expectation with the rod each and every time that they fail to obey. Don’t fall into the trap of constructing some kind of early warning system. There are some parents who have to tell their children to do something two or three times before they will do it. Other parents have to raise their voices beyond the normal range before their children will listen. And still others have to count to three before their children will obey. "If you don’t do this by the time I count to three, you’re really going to get it." They count, "1–2–the child doesn’t move–2½" and so it goes. The child has won. Expect instant obedience and do not implement any kind of early warning system.

There are times when the very lives of our children may depend upon their obeying us immediately. I read of one such instance that occurred in Southern California when a family was camping on their vacation. They were staying in a campsite and the children were out playing on some rocks nearby. As the father scanned the area to see where his two boys were, his eyes fastened upon five-year-old Michael, who had unknowingly cornered a rattlesnake. The rattlesnake was coiled and ready to strike. The father said firmly, "Mike, stand still." The boy froze in his tracks when he heard the command of his father. He obeyed instantly. His father then got a rifle and shot the snake. What do you suppose might have happened if it had been necessary for the father to say, "Mike, if you don’t stand still by the time I count to three, you’re going to be in a lot of trouble." His son’s life would have been in danger. There are times when our children’s very lives will be in danger unless they learn to obey instantly.

Our children will not respond to our voice the first time in a crisis unless they are accustomed to responding to it the first time under normal circumstances. Our children ought to know that we mean it the very first time that we say it, or they will never believe it until we count to three, say it twice, or raise our voice. Train your children to expect to obey the first time you say something and when you say it in a normal tone of voice. When they do not obey, correct them.

Bruce Ray, Withhold Not Correction
(Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company),
p. 103–104.

Recommended:

Spank a Child, Save a Life

Vincent Cheung, Preach the Word

Bruce Ray, Withhold Not Correction

Louis Paul Priolo, Teach Them Diligently

Tedd Tripp, Shepherding a Child’s Heart

John MacArthur, What The Bible Says About Parenting

Does the Bible Contain Paradox?

By W. Gary Crampton
© The Trinity Foundation

According to Kenneth S. Kantzer, editor of Christianity Today, there are two sorts of paradoxes: rhetorical and logical. The former is "a figure used to shed light on a topic by challenging the reason of another and thus startling him"(Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, edited by Walter A. Elwell, 826, 827; Robert L. Reymond, Preach The Word! 31, 32). The Bible clearly contains rhetorical paradox (compare Matthew 10:29; John 11:25,26; 2 Corinthians 6:9,10).

Logical paradoxes, however, are altogether different. Here we have a situation where an assertion (or two or three assertions) is self-contradictory, or at least seems to be so. One way or the other the assertion cannot possibly be reconciled before the bar of human reason. The hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in the one person of Jesus Christ, unconditional election and the free offer of the Gospel, and God’s sovereignty and man s responsibility, are examples set forth by the advocates of biblical (logical) paradox.

For example, Edwin H. Palmer in The Five Points of Calvinism refers to the doctrine of God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility as a "paradox" which the Calvinist affirms, "in the face of all logic" (85). Does God speak to us in such language? Is He the author of logical paradox? No, says the apostle Paul, "God is not the author of confusion" (1 Corinthians 14:33).

And yet, far too frequently such comments are heard within the camp of orthodox. J. I. Packer makes the statement that the Bible is full of such paradoxes (he refers to them as antinomies). Packer writes that these antinomies are "seemingly incompatible positions" that we must learn to live with. We are to "Refuse to regard the apparent inconsistency as real" (Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God, 18-21). Cornelius Van Til nods at this point as well. He goes so far as to say, "Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradictions in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical [i.e., there is no univocal point at which God’s knowledge is the same as man’s knowledge] and therefore must be paradoxical" (The Defense of the Faith, 44). Further, says Van Til, "All the truths of the Christian religion have of necessity the appearance of being contradictory" (Common Grace and the Gospel, 165).

These are incredible statements coming from such eminent orthodox scholars as Drs. Palmer, Packer, and Van Til; and yet, sadly, they are not all that unusual. How should we view logical paradox, as it is (supposedly) found in Scripture? According to Gordon Clark, the issue of biblical paradox is totally subjective. What may be paradoxical to one may not be to another (The Atonement, 32).

