Scripture's teaching on submission to human authority is not limited to the civil government but to all human institutions (2:13), and the exception is also stated in general terms, that we must obey God rather than man when the two are in conflict (Acts 5:29). Therefore, the same principle applies to all situations in which we must deal with human authority, such as the relationships between parents and children, husbands and wives, and church leaders and church members.

This is a good place to say something about divine command ethics. This system of ethics affirms that right and wrong are defined by God and revealed to us through his commands. Thus we may affirm that it is immoral to commit murder just because God has said, "You shall not murder" (Exodus 20:13).

One philosopher notes, "The chief objection to the theory is that dependence on divine commands would make morality unacceptably arbitrary. According to divine command ethics, murder would not be wrong if God did not exist or existed but failed to forbid it." This statement summarizes the objection, and we cannot expect from it all the details that would be included in a philosophical treatise. However, since the objection is fundamentally indefensible and not just flawed in its details, my response will apply to any expression of the objection that is based on the above line of reasoning.

First, the objection fails to define "arbitrary." The word can refer to randomness or capriciousness on the one hand, but also absolute authority on the other. Then, it fails to explain why it is wrong for a system of ethics to be "arbitrary." If there is a problem with a system of ethics that is arbitrary in the former sense, why is there a problem with the latter sense?

Second, the objection already presupposes a system or standard of ethics other than divine command ethics, and by which it judges divine command ethics. Notice that it challenges divine command ethics based on whether this system would necessarily make murder wrong, when whether murder is wrong is precisely one of the questions that a system of ethics should answer.

Here it is assumed that murder is wrong and then a system is evaluated by the assumption. That is, a person who makes such an objection is not seeking a system to define right and wrong for him, but he is seeking a system to explain and justify what he already thinks. Therefore, as a challenge against divine command ethics, the objection begs the question.

This is a common error in arguments and discussions about ethics, so that if a system does not condemn murder by necessity, then for this reason alone it could be considered wrong. However, to reason this way, a person must first establish that murder is wrong, and once he has already done this, he already has his ethical system. Many believers also succumb to this faulty line of reasoning, and so they argue as many do, for example, that a religion that condones or even commands violence, such as Islam, must be a false religion. But this also begs the question.

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