For example, Dr. Palmer’s paradox, noted above, regarding God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility, is no paradox at all to John Gerstner, who writes, "We do not see why it is impossible for God to predestinate an act to come to pass by means of the deliberate choice [i.e., human responsibility] of specific individuals" (A Predestination Primer, 26). Neither was it a paradox to the Westminster divines, who maintained that "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes [i.e., man’s responsibility] taken away, but rather established" (WCF, III, 1). This doctrine may be a "high mystery" (i.e., difficult to fully grasp), but it is in no way paradoxical (i.e., impossible to reconcile), says Westminster (III, 8). In fact, the doctrine is "to be handled with special prudence and care" by men as they seek "the will of God [as] revealed in His Word" (III, 8). This, of course, would not be possible with any doctrine that cannot be reconciled by the mind of man.

The present author agrees with Dr. Clark when he says that a Biblical paradox is nothing more than "a charley-horse between the ears that can be eliminated by rational massage." To insist on the existence of logical paradox in the Bible is to hold, at least implicitly, to a very low view of God’s infallible Word. (This statement is in no way meant as a slur on Drs. Palmer, Packer, and Van Til, all of whom hold to a high view of biblical inspiration.) For, as Clark elsewhere says, "dependence on…paradox…destroys both revelation and theology and leaves us in complete ignorance (The Philosophy of Gordon Clark, edited by Ronald Nash, 78).

Interestingly, the affirmation of biblical paradox is a major tenet of neo-orthodoxy, a theology which so revels in the existence of such paradox that it is called "The Theology of Paradox" (Kantzer, loc. cit.). Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, for example, both aver the existence of contradictions within the Bible (in neo-orthodoxy the Bible is not "the Word of God"; rather, it contains the Word of God). Barth claims that the Bible is at every instance nothing more than the vulnerable words of men, who were fallible and erring in their writings (Church Dogmatics, I: 2:507ff.). According to Barth, it is beneath the transcendent God to reveal Himself, in Christ, through lowly propositional statements. Thus, in the Bible we will encounter numerous paradoxical, contradictory statements.

Emil Brunner, another champion of neo-orthodoxy, concurs. Following Soren Kierkegaard, Brunner acknowledges that the Christian faith, the Bible, God’s revelation to man, and so forth, must all be viewed as paradoxical. Such being the case, the Bible is never to be considered as the infallible Word of God. It contains numerous contradictions, i.e., paradoxes (Robert L. Reymond, Brunner’s Dialectical Encounter, 88ff; Stewart Custer, Does Inspiration Demand Inerrancy? 76ff.). At this point, Brunner goes so far as to say that contradiction is the hallmark of religious truth (cited in John Gerstner, Jonathan Edwards: A Mini-Theology, 24). What kind of nonsense is this? Very scholarly nonsense.

Neo-orthodox theology, following on the heels of Immanuel Kant and the immanentistic theologians Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl, sought to erect a wall between a transcendent Deity and man (Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 17ff.) True knowledge of God is not possible; He is the "wholly other" (Barth). Moreover, maintains neo-orthodoxy, because propositional revelation is not possible, theological agnosticism results.

Understandably these teachings in the theological milieu led to a divorce between Christian truth (and faith) and reason. What we not all too frequently encounter is the result of what Nash calls "the religious revolt against logic" (ibid., 918.). While Augustine claimed that logic was divinely ordained (even an attribute of God), and thus to be trusted and used by man as God’s image bearer, neo-orthodoxy and much modern day evangelicalism deny that logic can be trusted.

Evangelical Donald Bloesch, for one, openly denies that there is a univocal point at which man’s logic and knowledge are the same as God’s. Due to this lack of a point of contact, paradox must exist in Scripture. Herman Dooyeweerd, and the majority of the Amsterdam Philosophy school, for another, have erected a "Boundary" between God, as Lawgiver, and man, as recipient The laws of logic exist only on man’s side of the Boundary. If this Dooyeweerdian Boundary truly existed, God could never reveal anything at all to His creatures, and man could never know anything about God, including the notion of the Boundary.

The truth of the matter is, however, that logic is an attribute of God himself. He is the God of truth (Psalm 31:5); Christ is truth (Wisdom, logic, reason, etc.) Incarnate (John 14:6; 1 Corinthians 1:24; Colossians 2:3). God is not the author of confusion (1Corinthians 14:33); thus, He cannot speak to us in illogical, paradoxical statements. Because logic is one of God’s attributes, the laws of logic are eternal principles. And because man is an image bearer of God, these laws are a part of man. There must be, then, a point of contact between God’s logic (and knowledge) and man’s.

Carl Henry writes, "The insistence on a logical gulf between human conceptions and God as the object of religious knowledge is erosive of knowledge and cannot escape a reduction to skepticism. Concepts that by definition are inadequate to the truth of God cannot be made to compensate for logical deficiency by appealing either to God’s omnipotence or to His grace. Nor will it do to call for a restructuring of logic in the interest of knowledge of God. Whoever calls for a higher logic must preserve the existing laws of logic to escape pleading the cause of illogical nonsense" (God, Revelation and Authority, III, 229).

According to Henry, the question being raised in orthodox circles about the Bible containing logical paradox about the great divorce between God’s logic and mere human logic, and so forth, is-the result of the dialectical epistemology of neo-orthodoxy (op. cit., 214ff.). Ronald Nash confirms what has already been noted above, "If there is absolutely no point of contact between the divine logic and so-called human logic, then what passes as human ‘preaching’ can never be valid." In other words, without this point of contact, man could never truly know anything at all (op. cit., 96).

The laws of logic, then, are essential for man to have knowledge. Apart from the law of contradiction, not both A and non-A, for example, Genesis 1:1 would be a meaningless proposition. "In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth" cannot at one and the same time mean, "In the beginning God did not create the Heavens and the Earth." Eliminate the law of contradiction as axiomatic, and one has eliminated the meaning of all Scripture.

Appeals to biblical passages such as Isaiah 55:3, 9, God’s thoughts and ways are above those of mankind, in order to contradict the position taken in this article, are specious. No orthodox Christian questions the quantitative difference in God’s knowledge, thoughts, ways, etc., and man’s. What is questioned is the qualitative difference. That is, the difference between God’s thoughts and man’s thoughts is one of degree, not of kind. Any exegesis of this passage that concludes that God’s thoughts are wholly other than man’s thoughts stumbles on the command for the wicked to forsake his thoughts and think as God does.

Writing on this subject, Gordon Clark says, "Of course, the Scripture says God’s thoughts are not our thoughts and His ways are not our ways. But is it good exegesis to say that this means His logic, His arithmetic, His truth are not ours? If this were so, what would the consequences be? It would mean not only that our additions and subtractions are all wrong, but also that all our thoughts, in history as well as in arithmetic, are all wrong." Not so, says Clark, "we must insist that truth is the same for God and man" (The Philosophy of Gordon Clark, 76).

What, then, are we to conclude about the alleged inclusion of logical paradox in the Bible? Enough has been said to show the serious problems raised with such a concept. But more needs to be said. Robert Reymond poses three insuperable obstacles that those averring such an errant view must deal with (Preach the Word, 30-31):

1) As noted above, the issue of what is and what is not a paradox is totally subjective. To universally claim that such and such a teaching is a paradox would thus require omniscience. How could any one know that this teaching had not been reconciled before the bar of someone’s human reason?

2) Even when one claims that the seeming contradiction is merely "apparent," there are serious problems. "[I]f actually non-contradictory truths can appear as contradictories and if no amount of study or reflection can remove the contradiction, there is no available means to distinguish between this ‘apparent’ contradiction and a real contradiction" (ibid.). How then would man know whether he is embracing an actual contradiction (which if found in the Bible [an impossibility; 1 Corinthians 14:33], would reduce the Scriptures to the same level as the contradictory Koran of Islam) or a seeming contradiction?

3) Once one asserts (with Barth and Brunner) that truth may come in the form of irreconcilable contradictions, then, "he has given up all possibility of ever detecting a real falsehood. Every time he rejects a proposition as false because it ‘contradicts’ the teaching of Scripture or because it is in some other way illogical, the proposition’s sponsor only needs to contend that it only appears to contradict Scripture or to be illogical, and that his proposition is one of the terms…of one more of those paradoxes which we have acknowledged have a legitimate place in our ‘little systems’" (ibid.). This being the case, Christianity’s uniqueness as the only true revealed religion will die the death of a thousand qualifications.

What is our conclusion? Simply this: The Bible does not contain logical paradox. Clark is correct; any so-called logical paradoxes found in Holy Scripture are little more than charley-horses between the ears that can be removed by rational massage; they are the result of faulty exegesis, not God’s Word. Any stumbling in this area will lead to (at least) a fall into neo-orthodox nonsense.